The impact of regulation, governance, market power and diversification on bank performance and risk by Hu, Wentao
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
i 
 
  
The impact of Regulation, Governance, Market Power and Diversification on 
Bank Performance and Risk 
Wentao Hu 
 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Sussex 
July 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
  
 
Department of Finance 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
WORK NOT SUBMITTED ELSEWHERE FOR EXAMINATION 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been, and will not be, submitted in whole or in 
part to another University for the award of any other degree. 
Signature:……………………………………………………. 
 
iii 
 
  
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
WENTAO HU 
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
The impact of Regulation, Governance, Market Power, Diversification and 
Government Support on Commercial and Saving Bank Performance and Stability 
 
SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the impact of banking regulation, external governance and bank-
specific variables on commercial and savings bank performance, as estimated by 
efficiency and financial indicators, in the Asian market, between 2000 and 2012. 
Furthermore, the thesis analyses the effect of deposit diversification and insurance on the 
bank’s liquidity risk tolerance in G7 and BRICS countries. It further investigates the 
impact of expected government support on bank risk-taking in China.    
Firstly, we examine the impact of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) on bank performance 
in general, and in particular on how this impact can be moderated by the strict regulation 
of banking criteria and the quality of investor protection embedded in different 
institutional environments. We find that CRAs enhances bank performance. CRAs as the 
flexible governance power, their positive monitoring impact is further enhanced by the 
quality of investor protection but mitigated by the inflexible and strict banking regulations. 
Secondly, this research investigates the impact of market power and revenue 
diversification on bank performance and stability. We find that market power could not 
only improve banking performance, but also increase individual bank fragility in an 
iv 
 
  
emerging market. Although revenue diversification reduces bank efficiency, it improves 
individual stability.  
Thirdly, we study the relationship between liquidity risk, deposit diversification and 
insurance in 12 countries during the period 2005-2014. We capture liquidity risk by 
focusing on the unfunded loan commitments. We find that higher diversification in the 
deposit base can reduce the impact of liquidity demand risk during the crisis by decreasing 
the cost of funding, increasing the funding inflow, maintaining the total amount of loan 
lending and enhancing the liquid ratio. Additionally, the results suggest that although 
deposit insurance has a positive impact during the crisis, its effect cannot mitigate the 
liquidity demand risk.  
Fourthly, this research examines the impacts of expected government support on bank 
risk-taking behaviour, and in particular how its impact can be stronger in state-owned and 
large banks. We find that the willingness and capacity of government support enhance 
bank’s risk-taking behaviour through increasing non-performance loan as well as 
doubtful loan, and decreasing Z-score as well as liquid ratio. This moral hazard problems 
are further enhanced in state-owned banks and large banks.  
Finally, we outline our conclusions along with the limitations of this research and a plan 
for any future work.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In this thesis we investigate the effect of credit rating agency (CRA), banking regulation, 
investor protection and bank-specific characteristics on banking performance as well as 
bank stability, in emerging economies during the 2000-2012 period. In addition, we 
examine the impact of deposit diversification and insurance on bank liquidity risk over 
the 2005-2014 period, when a number of banks in G7 and BRICS countries utilized 
unfunded commitment loan to improve their liquidity. This line of credit may trigger a 
potential liquidity problem, especially during the recent global financial crisis. We also 
analyse whether implicit or expected government support could enhance bank risk-taking 
in China, where banking sector does not have explicit government support before 2016. 
As an introduction this section briefly discusses why it is important to analyse the 
determinant of bank performance as well as the stability of the banks in the emerging 
market by focusing on both the macro-level (i.e. regulation) and the micro-level (i.e. 
market power). It further shows why it exhibits a potential liquidity crisis for the banks 
and how this liquidity risk can be moderated. 
A well-developed financial market can contribute to an economy’s growth and 
development (Levine et al., 2000; Hassan et al., 2011), since the financial market is able 
to execute three important functions to promote growth enhancement. These functions 
are the following: i) The transmission of ex ante and ex post information about investment 
as well as capital allocation to investors (Ross, 1989), ii) Promoting saving and increasing 
the motives of capital operation contributes to balanced economic growth (Levine, 1997; 
Alfaro et al., 2004), iii) Providing liquidity to facilitate trading, diversification and 
management of risk (Arestis et al., 2001).  
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As a result of this, most of the function of the financial market described above are carried 
out by the banking industry. An effective banking sector is an essential in a well-
developed financial market that in turn promote economic growth (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006; Pascali, 2016). Banking is the most important financial intermediary in the 
economy by connecting surplus and deficit economic agents (Levine, 2005; Hasan et al., 
2009; Craig and Von Peter, 2014). Generally speaking, the bank has two function, such 
as primary and secondary functions (Ritter et al., 2009; Cassis et al., 2016). As Figure 1. 
shows, the primary functions include the basis of banking operations such as, acceptance 
of deposits (i.e. saving, fixed, current and recurring deposits) and granting advances (i.e. 
overdraft, cash credit, loans and discounting bills). While the second functions include 
agency functions (i.e. transfer of funds, portfolios management, periodic of payments and 
collections) and utility functions (i.e. drafts, underwriting, project reports and social 
welfare programmes).  
 
Figure 1. The functions of banks are briefly highlighted in the following Diagram. 
As banks among other financial institution carry out these important functions, it is 
natural to expect that if banks perform poorly, it would have a severely negative impact 
on the real economy. The recent international crisis is a good example of this (Dell'Ariccia 
et al., 2008; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). If banks are in a stressed financial position 
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and lose their credit availability as well as alchemy 1 , this negative effect is like a 
contagion spreading to the rest of the economy (Longstaff, 2010). Generally, this loss of 
credit availability can lead to a reduction in investment activity and in turn a decrease in 
economic growth and an increase in the unemployment rate. Particularly, in the case of 
Lehman Brothers, not only did this bank go into liquidation, but the impact was felt 
throughout the financial sector both in companies connected and unconnected with this 
bank (Fernando et al., 2012). Banks that co-syndicate credit lines with Lehman Brothers 
would be more vulnerable to drawdowns on these credit lines after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
The credit lines syndicate members would be exposed to additional drawdowns by the 
failure of Lehman, because the firm may be panicked into choosing to draw on these 
credit lines (Acharya and Mora, 2015). Other research (e.g. Chakrabaty and Zhang, 2012) 
also shows that companies that had business relationship with Lehman Brothers 
encountered severe damage, since they were exposed directly to credit risk. Consequently, 
those companies exposed to credit loss with Lehman can have a negative impact on the 
performance of other firms in the same industry, and this negative effect can be contagion 
across industries, as in the “butterfly effect” (Jorion and Zhang, 2009). Information of the 
unexpected default of a firm is shared across companies, and thus this information can 
lead a number of unassociated firms to perform abnormally (Bai et al., 2015). Therefore, 
the failure of a bank provides a negative signal to the individual investor, other related as 
well as unrelated companies, and may lead to underperformance, which is more likely to 
trigger financial panic in the market. As a result, the function of information transmission 
in the financial market will be damaged by the underperformance of a bank.  
The impact of banking crises can increase the probability of fragility in the financial 
market and destroy economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006). Previous research 
                                                          
1 The advantage of attracting deposit ((Acharya and Mora, 2015; King, 2016). 
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highlights the importance of banks for an economy, and suggests that the 
underperformance of the banking industry can lead to an increase of borrowing from the 
government, and experience a 1.6% greater contraction of GDP in growth as in the US 
(Kroszner et al., 2007). Furthermore, other literatures further indicate that the poor 
performance of a bank can lead to an increase in public debt and deficit (Lane, 2012), and 
execute fiscal burden sharing in the European Union (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011), and an 
increase of expectations of a future bailout as well as deposit insurance (Corsetti et al., 
1999). As the underperformance of the banking sector gives a signal to the financial 
market, investors lose their confidence and are more likely to withdraw their deposits 
early, and thus banks will face a shortage of savings and funding (Acharya and Mora, 2015). 
As a result, among the firms that depend heavily on outside financing, young firms with 
short histories and firms with a large proportion of hard-to-measure intangible assets, 
encounter particular difficulty raising funds from banks (Kroszner et al., 2007). This 
channel of credit contagion decreases savings and may eventually restricts the motives of 
the capital operation. The second function of the financial market will be deteriorated by 
the underperformance of the banking sector. Not only is the function of the financial 
market influenced by the pool performance of banks, the government’s function in the 
real economy is also obviously affected. As an increase in government debt (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011), can be seen as government intervention in the banking industry in the form 
of bank bailouts and recapitalization measures. In order to moderate the negative impact 
of a banking crisis, the costly government intervention has been employed to increase 
credit supply (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). However, this costly rescue operation will 
place greater burdens on the government accompanied by a steep reduction in tax revenue 
and an increase in spending to deal with any economic downturn (Roubini and Sachs, 
1989). Therefore, the increase in the government deficit caused by the direct cost of 
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policies to support the banking industry will reduce economic growth and even lead to 
unbalanced economic development.     
The onset of the 2007 to 2009 crisis was, in effect, a crisis of banks as liquidity providers 
(Acharya and Mora, 2015), which decreased the stability of the financial market 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2005; Brunnermeier, 2009). Banks have a natural strength in 
supplying liquidity to business through credit lines, so that they have no difficulty meeting 
the credit demands (Gatev and Strahan, 2006). However, after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, related and unrelated firms drew heavily on credit lines with the banks 
(Campello et al., 2011; Berrospide et al.,  2012)2. Banks honoured their ex ante promises 
and met this demand at the beginning while as the credit line availability decreased, the 
synchronized drawdowns such as deposit withdrawals and commitment drawdowns, 
drove banks to encounter financial stress. As a result, banks would not be treated as a safe 
haven because of tightened lending and runs on deposits. It is obvious that after the initial 
subprime shock, investors started to lose confidence in their ability to identify low- from 
high-risk banks; this leads to huge withdrawals from deposit accounts (Covitz et al., 2013). 
The ability of banks to diversify or spread the shock across corporations and depositors 
is disrupted (Acharya et al., 2013a). In particular, the banks with greater credit 
commitment and fewer core deposit inflows had difficulty to satisfy the liquidity demand. 
As a bank, the liquidity provider, lost its function, it would broke the fund chain to 
business, which drove firms facing a shortage of funds into bankruptcy. This negative 
impact from the banking crisis in 2008 was transmitted to the financial industries, then to 
the entity industry and trade by the conduction of capital inflowing. Since banking 
                                                          
2 They suggest that banks that co-syndicate credit lines with Lehman Brothers would be more vulnerable 
to drawdowns on these credit lines after Lehman’s bankruptcy. The credit lines syndicate members would 
be exposed to additional drawdowns by the failure of Lehman, because the firm may be panicked into 
choosing to draw on these credit lines. 
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liquidity is a good predictor of resource allocation, economic growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck and Levine, 
2004), the illiquidity of banking will damage the national economic activities. Therefore, 
if the liquidity of the banking sector is heavily deteriorated, the function of the financial 
market in providing liquidity to facilitate trading, diversification and management of risk 
would be disappear, and then the economy would go into recession.     
The impact of the underperformance of the banks would be significant in the emerging 
market, and G7 as well as BRICS countries, if the function of the banking sector is heavily 
damaged. In the emerging market, the underperformance of the banking industry is like 
a “time bomb” threatening an economy’s development and stability. This is because of 
the inconsistent creditability of banking in this market (Rojas-Suarez, 2002)3. Banks in 
an emerging market usually face large shocks to their supply of liquidity due to regime 
shifts, speculative bank runs, “hot money” flows and exchange rate volatility (Khwaja 
and Mian, 2008)4. This will severely damage the banks overall credit worthiness. Since 
most of the firms in an emerging market heavily rely on the cash inflows from the banking 
sector, the huge potential credit risk of a bank will further restrict economic growth. It is 
natural to expect that the underperformance of a bank, particularly a poor performance in 
a bank lending channel (i.e. bank liquidity shocks), may lead to economic recession in an 
emerging market (Peek and Rosengren, 2000), and may even transmit liquidity shock 
across economies (Schnabl, 2012).  While in the most sophisticated economies, such as 
G7 and BRICS countries, the banking industry can not only capture a large amount of the 
                                                          
3 Generally speaking, these two factors influence the creditability of banks in an emerging market: (1) 
severe deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework and (2) lack of liquid markets for bank 
shares, subordinated debt and other bank liabilities and assets needed to validate the “real” worth of a bank 
as opposed to its accounting value. 
4 The average standard deviation of the real cost of deposits is 1 6 percent in G7 countries but 12 9 percent 
in 25 major emerging markets, and the standard deviation of real demand deposit growth is 14 percent and 
24 percent, respectively. 
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revenue from total financial profit, but also provide a significant number of financial 
services, such as traditional (i.e. saving, lending, credit and transfer) and untraditional 
activities (i.e. underwriting, securitizing, sales and trading). Over the last two decades, 
these economies have been dramatically integrated with the international financial market 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). Not only the United States (US) and the United Kingdom 
(UK) have an advanced banking system closely connected with the global market, but 
also the banking system of European countries such as Germany and France (Hölzl, 2006), 
and BRICS countries (Zhang et al., 2013) is more relevant than in the past. Therefore, it 
is obvious that the financial market in these economies has greatly expended in both the 
domestic and the foreign market, and the performance of banks gradually played a leading 
role in their economic growth, since G7 and BRICS countries experienced financial 
integration over the last twenty years. These countries need banks to provide high quality 
financial services, create opportunities for employment, increase revenue and generate 
prosperity (Berger et al., 2004). International business in these economies also needs 
banks to supply liquidity and advice for them to carry out cross-border mergers, 
acquisition as well as greenfield-investment (Amihud et al., 2002). The banking industry 
in these economies also plays an important role as intermediary to issue new financial 
products in order to expand market, promote financial globalization and environment 
conditions i.e. regulation and governance (Mishkin, 2007). Therefore, because of the 
leading role of the bank in the emerging market, G7 as well as BRICS countries, and the 
huge impact of banking in the recent financial crisis, the investigation of determinants of 
the performance of the banking industry is great importance.     
This thesis initially focuses on the macro-level determinants that affect banking 
performance. We mainly analyse the impact of credit rating agencies, banking regulation 
and investor protection quality on bank performance. The main reason that interests us in 
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these factors is the limited existing literature on the determinant of credit rating agencies 
on bank performance, and the lack of any empirical study that considers the emerging 
market, and the lack of any consensus on banking regulation and the quality of investor 
protection. In addition, my thesis fills the gap that it may exist over-regulated banking 
sector in emerging market when the three macro-level factors jointly affect the industry. 
Different from those inflexible regulations, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), advocating 
for greater self-regulation, are an important and flexible private governance power in the 
banking industry (Ceuster & Masschelein, 2003). However, the negative role of CRAs in 
the global financial crisis (Bolton et al., 2012) and the unsatisfactory records (Rojas-
Suarez, 2002) raises concerns regarding the quality of the monitoring of CRAs, especially 
in an emerging market. As a result of the negative role of banks in recent financial crisis, 
the strengthening of banking regulations (i.e. Basel III) is back in the spotlight. The 
investigation into the impact of regulation on bank performance is important, and the 
existing literature neither considers the market discipline (CRAs) nor provides a 
consensus on this effect5. Moreover, an advanced institutional environment is essential in 
the financial market (Delis, 2012). This is because not only does this investor protection 
reduce the moral hazard and the adverse selection problem for the investor (Alan and 
Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015), but also provides a flexible private governance 
power in the banking industry (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). The first contribution of this 
                                                          
5 Previous papers (e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006a; Berger and Bouwman; 2013) suggest that 
banking regulation prevent banks from expanding their financial business, in order to weaken banking 
diversification of their investment portfolio. Thus, banks with more activity regulation may be exposed to 
less risk from external financial condition and capital markets. Bank supervisors can maintain the efficiency, 
integrity and transparency of the banking industry and then motivate bank management to provide high 
quality financial reports. However, others (Barth et al., 2002; VanHoose, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) 
indicate that banking performance and stability are influenced negatively by ACTR, because banks would 
like to engage in a broad range of activities to generate more funds. Furthermore, banks may be allowed to 
consolidate on the exploitation of economies of scale and scope by giving fewer regulatory restrictions.  
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thesis is to investigate the impact of various macro-level factors on banking performance 
in an emerging market.   
Additionally, this thesis also focuses on the micro-level determinants that affect bank 
performance and stability. We put emphasis on market power, revenue diversification and 
the unfunded commitment loan and their impact on bank efficiency, stability as well as 
liquidity. The main reason that interests us in these factors is a lack of consensus on the 
impact of the two strategies (market power and revenue diversification) particularly in an 
emerging market, and the lack of any empirical study that considers dynamic panel 
threshold values. The liquidity shock caused by credit commitment during the financial 
crisis, also motivates us to analyse the crisis of the bank as liquidity provider. In 
developed countries, market power drives banks earn monopoly rents and provides 
“capital buffer” to reduce the negative effect of the financial crisis (Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2007; Anginer et al., 2014a). Meanwhile, revenue diversification 
increases fee income and reduces revenue volatility (Lepetit et al., 2008). However, since 
many banks are state-owned enterprises an in emerging market (Firth et al., 2008), the 
impact of market power is more likely to differ from developed countries. It would induce 
banks to charge higher loan rates leading to greater default (Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014), 
and revenue diversification involving in security market rises in exposure to systemic 
shocks (De Jonghe, 2010), especially in the 2007 subprime crisis. As banks in an 
emerging market usually face severe shocks to performance as well as stability due to 
regime shifts, speculative bank runs, “hot money” flows and exchange rate volatility 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2008), it is important to analyse dynamic value changes by employing 
the model of Kremer et al. (2013). Moreover, the investigation on the impact of credit 
commitment on bank liquidity is also important, because this effect can dramatically 
influence the survival and effective-functioning of the banking industry in a financial 
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crunch (Acharya et al., 2013). If banks exposed to greater undrawn commitments are in 
a stressed financial condition, they would have to increase the interest rate, face low 
deposit inflow, reduce lending and suffer low liquid assets, which severely affects their 
survival (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Mora, 2010; Acharya et al., 2015). However, there 
are no research paper, which focuses on how to reduce the liquidity risk caused by credit 
commitment. The second contribution of this thesis is to analyse the impact of various 
micro-level factors on the banking performance including a period of economic downturn.  
From a methodological point of view, this thesis employs the dynamic threshold 
methodology as recently developed by (Kremer et al., 2013). This economic technique 
enables the data employed in this thesis to show when the financial crisis took place, and 
could identify the possible coefficient changes on the independent variables. This 
dynamic panel threshold methodology covers a long period of time including both 
tranquil and turbulent periods, and analyses the presence of possible threshold-effects of 
bank determinants with respect to bank performance and stability. This methodology 
investigates the change of the economic condition through changes in the number of 
banks that belong to each threshold regime. For measuring bank performance, except the 
financial indicator, we opt for cost inefficiency in chapter 1 and 2. There has been an 
extensive of banking studies analysing bank performance by using the frontier efficiency 
estimations (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Feng and Zhang, 
2012; Goddard et al., 2014; Mamatzakis et al., 2015; Silva et al., 2016). The usage of cost 
efficiency, in chapter 1, is based on the ground that the macro-level variables (CRAs, 
bank regulation and investor protection) are linked particularly with cost efficiency, and 
thus would enable us to capture adequately relationships between them and bank 
performance. In chapter 2 of this thesis, we employ frontier efficiency estimation to 
investigate the impact of market power and revenue diversification on bank performance. 
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Besides, in light of  the exiting literature (Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Jiang et al., 2013; 
Luo et al., 2016), we consider the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, which allows for 
measurement of inefficiency from the best-practice frontier in a single-step estimation 
that incorporates other factors including country- and bank-specific variables to influence 
directly the mean inefficiency of banks. We focus on the measures of the banking market 
competition by estimating the Lerner index as our main indicator. A number of studies to 
date have provided consistent estimates of the Lerner index across countries in Europe 
(Beck et al., 2013b; Jiménez et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2014). In chapter 2, we primarily 
measure bank risk using the z-score of each bank, which equals the return on assets plus 
the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013a; Fratzscher et al., 2016; Ahamed and Mallick, 2017). 
The third contribution of this thesis is that it estimates bank efficiency and examines the 
determinants of bank performance through employing recent methodology.   
This thesis is structured into six chapters. The following chapter, Chapter 2, analyses the 
impact of CRAs, banking regulation and investor protection on bank performance in the 
emerging market (11 Asian countries), during the period 2000-2014. We collect our bank 
data from BankScope. By using the bank-specific data (including input, output and netput 
indicators) from BankScope, we estimate the cost inefficiency scores employing a 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which has been broadly used in previous literature 
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Feng and Zhang, 2012; 
Goddard et al., 2014; Mamatzakis et al., 2015; Silva et al., 2016). Credit Rating Scores 
are collected from Thomsen Reuters Eikon. We focus on long-term ratings from three 
dominating CRAs including Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). We 
therefore construct our key explanatory variable Credit Ratings (CR) as a truncated 
variable, equal to the average scores issued by these three CRAs during a given year. For 
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measuring bank regulation, we focus on the restriction activities, capital requirement, 
supervisory power and private monitoring by following Basel II three pillars. The bank 
regulation data updated by Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2012) is in the Word Bank database. 
For measuring investor protection quality, we focus on four institutional environment 
factors (governance effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of 
corruption). These data are derived from the World Bank database. Macroeconomic data 
are obtained from the World Development Indicators. For examining the determinants of 
bank performance, we use the cost inefficiency scores in fixed panel models, dynamic 
panel models (AB-GMM, IV-GMM) and two-stage IV models. Additionally, we further 
analyse the impact of a credit rating downgrade and update on bank performance.  
The next chapter, chapter 3, shows a comprehensive empirical analysis of the impact of 
market power and revenue diversification on the bank performance in an emerging market 
during the period 2000-2012. The bank-specific data are collected from Bankscope and 
Thomson one banker. We employ frontier efficiency estimation to measure performance, 
and use the Battese and Coelli (1995) model to analyse the determinant of bank 
performance in a single-step as robustness tests. We use the cost inefficiency scores in 
fixed panel models. Dynamic panel models (AB-GMM) and two-stage IV models are also 
employed in this charter, in order to investigate further endogeneity issues between 
market power, revenue diversification, and bank inefficiency as well z-score. We focus 
on the measures of banking market competition by estimating the Lerner index as our 
main indicator, and measure bank risk using the z-score of each bank. We also employ 
the dynamic panel threshold model that enables us to estimate the presence of possible 
threshold-effects of the two main variables (market power and revenue diversification). 
The strength of using this methodology in this chapter is to capture the possible change 
of the number of banks that fall with each regime that would imply transformations in the 
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strategies of market power and revenue diversification of banks. In addition, the bank 
regulation and institutional environment that influence the banking integration process in 
an emerging market over the last two decades are considered in the model.  
The following chapter, chapter 4, provides an empirical analysis on the effect of an 
unfunded loan commitment on the liquidity risk of a bank in G7 and BRICS countries 
over the 2005-2014 period. According to Berger and Bouwman’s (2013)6  study, we 
suggest that the period between 2008 and 2009 is a crisis, and other years are normal 
periods because of the yearly data in our database. We collect financial data from various 
sources including primarily 10-K and 20-F annual reports of SEC’s from Bloomberg, 
Thomson one and BankScope database. We use annual data in order to capture the long-
term effect of undrawn credit commitment on bank liquidity risk. Financial data are used 
to estimate the individual level of liquidity risk, interest rate, deposit inflows, lending 
amount and liquid ratio for each bank, and regress these indicators and other bank-specific 
and country-level variables using both fixed effect and dynamic panel models. We capture 
whether the impact of liquidity risk measured by unfunded commitment can be moderated 
by deposit diversification and insurance on the following factors: i) interest rate; ii) 
deposit inflows; iii) lending amounts; iv) liquid ratio during the crisis (2008-2009). In 
addition, we consider the impact of borrowing from government and others on the 
liquidity risk as robustness tests, and compare the “moral hazard effect” of deposit 
insurance and the “stabilization effect” on liquidity risk. 
Chapter 5, shows an empirical analysis on the impact of expected government support on 
bank risk-taking in China from 2010 to 2016. In chapter 4, we find that the explicit 
government support triggers the “moral hazard” problem, but the impact of government 
                                                          
6 They suggest that the recent subprime lending crisis occurred between 2007-Q3 and 2009-Q4.  
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support on bank risk-taking behaviour is ambiguous in the countries without explicit 
guarantee. Therefore, we analyse whether the implicit (expected) government support 
could trigger moral hazard problem in China. We collect financial data from various 
sources including from the Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Eikon and BankScope database. 
We measure expected government support using bank-specific ratings information from 
Moody’s. According to the studies (e.g. Gropp et al., 2011; Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 
2014; Correa et al., 2014), we employ a proxy which is the difference between the bank 
all-in rating and stand-alone rating, to reflect the capacity and willingness of government 
support. We capture the risk-taking behaviour of the following factors: i) non-
performance loan ratio; ii) Z-score; iii) doubtful loan ratio; iv) liquid ratio. 
Finally, in chapter 6 we show a summary of the contribution of this thesis and present 
some policy implications. We also discuss the limitations of this research and thoughts 
for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
  
Chapter 2: Credit rating agencies and bank performance in 
emerging economies: the effects of credit rating, bank 
regulation and investor protection standards 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Regulations and supervisions in the banking industry are complex and the costs of 
understanding and then complying with these rules are extremely high (Marsh & Norman, 
2015). Different from those inflexible regulations, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), 
advocating for greater self-regulation, are an important and flexible private governance 
power in the banking industry (Ceuster & Masschelein, 2003). CRAs’ importance in 
monitoring banks by addressing the issues related to high complexity and serious 
information asymmetry problems in the industry has been highlighted when Basel II set 
minimum capital requirements for credit, market, and operational risks. Basel II requires 
banks to assess these risks using either an “internal ratings based approach” (IRB) or a 
“standardized approach”. If a bank elects to use the standardized approach, Basel II allows 
it to rely on CRA ratings instead of assessing risks itself using IRB. Despite some large 
banks will elect to use the internal ratings based approach, the vast majority of banks, 
especially those in less-developed countries are expected to adopt the simpler 
standardized approach using CRA ratings where institutional environments for investor 
protection are weak.  
However, the negative role of CRAs in the global financial crisis (Bolton et al., 2012) and 
the unsatisfactory records of the rating agencies in banking problems in emerging markets 
(Rojas-Suarez, 2002) raises concerns of CRAs on their monitoring quality in the banking 
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industry, especially in emerging markets. Also the objective of CRAs, by providing 
investors with an adequate measurement of the risks involved in banks, may not be in line 
with that of policy makers’ objectives which are to minimize the costs associated with 
existing financial-markets safety nets (Rojas-Suarez, 2002). It is not clear yet, how CRAs 
affect bank performance in emerging markets in general and in particular, how the CRAs, 
as the flexible private monitoring force in the market, interact with inflexible strict bank 
regulations as well as investor protection standards embodied in different institutional 
environments. Our research addresses these gaps in the literature and has implications for 
policymakers in understanding the monitoring properties of CRAs and the overall 
benefits and costs of the bundle of monitoring and discipline mechanisms related to CRAs, 
bank regulations and investor protection in the unique banking industry from emerging 
economies.  
We argue that CRAs represent an independent and effective monitoring and discipline 
power for their rated banks in many emerging economies. Thus CRAs, by issuing their 
credit ratings, should be able to contribute their sophisticated insights to investors. Thus 
better informed investors should be able to mitigate agency problems between managers 
and shareholders (AP1), as well as between managers and debtholders (AP2), and reduce 
the overall cost of equity and debt capital (Bayoumi et al., 1995; Easley & O’Hara, 2004), 
which ultimately enhances a banking efficiency. The benefits of CRAs as the effective 
and flexible private governance enforcers should be further enhanced by high investor 
protection standards embedded in different institutional environments, which aim to 
protect shareholders and debtholders. Given the potential conflicts between shareholders’ 
efficiency goals and regulators/societies/debt holders’ safety goals, the interaction 
between CRAs and bank regulation reveals such conflicts, weakening the cost efficiency 
benefits of CRAs.  
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We contribute to bank governance literature in a few important ways. First, the majority 
of previous papers focus on the role of external credit ratings in different financial 
instruments such as corporate bonds (Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010, White, 2010), 
sovereign bonds (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Acharya et al., 2014), debt (Asquith, 
2005) and loans (Hasan et al., 2014) and stock markets (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). We 
focus on the credit ratings assigned to an individual bank and extend previous literature 
by focusing the monitoring impact of CRAs on bank performance.  
Second, previous research using an isolated monitoring and discipline perspective to 
examine the impacts of bank regulation (e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006b; 
Pasiouras, 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Berger & Bouwman; 2013), or institutional 
environment (e.g. Dietsch &Lozano-Vivas 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008; Houston et 
al., 2011; Delis, 2012) on bank performance. Such an isolated approach generates mixed 
results and fails to understand what kind of transmission mechanism helps to realize the 
impact of these industry level or market level factors in affecting bank-level efficiency, 
and how different aspects of the monitoring and discipline system work together as a 
bundle to influence bank performance (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Bruno and 
Claessens, 2010; Aslan and Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). By investigating 
the interaction between CRAs and bank regulation, as well as between CRAs and investor 
protection embodied in different institutional environments, we not only enhance our 
understanding of the specific transmission mechanism related to CRAs which helps to 
realize the impact of bank regulations and investor protections on bank performance. Also 
we extend previous literature on the impact of a bundle of governance mechanisms on 
corporate industries (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Bruno and Claessens, 2010; Aslan 
and Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Zattoni., 2015) into this unique banking industry. From a 
wider governance perspective, we contribute to our understanding on too much regulation 
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and how this may not represent optimal public policy for bank performance (Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). 
Third, effectiveness of governance mechanisms may vary across different institutional 
environments (Aslan and Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). We extend previous 
research, focusing on advanced economies such as the U.S. and U.K., to emerging 
economies with different institutional environments. In this paper, we focus on 11 South-
East Asian countries where bank regulations and investor protection quality embedded in 
their institutional environments are much weaker than in advanced economies.  
The rest of this paper is structured along the following lines. Section 2.2 provides 
literature review. Section 2.3 provides our paper hypotheses. Section 2.4 presents the 
explanatory variables used to investigate the relationship, and discusses the methods used 
to estimate bank efficiency and to examine the relationship between regulations, bank 
performance and institutions. Section 2.5 analyses the empirical results. Section 2.6 
contains the conclusions.  
2.2 Literature review 
The previous papers (e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006a; Pasiouras, 2008; Pasiouras 
et al., 2009; Berger and Bouwman; 2013) indicate that banking regulation could have a 
positive impact on banking operation. They suggest that less regulatory restrictions may 
lead to moral hazard problems so that managers are willing to exchange private 
information and conduct insider transactions. These regulations restrict banks expanding 
their financial business in order to weaken banking diversification of their investment 
portfolio, and thus banks with more activity regulation may be exposed to less risk from 
external financial condition and capital markets. Capital requirement helps small banks 
to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking 
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crises, market crises, and normal times). Most importantly, capital enhances the 
performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. They also 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between SPR and bank technical efficiency. 
Bank supervisors can maintain the efficiency, integrity and transparency of the banking 
industry and then motivate bank management to provide high quality financial reports. In 
the absence of market discipline mechanisms, managers of firms with more market power 
may be allowed to pursue their own objectives, thus causing firms’ profitability to decline. 
PMON may establish disclosure requirements for banks, and then allow private agents to 
assess banking information and transaction costs that could enhance the profitability and 
productivity of banks. Private monitoring could enhance transparency of banks, through 
asking banks to disclose information to the private sector and weaken the degree of 
corruption. However, other literature (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Barth et al., 2002; 
VanHoose, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) argues that the relationship could not play 
an effective role in supervising bank performance. Moreover, they also indicate that there 
is no evidence that regulation can prevent banking crises. They indicate that banking 
performance and stability are influenced negatively by ACTR, because banks would like 
to engage in a broad range of activities to generate more funds. Furthermore, banks may 
be allowed to consolidate on the exploitation of economies of scale and scope by 
implementing fewer regulatory restrictions. For the capital requirement, it will have an 
impact on the decision of banks in allocating their asset portfolios. Moreover, it also 
affects the decision of banks when attracting their sources of funds and large requirements 
may generate costs or opportunity costs to banks. Implementing capital restrictions will 
influence banks to expand services and profitability by restricting sources of funds. They 
also find that there is not a strong association between banking-sector development, 
performance, and official SPR. The presence of more powerful government supervisors 
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is linked to higher levels of nonperforming loans and the former could be harmful to the 
banking-sector development in countries with closed political systems. Private 
monitoring (PMON) harms managerial initiative and reduces manager incentives to 
improve bank performance. 
The previous literatures (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008; 
Houston et al., 2011; Delis, 2012) has suggested that a bank working in a better 
institutional environment may face less risk of financial crunch, and even the probability 
of any moral hazard may be reduced. They indicate that institutional factors, such as low 
corruption and the high quality of the rule of law, which are prerequisites for embarking 
on financial reforms, can improve transparency. Financial fragility may be decreased in 
a country associated with a high quality institutional environment. Significant reform 
efforts were directly improved by legislation related to the banking industry. Financial 
reform should be based on a good regulatory and institutional environment. Reform could 
enhance corporate governance and operational efficiency, and establish a sound 
supervision mechanism. Better institutional quality at the country level decreases the 
probability of a country experiencing banking crises. Institutional variables such as 
governance effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality, can 
be treated as country-level regulation. 
 
2.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
The agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control is perhaps the 
defining feature of modern finance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the banking industry, 
besides the traditional agency problems between management and shareholders (AP1), 
there are two additional agency conflicts existing among management, shareholders and 
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debtholders (AP2), and among management, shareholders and financial 
regulators/society (AP3) (Thanassoulis and Tanaka, 2016). Regarding AP2, the bank 
executives may take excessive risks at the expense of the debtholders, and ultimately 
lower the shareholders’ value as costs of borrowing rise (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Hasan et al., 2014; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). Debt market monitoring over bank 
management may be compromised given the high information asymmetries and its failure 
in appropriately pricing risk (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Manso, 2013). Regarding AP3, the 
so called too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem, the presence of explicit deposit insurance and 
the implicit possibility of government bailouts can induce management to take excessive 
risks at the expense of taxpayers (or the deposit insurance fund), even if the shareholders 
and debtholders effectively monitor bank managers (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010; 
Thanassoulis and Tanaka, 2016).  
Credit rating agencies serve as gatekeepers to capital markets by providing opinions via 
their credit rating scores on the creditworthiness of entities and their financial obligations 
and reducing informational asymmetries for shareholders, debtholders as well as 
regulators (Xia 2014; Becker & Milbourn, 2011; Aslan and Kumar, 2014). CRAs, as the 
sophisticated information collectors and processors, by contributing their superior 
insights to the market, help shareholders, debtholders as well as regulators become better 
informed on the intrinsic default risk in the rated banks, improve the effectiveness of 
existing corporate governance mechanisms (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006) and the 
discipline effects from stock markets (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Zhang et al., 2015); bond 
markets (Edmans and Liu, 2011), as well as regulators (Thanassoulis and Tanaka, 2016). 
These should ultimately mitigate all types of agency problems (AP1, AP2 and AP3) in 
banks (Manso, 2013) by promoting more managerial efforts to improve bank operational 
efficiency (Bernardo et al., 2004; Garmaise and Natividad, 2010) and mitigate their 
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excessive risk taking (Thanassoulis and Tanaka, 2016). On the other hand, a good credit 
rating outcome can also reduce the cost of loans (Hasan, 2014; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010) 
and improve bank capital structure (Kisgen, 2006), which ultimately increases liquidity 
(Ericsson and Renault, 2006), enhances bank leading capabilities and helps banks realize 
the benefits of economies of scale to improve bank performance (Jones, 2000).  
However, there are concerns with the CRA monitoring and discipline role on bank 
management (Bolton et al., 2012). Since rating agencies get paid from borrowers, they 
are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to 
downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists, especially in 
the global financial crisis (Bolton et al., 2012). Their credit rating records are particularly 
unsatisfactory in revealing banking problems in emerging markets (Rojas-Suarez, 2002).  
Thus, the net impact of CRAs in monitoring and disciplining bank management becomes 
ultimately an empirical question. Frost (2007) and Manso (2013) argue that the criticism 
of credit quality deterioration may not be dominating, compared with the benefits of credit 
ratings as the private flexible monitoring enforcement for investors, debt holders, as well 
as regulators to mitigate all three types of agency problems in banks. This is especially 
true when the independence of CRAs can be strengthened in many emerging markets 
because of the foreign nature of three dominating credit rating players (Fitch Ratings, 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P)). Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows:      
Hypothesis 1: Credit rating agencies improve bank performance in emerging markets.  
 
2.3.1 The interaction between credit ratings and investor protection quality  
Previous research on institutional environments has documented that strong investor 
protection quality embedded in them can improve firm performance (Alan and Kumar, 
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2014; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). The investor protection quality has four main indexes, 
which are governance effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory 
quality. Governance effectiveness can be treated as an indicator to solve the principal-
agency problem (Williams and Nguyen, 2005) and it could reduce the possibility of a 
moral hazard problem. For the rule of law, this is one of the most important factors in 
corporate governance and better corporate governance is highly correlated with better 
operating performance (Klapper and Love, 2004). Furthermore, controlling shareholders 
have more incentives to expropriate the benefit from minority shareholders when they 
invest in a country with a weaker rule of law. Control of corruption can increase the 
transparency of a banking operation (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006a). 
Additionally, regulatory quality in terms of more financial transparency is positively 
associated with banking disclosure (Barth et al., 2013).  
However, there is not much research explicitly analyzing the relationship between 
investor protection quality and bank efficiency in emerging markets in general (Carbo et 
al. 2009). In theory, strong investor protection embedded in institutional environments by 
giving strong power to shareholders and debtholders, should mitigate AP1 and AP2 in the 
banking industry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, it is not clear yet on the specific 
transmission mechanism to realize the benefits of strong investor protection in the unique 
banking industry (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008; Schaeck et al., 2009; Delis, 2012；Barth 
et al., 2001; 2006, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012; Haw et al., 2010). Here we focus 
on CRAs as the specific transmission mechanism.   
The foreign liability of CRAs by affecting their capabilities in processing information and 
evaluating banks’ performance (Bell et al., 2012) can eventually affect their monitoring 
and discipline impacts on bank management. Strong investor protection by enhancing the 
information environment and transparency of banking operations (Alan and Kumar, 2014; 
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Kumar and Zattoni, 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; Delis, 2012; Beck et al., 2006b; 
Barth et al., 2013) should mitigate foreign liability of credit rating agencies (Bell et al., 
2012) so that enhances their capabilities in effectively evaluating bank performance for 
investors and regulators. Therefore, credit rating agencies, as the independent 
enforcement power to assess their rated bank’s creditworthiness and their financial 
obligations and contribute their superior insights to the market, should positively interact 
with strong investor protections and ultimately realize the benefits of strong investor 
protection quality by mitigating all types of agency problems and enhancing bank 
efficiency. Therefore, our hypothesis 2 is as follows:   
Hypothesis 2: Credit rating agencies enhance bank performance more when there are 
stronger investor protections embedded in the institutional environments in emerging 
markets.       
 
2.3.2 The interaction between credit rating agencies and bank regulation 
Bank regulations are expected by policy makers to be an effective tool in guaranteeing 
the soundness of the financial system (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 2008; Houston et al., 2011; Delis, 2012). By restricting bank activities from 
securities underwriting, real estate investment and insurance underwriting, bank 
regulations mitigate the potential conflicts of interest between these activities and their 
fundamental banking business (Barth et al., 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Barth et 
al., 2001; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012). These can secure bank 
stability (Barth et al., 2004; Haw et al., 2010) and avoid market crises (Barth et al., 2004; 
Pasiouras et al., 2009). But their impact on banking performance is mixed (Beck et al., 
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2006b; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Barth et al., 2002; VanHoose, 
2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Delis et al., 2011).  
The objective of policy makers to minimize the costs associated with existing financial-
markets safety nets (Rojas-Suarez, 2002) may come at a cost of bank performance 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2001; Barth et al., 2002; VanHoose, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2008). Particularly, strict restrictive capital requirements may improve bank soundness 
(Kim et al., 2005; Pasiouras et al., 2009), i.e., mitigating AP3 and AP2, but damage bank 
lending capabilities (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; VanHoose, 2007), i.e., stimulating AP1. 
Previous research focusing on the nonbanking sector has highlighted the costs of over-
regulation in damaging managerial incentives to exert effort to search for profitable 
investment projects, and deliver performance (e.g. Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; 
Bruno and Claessens, 2010; Zhang, 2007). Especially, regulations in the banking industry 
are complex, and the costs of understanding and then complying with these rules are 
extremely high (Marsh & Norman, 2015). Such high costs of compliance can damage 
bank competition advantages and thus lead to lower credit ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006). 
Inflexible bank regulations can even stimulate more AP1 agency problems which lead to 
managerial opportunistic incentives to inappropriately assess operational risk and mislead 
outsiders via poor and distorted disclosure (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). This can 
therefore cause adverse selection problems for CRAs to assess and evaluate bank 
performance for investors and ultimately enhance costs of borrowing and damage bank 
performance. 
Overall, the objective of CRAs to provide investors with an adequate measurement of the 
risks involved in banks, may not be in line with policy makers’ objectives which are to 
minimize the costs associated with existing financial-markets safety nets (Rojas-Suarez, 
2002). Thus, when such a flexible private enforcement mechanism operates together with 
26 
 
  
an inflexible and strict bank regulation system, CRAs’ benefits in enhancing bank 
performance for shareholders can be offset, resulting in the mitigation ofAP3 and AP2 at 
the costs of AP1 and concerns of over-regulation (Marsh & Norman, 2015). Therefore, 
our third hypothesis is as follows:   
Hypothesis 3: Credit rating agencies enhance bank performance less when bank 
regulations are stricter in emerging markets. 
 
2. 4 Data and Methodology 
We focus our empirical analysis on all commercial and savings banks listed on stock 
exchanges from 11 South-East Asian countries including Australia, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, for 
the period from 2000 to 2012. We collect our bank data from BankScope. Credit Rating 
Scores are collected from Thomsen Reuters Eikon, and investor protection quality data 
from the World Bank database. Macroeconomic data are obtained from World 
Development Indicators. After removing observations with missing variables, we have 
an unbalanced panel dataset with 2,398 observations including 389 commercial and 
savings banks. 
 
2. 4.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the empirical analyses is bank cost inefficiency. A key 
advantage of the cost efficiency index is that it considers worth, costs, or benefits of a 
bank at the same time (Shaban and James, 2017), and make the estimates less exposed to 
the influence of random events and measurement errors (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). 
Previous studies estimating the efficiency of banks (Brissimis et al., 2008; Delis et al., 
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2011) use the technical efficiency measurement. We use the cost efficiency measurement 
because it is a wider concept than technical efficiency, referring to both technical and 
allocative efficiency (Pasiouras et al. 2009). Empirically, when analyzing bank cost 
inefficiency, we opt for stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) rather than data envelop 
analysis (DEA), following Barth et al. (2002), Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2008). The SFA method is better than the DEA approach because it simultaneously 
accounts for relevant inputs and outputs of a bank, as well as for differences in the input 
prices, which allows us to distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic shocks 
in the estimation of efficiency scores (Pasiouras et al., 2009).  The SFA approach, by 
incorporating both error and inefficiency in a composite error term, allows us to estimate 
a global frontier while accounting for cross- country differences (Aigner et al., 1977). 
More specifically, the model for examining the cost efficiency frontier is as follows:  
ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑄𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡              𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇        (1) 
Where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 the total cost for bank 𝑖 at year 𝑡; 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of inputs; 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 denotes a vector 
of values of outputs, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of fixed netputs while 𝑍𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of control 
variable. The term 𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is symmetric error and represents that management of a bank 
cannot deal with this random fluctuation. 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 captures the effects of inefficiency relative 
to the stochastic cost frontier; it is assumed to be independently distributed on one-side, 
meaning that this effect has the potential to enhance the cost of banks over the best-
practice level.  
We use the translog specification that results in an empirical cost frontier model:     
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ln 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ln 𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑖
ln 𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜉𝑖,𝑗 ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ln 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜀𝑖
𝑖
ln 𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                    (2)  
In terms of the cost frontier model, we not only impose the restrictions of standard linear 
homogeneity and symmetry, we also consider the time and country effects. As mentioned 
above, concerning the specification of the efficiency frontier, we decide the bank’s total 
cost (𝐶) , which is calculated as a total expense (non-interest expenses plus interest 
expenses), as the dependent variable. Following Sealey and Lindley (1997), we choose 
two outputs, which include loans (net of provisions, 𝑄1 ) and other earning assets 
(government securities, bonds, investment, CDs and T-bills, 𝑄2). Furthermore, consistent 
with previous studies of bank efficiency, we select the following two inputs: price of 
labour (𝑃1), calculated as the ratio of personnel expense to total assets; price of financial 
capital (𝑃2), calculated as total interest expense to total interest bearing borrowed funds. 
It can be seen that equity is an alternative funding for a bank and has the potential of 
affecting the bank’s cost. Following Berger and Mester (1997), we use the equity of each 
bank in the model as a fixed netput (𝑁) to control for differences in risk preference. 
Analysing the efficiency frontier in a cross-country sample, it is crucial to control 
variables that can capture country-level heterogeneity so GDP per capita is chosen as an 
indicator of the dynamism of each economy.  
In order to avoid heterogeneous error, we estimate the bank cost inefficiency (BCIE) 
separately in the advanced countries group and the developing countries group. Advanced 
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countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, Japan and Singapore, and others are in 
developing countries group. The inefficiency scores using the cost efficiency frontier 
model are summarised in Table 1 by country in Panel A and by year in Panel B 
accordingly. The full sample overall mean BCIE score equals 0.252, which means on 
average a bank in our sample needs to improve by 25.2% to achieve its full cost-efficiency. 
Banks in China are the best performers with inefficiency scores at about 0.201, in line 
with the results from Berger et al. (2009a). Banks in the Australia are the second best 
performers with scores around 0.212. Banks in Japan and Singapore have the largest cost 
inefficiency levels, with scores of 0.268 and 0.259 respectively, in line with the results 
from Drake et al. (2009).  Japan and Singapore, which are well-developed, are prone to 
establishing investment banks to stimulate their economic evolution and thus their 
savings and commercial banks may not receive enough attention in terms of efficiency 
maximization. Our results show that Sri Lanka and India have inefficiency scores 0.231 
and 0.251 respectively, in line with Sathye (2003). Compared with the results from Perera 
et al.’s (2007) study focussing on Sri Lankan and Indian banks before 2004, our results 
show there is significant bank efficiency improvement in these two countries after 2004.  
Table 1, Panel B shows that banks on average have the worst performance in 2003 in 
South-East Asian countries during the period of 2000-2012, which is similar to the result 
of Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009). This reflects that Asian bank industries struggled 
to improve their low efficiency before the entry of foreign banks (Park and Weber 2006). 
Table 1 Panel B also shows that on average, banks in South-East Asian countries have 
better performance in the post- 2007-2008 financial crisis period than the pre financial 
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crisis period such as year 2006. This shows the impacts of enhanced attention on 
improving bank efficiency after the financial crisis in Asia (Campello et al. 2010)7. 
Table 1A shows the Chi-square test for Inefficiency. The result indicates Inefficiency 
scores are homogeneous, as the P-values are higher than 5 percentage. This is because 
that when we estimate the bank inefficiency (IE) separately in the advanced countries 
group and the developing countries group.  
 
Table 1                  Bank cost inefficiency (BCIE) estimates 
Panel A  By Country  
N Mean             Min           Max 
Advanced countries     
Australia  
 
121 0.212 0.092 0.391 
Hong Kong China 148 0.220 0.054 0.552 
Japan  111 0.268 0.029 0.817 
Singapore 59 0.259 0.047 0.501 
Developing countries     
India 
 
531 0.251 0.055 0.707 
Indonesia 437 0.249 0.055 0.667 
China 
 
464 0.201 0.062 0.613 
Sri Lanka 
 
31 0.231 0.092 0.325 
Malaysia 
 
63 0.257 0.060 0.455 
Philippines 214 0.231 0.064 0.543 
Thailand 
 
222 0.255 0.052 0.682 
Panel B By year     
2000  50 0.200 0.060 0.407 
2001  74 0.303 0.155 0.447 
2002  80 0.306 0.135 0.409 
2003  95 0.250 0.117 0.817 
2004  130 0.213 0.092 0.469 
2005  165 0.220 0.029 0.347 
2006  196 0.251 0.103 0.467 
2007  207 0.244 0.092 0.635 
2008  223 0.239 0.070 0.411 
2009  246 0.207 0.066 0.490 
2010  273 0.198 0.061 0.278 
2011  331 0.225 0.067 0.257 
2012  328 0.230 0.073 0.291 
Average  2398 0.252 0.029 0.817  
                                                          
7 Campello et al. (2010) indicated that firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital 
spending during the financial crisis in the US, Europe and Asia. 
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Table 1A 
Chi-square test for Inefficiency  
Variables IE 
T-test 1.387 
P-value 0.172 
Advanced 439 
Developing 1959 
Number 2398 
Notes: 95% Conf. Interval 
 
2.4.2 The Explanatory Variables 
We have hypothesized that bank efficiency is related to credit rating scores. A credit 
rating is an evaluation of the credit risk of a prospective debtor (a bank), predicting their 
ability to pay back the debt, and an implicit forecast of the likelihood of the debtor 
defaulting. A rating expresses the likelihood that the rated party will go into default, 
within a given time-horizon: 1 year (short-term) or above (long-term). We focus on long-
term ratings from three dominating CRAs including Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P). As Table 2 shows, there are 12 grades in total, with AAA as the highest 
grade to indicate the lowest default risk, and D as the lowest grade to indicate the highest 
default risk. Thus, we code these ranking grades using 12 as the highest and 1 as the 
lowest accordingly. We therefore construct our key explanatory variable Credit Ratings 
(CR) as a truncated variable, equal to the average scores issued by these three CRAs 
during a given year, and 0 if there is no coverage by any of these CRAs. The average 
credit rating score in our sample is 7.721, which is equivalent to BB level, and means that 
the bank credit quality in South-East Asian countries is still at a low-level.  
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Table 2 
Bank's long-term credit rating grades and definitions 
Fitch  Moody's S&P Ranking Definition 
AAA Aaa AAA 12 Highest quality 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 11.5  
AA Aa2 AA 11  
AA- Aa3 AA- 10.5  
A+ A1 A+ 10 Upper-medium grade, high credit quality 
A A2 A 9.5  
A- A3 A- 9 Lower-medium grade, high credit quality 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 8.5  
BBB Baa2 BBB 8  
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 7.5  
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 Speculative grade rating 
BB Ba2 BB 6.5  
BB- Ba3 BB- 6  
B+ B1 B+ 5.5 Highly speculative 
B B2 B 5  
B- B3 B- 4.5  
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 4 Significant speculative, Substantial credit risk 
CCC Caa2 CCC 3.5  
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 3  
CC Ca CC 2.5  
C+ C C+ 2  
C WR C 1.5 Extremely speculative 
DDD  D+ 1  
DD/D  D/SD 0.5 Payment default 
 
Our second hypothesis relates to the interaction between CRAs and the standards of 
investor protection. Following Nguyen et al (2015), Knudsen (2011) and Van Essen et al 
(2013), three indicators of national governance quality are chosen from the six 
dimensional World Governance Indicators (WGIs) to measure each country investor 
protection quality8, namely Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), 
                                                          
8  These World Governance Indicators (WGIs) are the most widely-used indicators in multi-country 
comparative studies (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012; Kaufmann et al, 2011) and cover six dimensions of national 
governance quality including: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. According to 
Kaufmann et al. (2011, p. 4), the Government Effectiveness index captures “the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies”. The Regulatory Quality index captures “the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. The Rule of Law index 
captures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence”. The Control of Corruption index captures “the extent to which public power is 
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and the Rule of Law (RL). Given the Control of Corruption (CC) is particularly related 
to the unique banking industry (Beck et al., 2006a; Barth et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2011; 
Delis, 2012). We also further add it into our previously selected indicators to construct 
our four dimensional indicator framework to measure the quality of investor protection 
for investors in the banking industry of a given country. The indicators are displayed in 
standard normal units ranging from −2.5 to +2.5, with more positive values indicating 
better national governance quality (Kaufmann et al, 2011). The indicators are highly 
correlated (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002) hence, in line with Knudsen (2011), the four 
indicators are combined to form an aggregate national Investor Protection Index (IPI) by 
summing these together, IPI-Sum = GE + RQ + RL + CC. Following Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002), we also combined these four indicators into one index using principal 
component analysis (IPI-PCA) for our robustness test. 
Our third hypothesis relates to the interaction between CRAs and bank regulation 
strictness. We measure the strictness of bank regulations in a given country using four 
banking industry-level regulatory indicators, including the level of restrictions on the 
banks’ activities (ACTR), capital requirements (CAPR), power of the supervisory 
agencies (SPR), and market discipline (PMON). Data on bank regulation is obtained from 
a database that has been updated by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2012)9. In order to analyse the 
                                                          
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests.” 
9 ACTR takes values between 3 and 12 with higher values indicating higher restrictions. It includes three 
standards for evaluating the values, securities, insurance and real estate activities, and its four levels for 
evaluating are unrestricted (=1), permitted (=2), restricted (=3) or prohibited (=4). Thus, the final 
assessment for ACTR is the summation of the values of securities, insurance and real estate activities. CAPR 
is an indicator of capital requirements, accounting for both overall and initial capital stringency. The overall 
capital stringency, determines whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts 
certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy. CAPR can take values between 
0 and 10 with higher values, suggesting a greater stringent capital requirement. SPR is a measure of the 
power of the supervisory agencies and its values with greater values indicating more power of supervision. 
It is examined on the basis of the answers and the aim of this measurement is to discover whether the 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. PMON 
is an indicator of market discipline that takes values between 0 and 12. It indicates whether there are 
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overall effects of bank regulation, we use an aggregate Bank Regulation Index (BRI) by 
summing these together, BRI-Sum = ACTR + CAPR + SPR + PMON. We also combined 
these four bank regulation related indicators into one BRI by using principal component 
analysis (BRI-PCA) for our robustness test.  
We control bank specific characteristics as well as country macro economy characteristics 
which are found to affect bank performance. We use the natural logarithm of total assets 
to represent the bank size (BS) and the ratio of total equity to total assets to control bank 
capitalization. Delis (2012) points out that large and well-capitalized banks are probably 
able to access funds at a lower cost, due to scale of economy, lower informational 
asymmetries and fewer moral hazard problems. We control the fee income (FI), which 
equals non-interest operating income divided by total assets because it may affect the 
pricing of loan products. We also control default risk using the ratio of non-performance 
loan to total asset (NPL) because NPL by generating additional expenses, such as labor 
and storage costs damages bank cost efficiency (Barth et al., 2004). We also control equity 
to total asset (ETA) with the expected impact on bank cost inefficiency being positive. 
This is because internal funds can reduce transaction costs and enhance bank cost 
efficiency (Barth et al., 2004; 2013). We control GDP growth, private sector credit (PSC) 
and unemployment rate (UR), following Barnichon (2010) and Delis, (2012). Private 
sector credit (PSC) represents the level of development of the financial sector with the 
expected impact being to reduce bank cost inefficiency (Delis, 2012). GDP growth and 
unemployment rate (UR) being the other two important country level characteristics, 
which may affect productivity and efficiency, and ultimately reduce bank cost 
                                                          
incentives for the private monitoring of firms, with higher values indicating more private monitoring. Thus, 
higher values suggest higher disclosure requirements and more incentives to increase private monitoring. 
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inefficiency (Barnichon, 2010). Table 3 provides the definitions for all variables and their 
expected impact on bank cost inefficiency. Tables 4 and 5 provide descriptive statistics 
for our variables. 
Table 3. Definition of the variables.  
Variable  Definition  Expected 
impact on 
bank cost 
inefficiency 
BCIE Bank cost inefficiency estimated using   
CR  
Credit ratings are the average value of the long-term 
rating scores from three companies (Fitch Ratings, 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P)). 
+ 
IPI 
Investor protection index measuring the standards of 
investor protections in a given country 
+ 
CR * IPI The interaction term between CR and IPI + 
BRI 
Bank regulation index measuring the strictness of bank 
industry level regulation in a given country  
+ 
CR* BRI The interaction term between CR and BRI - 
CRD 
Credit rating downgrading measured by negative 
difference between the credit rating in a given year t and 
the credit rating in the previous year t-1 
- 
CRU 
Credit rating upgrade measured by positive difference 
between the credit rating in a given year t and the credit 
rating in the previous year t-1 
+ 
CRDW 
Credit rating downgrading within group is a sub-group of 
credit rating downgrading focusing on the downgrading 
in the same group 
- 
CRDC 
Credit rating downgrading cross group is a sub-group of 
credit rating downgrading focusing on the downgrading 
across group (i.e. from investment group to speculative 
group vice versa) 
- 
CRUW 
Credit rating upgrading within group is a sub-group of 
credit rating upgrading focusing on the downgrading in 
the same group 
+ 
CRUC 
Credit rating upgrading cross group is a sub-group of 
credit rating upgrading focusing on the downgrading 
across group (i.e. from investment group to speculative 
group vice versa) 
+ 
ACTR 
ACTR indicates the level of restrictions on the banks’ 
activities 
- 
CAPR 
CAPR is an indicator of capital requirements, accounting 
for both overall and initial capital stringency 
- 
SPR 
SPR is a measure of the power of the supervisory 
agencies and its values with greater values indicating 
more power of supervision 
- 
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PMON 
PMON indicates whether there are incentives for the 
private monitoring of firms, with higher values indicating 
more private monitoring 
- 
BS 
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets 
+ 
FI 
Fee income is the ratio of non-interest operating income 
divided by total assets 
+ 
NPL 
Non-performing loan ratio is calculated using non-
performing loan divided by total asset 
+ 
ETA 
Equity to Assets ratio is measured using equity divided 
by total assets 
- 
PSC 
Private sector credit is measured by the value of credits 
extended by all financial intermediaries to the private 
sector divided by GDP.  
- 
UR 
Unemployment rate measured by the percentage of the 
total labor force that is unemployed but actively seeking 
employment and willing to work. 
- 
GDP 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the monetary value of 
all the finished goods and services produced within a 
country's borders in a given year 
- 
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Table 4             
Summary statistics             
Variable N Mean P25 Median p75 STD 
Panel A - Estimation of Inefficiency 
Total cost (TC) 2398 12.40 11.08 12.48 13.75 1.979 
Price of labour (P1) 2398 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.009 
Price of financial capital (P2) 2398 0.060 0.021 0.040 0.063 0.147 
Net loan (Q1) 2398 14.74 13.30 14.85 16.18 2.280 
Other earning assets (Q2) 2398 14.35 12.94 14.41 15.80 2.235 
Equity (N) 2398 3.340 1.892 3.561 4.501 12.62 
GDP per capital 2398 8.792 8.122 8.492 9.114 0.974 
Panel B – regulatory and institutional variables 
ACTR 2398 8.485 7.000 9.000 10.00 2.301 
CAPR 2398 6.710 6.000 7.000 8.000 1.605 
SPR 2398 10.91 9.500 10.00 12.00 1.983 
PMON 2398 8.704 8.000 9.000 10.00 1.279 
Governance effectiveness 2398 0.315 -0.131 0.017 0.281 0.722 
Rule of law 2398 0.055 -0.489 -0.132 0.185 0.781 
Control of corruption 2398 -0.099 -0.596 -0.479 -0.278 0.947 
Regulatory quality 2398 0.134 -0.331 -0.210 -0.240 0.764 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (number, mean, P25, median, P75, minimum, maximum and standard deviation) for the variables used in measuring 
bank cost inefficiency, and the summary statistics of regulatory and institutional variables. In the Panel A, units of the variables are as follow: Total cost, Net loan, 
other earning assets, equity and GDP per capital are logarithm variable; price of financial capital and the price of labor are ratios. In the Panel B, units on the 
variables are ACTR (activity restrictions), CAPR (capital requirement), SPR (power of the supervisory agencies) and PMON (private monitoring). Other units of 
the variables are institutional variables, such as governance effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality.  
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Table 5             
Summary statistics for determent of cost inefficiency      
Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 STD 
Credit ratings (CR) 2398 7.721 6.000 9.000 10.300 3.548 
CRD 418 -1.293 -1.000 -1.000 -0.500 1.527 
CRU 715 1.311 0.500 1.000 1.400 1.322 
CRDW 345 -1.005 -1.000 -1.000 -0.500 0.828 
CRDC 73 -.0763 -6.500 -2.000 -1.000 3.264 
CRUW 570 1.244 0.500 1.000 1.400 1.068 
CRUC 145 4.417 1.000 3.000 8.000 3.689 
IPI-Sum 2398 0.405 -1.324 -0.953 0.286 3.163 
IPI-PCA 2398 0.172 -0.688 -0.520 0.083 1.592 
BRI-Sum  2398 34.479 30.500 34.500 40.000 4.889 
BRI-PCA  2398 15.515 13.552 15.270 16.925 2.614 
Bank Size (BS) 2398 9.721 9.093 9.758 10.30 0.926 
Fee Income (FI) 2398 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.003 
Non-performance loan (NPL) 2398 0.020 0.006 0.011 0.021 0.056 
Equity to asset (ETA) 2398 0.109 0.059 0.084 0.123 0.089 
Private sector credit (PSC) 2398 4.172 3.437 3.932 4.844 2.991 
Unemployment rate (UR) 2398 5.855 4.100 5.246 7.960 2.558 
GDP  2398 0.062 0.042 0.063 0.085 0.031 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (number, mean, P25, median, P75, minimum, maximum and standard deviation) for the variables used in this paper. 
IPI-Sum is an aggregate national governance index provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010), and updated by the World Bank. IPI-PCA is a national governance index 
using principal component analysis. BRI-Sum is an aggregate national regulation index updated by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2012) at the World Bank. BRI-PCA is 
a national regulation index. Other variable definitions refer to Table 3.  
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Table 6 reports the correlation matrix of variables. All of the variables used in the regression have correlation co-efficiencies lower than 0.65, 
indicating no serious multicollinearity issues. We also conducted VIF tests, again without detecting multicollinearity problems.  
 
Table 6                                       
Correlation matrix                                     
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.BCIE 1.00                   
2.CR -0.08 1.00                  
3.CRD -0.05 0.20 1.00                 
4.CRU 0.07 0.11 0.10 1.00                
5.CRDW -0.12 0.11 0.47 0.11 1.00               
6.CRDC -0.17 0.17 0.86 0.05 -0.04 1.00              
7.CRUW 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.43 0.12 0.05 1.00             
8.CRUC 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.87 0.06 0.03 -0.08 1.00            
9..IPI-Sum 0.10 0.22 -0.11 -0.11 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 1.00           
10..IPI-
PCA 
0.10 0.22 -0.11 -0.11 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
-0.11 
0.98 1.00 
         
11.BRI-
Sum 
-0.12 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
0.04 
-0.31 -0.31 1.00 
        
12.BRI-
PCA 
-0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 
0.06 
-0.42 -0.41 0.96 1.00 
       
13.PSC 0.01 0.28 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.64 0.64 -0.08 -0.10 1.00       
14.UR -0.02 -0.15 0.09 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.42 -0.41 0.03 0.04 -0.54 1.00      
15.BS -0.10 0.18 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.17 0.16 0.16 0.29 0.25 0.37 -0.33 1.00     
16.FI 0.16 -0.13 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.16 -0.16 -0.11 -0.12 -0.42 0.33 -0.20 1.00    
17.NPL 0.05 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 0.03 -0.18 0.09 1.00   
18.ETA -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.22 -0.23 -0.03 -0.02 -0.49 0.24 0.17 1.00  
19.GDP -0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.35 -0.35 0.16 0.23 -0.10 0.08 0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
Notes: IPI-Sum is an aggregate national governance index provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010), and updated by the World Bank. IPI-PCA is national governance 
index using principal component analysis. BRI-Sum is an aggregate national regulation index updated by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2012) at the World Bank. BRI-PCA 
is national regulation index. Other variable definitions refer to Table 3. 
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2.4.3 Methodology: Fixed Effect 
We estimate two fixed effect panel regression models. Regarding the impacts of CRAs 
and the interaction between CRAs and investor protection standards, we estimate 
regression (3) below: 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑐
+ 𝛽4𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                                                                               (3) 
Regarding the impacts of CRAs and the interaction between CRAs and bank regulation, 
we estimate regression (4) below:  
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑐
+ 𝛽4𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                                                                 (4) 
In this equation, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡, which is calculated by the cost frontier model (equation 2) is 
the value of the cost inefficiency of bank 𝑖  at time 𝑡  in country 𝑐 ; ; 𝐶𝑅𝑡𝑐  is credit 
ratings. 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑐 is a set of variables representing the quality of investor protection standards 
in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡. 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑡𝑐 is the regulation variable, and measures the overall quality 
of supervision for the banking industry in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑐 is bank size. 𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑐 is 
the ratio of fee income. 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑐 is the ratio of non-performance loan. 𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐 is the ratio of 
equity to total asset. 𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑡,𝑐  is the index of private sector credit. 𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑐  is the 
unemployment rate. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,𝑐 the is growth rate of GDP. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is the error item.  
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2.4.4 Dynamic Panel Model 
A common problem in using empirical data is autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, and 
we eliminate their impact by using fixed effect with robust check. Another important 
feature of this analysis is that we account for the potential endogeneity of inefficiency. In 
order to correct for possible endogeneity (Arellano & Bond 1991; Aslan and Kumar, 
2014), we estimate the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) panel regression (5) and 
(6) below: 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑐
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                                                                                     (5)     
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝑅𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑐
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                                                                                         (6) 
In this equation, 𝐵𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lag value of the cost inefficiency of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in 
country 𝑐. 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 The effect of credit ratings, bank regulation and investor protection 
standards on bank cost inefficiency   
The regression results using fixed effect panel estimations are summarized in Table 7.  
Panel A, Table 7 shows the results using the IPI-Sum and the BRI-Sum calculated using 
the summarized approach while Panel B, Table 7 shows the results using IPI-PCA and 
BRI-PCA calculated using the principal component analysis (PCA) approach. These two 
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approaches generate similar results. Thus, we focus on Panel A to discuss our empirical 
results.  
As Model 1, Table 7 shows, credit ratings is negatively related to bank cost inefficiency 
and the co-efficiency is highly significant (𝛽1 = −0.004， 𝑝 < 0.001). This supports the 
hypothesis 1 and suggests that credit ratings issued by credit rating agencies improve bank 
performance by reducing bank cost inefficiency. Investor protection quality is positively 
related to bank cost inefficiency and the co-efficiency is also highly significant (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼 =
0.012， 𝑝 < 0.01). This contrasts with previous results (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Lensink et al., 2008; Delis, 2012). Our results suggest that 
high investor protection standards represent a net cost burden to banks operating in 
countries with such standards, thus reducing bank performance by increasing bank cost 
inefficiency.  
Model 2, Table 7 further shows that there is a significant negative interaction between 
credit ratings and investor protection quality in affecting bank cost inefficiency (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼 =
−0.003， 𝑝 < 0.01 ). This supports the hypothesis 2 and suggests that credit ratings 
improve bank cost efficiency more when there is a higher investor protection embedded 
in the institutional environment in an emerging market. Previous research from Haw et 
al. (2010), Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2012) and Delis (2012) highlights that bank 
competition can be the transmission mechanism utilised to realize the benefits of strong 
investor protection. From a different perspective, our findings highlight credit rating 
agencies as being the transmission mechanism, helping to realise the benefits of high 
investor protection standards embedded in the general institutional environment in 
emerging markets.  
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Model 3, Table 7 shows that credit ratings have a significantly negative impact on bank 
costs inefficiency, again supporting the hypothesis 1. Also it shows that bank regulation 
quality is negatively related to bank cost inefficiency, and such co-efficiency is highly 
significant ( 𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼 = −0.004， 𝑝 < 0.01 ). This implies that stricter bank industry 
regulations help banks to be more specialized in their restricted business area (Barth et al. 
2001, Pasiouras et al. 2009 and Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2012), and to be more efficient in 
utilizing their capital against the risk of insolvency (VanHoose, 2007; Pasiouras et al., 
2006) and thus become more cost efficient. This is consistent with the view that bank 
regulations are beneficial to bank performance (e,g. Barth et al., 2001; Barth et al., 2004; 
Pasiouras et al., 2009). However, as Model 4, Table 6 shows, there is a positive interaction 
between credit rating and bank regulation quality in impacting bank cost inefficiency with 
a highly significant co-efficiency (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼 = 0.002， 𝑝 < 0.001). This suggests that strict 
bank regulation, as a relatively less flexible approach to monitor bank activities, can offset 
the benefits of credit ratings (which represent a more flexible private monitoring 
enforcement power) in monitoring banks. In other words, active credit rating agencies 
and strict bank specific regulations, as a bundle of monitoring systems, may cause over-
regulation concerns and not be optimal for bank cost efficiency. The hypothesis 3 is thus 
supported. 
 
44 
 
Table 7: Fixed effects panel regression - The effect of credit ratings, bank regulation and investor protection standards on bank cost 
inefficiency   
 Panel A (Sum-Index) Panel B (PCA-Index) 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CR (𝛽1) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.013*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
IPI (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼) 0.012*** 0.020***   0.030*** 0.040***   
 (0.004) (0.004)   (0.007) (0.009)   
CR * IPI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼)   -0.003***    -0.002***   
  (0.001)    (0.001)   
BRI (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼)    -0.004*** -0.004***   -0.004*** -0.007*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
CR*BRI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼)    0.002***    0.001*** 
    (0.001)    (0.000) 
BS (𝛽2) 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.016* 0.011 0.010 0.016* 0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
FI (𝛽3) 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
NPL (𝛽4) -0.022 -0.022 -0.030 -0.032 -0.023 -0.022 -0.027 -0.028 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) 
ETA (𝛽5) 0.024 0.018 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.018 0.031 0.028 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
PSC (𝛽6) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR (𝛽7) -0.001 -0.002* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP (𝛽8) -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.066* -0.061* -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.057* -0.054* 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) 
R2_adjusted 0.104 0.110 0.122 0.131 0.104 0.114 0.111 0.119 
F 11.703 10.625 13.340 12.565 10.138 11.796 12.705 12.228 
Notes: The dependent variable bank cost inefficiency is used to reflect a bank's performance; a lower value illustrates better bank performance. Variable definitions 
refer to Table 2. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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In order to address possible endogeneity issues, we estimate the regression models using 
the AB-GMM approach. Following Arellano & Bond (1991), we adopt the AB-GMM 
approach by using the lagged values of the credit ratings, investor protection quality and 
bank regulation as instrumental variables. To control the autocorrelation of bank cost 
inefficiency itself, we also add first order lagged values of bank cost inefficiency (L.BCIE) 
into our regressions. This procedure eliminates the persistent components of the latent or 
unobservable variables and the error terms, and helps to address the reverse causality 
issue. The L.BCIE is significantly and positively related to the current bank cost 
inefficiency while the AR(2) z-value is insignificant. This suggests that previous bank 
efficiency positively impacts current bank efficiency with a short memory period (i.e., 
only 1 year) and our first order lagged L.BCIE is enough to capture such short memory 
period auto-correlation. Overall, the robustness test results in Table 8 are consistent with 
our previous results in Table 6 and the hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are fully supported.  
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Table 8: AB GMM panel regression: The effect of credit ratings, bank regulation and investor protection standards on bank cost 
inefficiency   
 Panel A (Sum-Index) Panel B (PCA-Index) 
 Model (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
CR (𝛽1) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.020*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
IPI (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼) 0.002** 0.007***   0.003** 0.013***   
 (0.001) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.004)   
CR * IPI(𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼)   -0.001***    -0.001***   
  (0.000)    (0.000)   
BRI (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼)    -0.002*** -0.004***   -0.003*** -0.006*** 
   (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.001) 
CR* BRI(𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼)    0.001***    0.001*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
BS (𝛽2) -0.006** -0.005** -0.006* -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FI(𝛽3) -0.004 0.007 0.012** 0.013*** -0.005 0.007 0.010** 0.011** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
NPL (𝛽4) -0.199 0.018 -0.353* -0.297* -0.200 0.016 -0.236* -0.264* 
 (0.128) (0.031) (0.208) (0.173) (0.122) (0.028) (0.130) (0.139) 
ETA (𝛽5) -0.094** -0.077** -0.112** -0.122*** -0.094** -0.077** -0.121** -0.125** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.055) (0.040) (0.037) (0.035) (0.048) (0.049) 
PSC (𝛽6) -0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001*** -0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR (𝛽7) -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP (𝛽8) 0.066** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.094*** 0.066** 0.088*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) 
L.BCIE(𝛽9) 0.669*** 0.616*** 0.622*** 0.606*** 0.670*** 0.618*** 0.645*** 0.638*** 
 (0.059) (0.072) (0.068) (0.073) (0.059) (0.072) (0.058) (0.061) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.104 0.780 0.232 0.161 0.103 0.791 0.159 0.135 
Hansen(p-value) 0.855 1.000 0.106 0.858 0.862 1.000 0.948 0.904 
Notes: The dependent variable bank cost inefficiency is used to reflect a bank's performance; a lower value illustrates better bank performance. Variable definitions 
refer to Table 2. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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2.5.2 Robustness: Instrumental Variables Estimation  
If the credit ratings are determined by a company’s operational environment, then the 
ratings monitoring-performance regression could spuriously pick up the effect of 
unobserved factors. For example, if a bank needs greater external financing for 
investment opportunities, it has to have more incentives to improve credit quality, thus 
inducing a positive relationship between credit ratings and performance. Similarly, 
country characteristics (economic environment, cultural difference, financial reform and 
development) may be correlated with both the country environment and the banks’ 
performance (Bruno and Claessens, 2010). In order to eliminate the possible endogeneity 
of credit ratings, we also use the instrumental variables (IV) approach as an alternative 
measure. 
We run a two-stage least squares instrumental variable analysis (2SLS)10 by using the lag 
variable of credit ratings11, one bank-level variable (liquidity ratio) and one country-level 
variable (inflation) as our instruments. The liquidity ratio (LR) is measured by dividing 
liquid assets by total assets in a given year. The inflation ratio is measured by the change 
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) between the previous year CPI and the current year 
CPI divided by the current year CPI in a given year. Liquidity ratio directly highlights 
whether a bank has sufficient current assets such as cash and quickly saleable securities 
to satisfy current obligations. This liquidity ratio may directly affect a bank’s credibility, 
thus CRAs evaluation outcome on such bank credibility (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; 
                                                          
10 We use the Cragg-Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there is one 
endogenous regressor as in our 2SLS models, the null hypothesis is that the instruments have no explanatory 
power in the first stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and two excluded instruments, the 
critical value (Stock–Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg–Donald statistic for 10% maximal size distortion is 
19.93. Since we have two instruments and one endogenous regressor, we use the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. If 
the test statistic exceeds the critical value, we reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the structural error and conclude that at least one of the instruments is not exogenous.  
11 We use the lag variable of credit ratings as instruments to control the autocorrelation problem.  
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Pasiouras et al., 2006). However, it does not directly affect how resources in a given bank 
may be utilized in an efficient and effective manner, i.e., bank cost efficiency (Minetti, 
2007). Similarly, inflation by directly affecting the valuation of an asset, may lead to 
imprudent policies, such as excessive borrowing, and so directly affect the probability of 
default and ultimately CRAs evaluation outcome on a bank’s credibility (David, 2008). 
Despite that inflation can be a significant determinant of credit spread in developed and 
developing countries (Butler and Fauver, 2006; Weigel and Gemmill, 2006), it may not 
directly affect the resource utilization efficiency (Benabou, 1992). Empirically, we find 
LR and Inflation are not significantly related to bank cost efficiency but are significantly 
related to CRAs (p<0.001). These two IVs related to bank-specific and country-level 
characteristics are strong instrument variables for CRAs, because the first step F-statistic 
value are higher than 19.93.  
In Table 9, we examine hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, using the exogenous bank-sector liquidity 
ratio and country-level inflation as instruments. The results are constituent with H1 that 
Credit rating agencies improve bank performance in emerging markets, and H2 that 
Credit rating agencies enhance bank performance more when there are stronger investor 
protections embedded in the institutional environments in emerging markets, and H3 that 
Credit rating agencies enhance bank performance less when bank regulations are stricter 
in emerging markets. 
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Table 9: Instrumental variables Estimiates: The effect of credit ratings, bank regulations and investor protection standards on bank cost 
inefficiency   
 Panel A (Sum-Index) Panel B (PCA-Index) 
 
Model 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
CR (𝛽1) -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.036*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
IPI (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼) 0.020*** 0.029***   0.039*** 0.057***   
 (0.003) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.009)   
CR * IPI(𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼)   -0.001***    -0.003***   
  (0.000)    (0.001)   
BRI (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼)    -0.002*** -0.009***   -0.004*** -0.017*** 
   (0.000) (0.002)   (0.000) (0.003) 
CR* BRI(𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼)    0.001***    0.002*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
BS (𝛽2) 0.018** 0.015* 0.020** 0.023*** 0.018** 0.015* 0.020** 0.021** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
FI(𝛽3) 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
NPL (𝛽4) 0.055 0.062 0.029 0.013 0.056 0.062 0.038 0.020 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.086) (0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) (0.078) 
ETA (𝛽5) -0.026 -0.040** -0.018 -0.035* -0.025 -0.040** -0.015 -0.032 
 (0.036) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.037) (0.038) 
PSC (𝛽6) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR (𝛽7) -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP (𝛽8) -0.088** -0.086** -0.030 -0.025 -0.086** -0.083** -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) 
        (Continued) 
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Table 9- Continued         
 Panel A (Sum-Index) Panel B (PCA-Index) 
 
Model 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Cragg–Donald(F-
statistic) 164.766 148.602 170.331 44.397 165.310 146.381 169.373 39.962 
Sargan test(p-value) 0.462 0.690 0.135 0.591 0.478 0.708 0.101 0.395 
r2_a 0.114 0.123 0.129 0.139 0.114 0.123 0.113 0.095 
F 18.454 17.920 24.245 21.685 18.444 17.823 22.317 19.765 
Notes: The table reports the second stage of a 2SLS model where the dependent variable is cost inefficiency as used to reflect a bank's performance, which is calculated 
from the translog cost function (SFA); We use the Cragg–Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there is one endogenous regressor as in 
our models (i.e., credit ratings), the Cragg–Donald statistic has an F distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments have no explanatory power in the first 
stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and two excluded instruments, the critical value (Stock–Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg–Donald statistic for 10% 
maximal size distortion is 19.93. Since we have two unique instruments and one endogenous regressor in each IV regression model, we use the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical 
significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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2.5.3 Robustness: The impact of bank regulation and investor protection standards 
Panel-A in Table 10 shows the estimation of the impact of regulation on banking cost 
inefficiency; this model includes the macroeconomic environment as well as bank 
specific variables. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of regulations on bank 
performance during the period 2000-2012, and investigate four standards of the 
regulations.   
As can be seen from the first model, ACTR has a statistically negative effect on cost 
inefficiency, implying that higher restrictions of activities increase the cost efficiency of 
banks. This is consistent with the view that more regulations restrict banks’ access to 
entry securities, insurance and real estate markets in order to protect banks from facing 
more risks (Barth et al. 2001, Pasiouras et al. 2009 and Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2012). This 
negative impact also indicates that the lower cost may allow banks to utilize their funding 
sources more effectively, and ensure the stable operation of Asian banks. On the other 
hand, because of higher restrictions on the banks’ activities, banks may reduce their 
expenditure on employing experts, and thus they have improved cost efficiency.  
Similarly, in the second model, the result differs from VanHoose (2007) that CAPR has 
a significant negative impact on cost efficiency, showing that a lower (higher) capital 
requirement result in a higher (lower) cost inefficiency. As Pasiouras et al.’s (2006) study 
shows, restrictive capital requirements may lead to higher levels of bank capital, so that 
there is a low probability of financial distress. Furthermore, a higher capital requirement 
can restrict banks to engaging in higher risk activities and ensure a stable performance.  
From the third and fourth models, there is significant negative impact on cost inefficiency 
caused by SPR and PMON, which aligns with Haw (2010) and Delis (2011). The effect 
of official supervisory action indicates that higher scores may give rise to greater cost 
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efficiency, meaning that powerful supervision can improve the corporate governance of 
banks and their functioning (Beck et al. 2006b). It is not unreasonable to suggest that 
supervisory authorities, who have the ability to take specific action to prevent or correct 
problems, may promote bank performance and efficiency. Similarly, the effect of PMON 
suggests that a higher PMON can drive banks to work more effectively. This impact 
related to the disclosure of accurate information to the public will allow private agents to 
mitigate asymmetric information (Beck et al. 2006b and Pasiouras et al. 2009). Obviously, 
as the public become aware of such information, the moral hazard problem and corruption 
of bank officials will be reduced. Finally, the BRI has a significantly negative impact on 
cost inefficiency. Our results support the previous studies (e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Beck et 
al., 2006b; Pasiouras et al., 2009) that bank-level regulation could improve bank 
performance effectively. At the same time, in terms of the macroeconomic control 
variables, the variable of private sector credit (domestic credit to the private sector of 
GDP) is significant at the 1% level of each model and has a negative impact on cost 
inefficiency, which means that this indicator could improve bank performance. 
For the country-level regulation, we analyze whether investor protection standards affect 
bank cost inefficiency in Panel-B. We analyze the impact of investor protection standards 
on bank performance during the period 2000-2012, and investigate the four standards of 
protection variables respectively.   
The variables, such as governance effectiveness (GE), rule of law (RL), control of 
corruption (CC), regulatory quality (RQ) and IPI, have a significantly positive impact on 
bank cost inefficiency. Our findings are different from previous studies (e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Lensink et al., 
2008; Delis, 2012), which indicate that the quality of protection standards may not 
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improve bank performance directly. The macroeconomic variable, such as private sector 
credit, is statistically significant at 1% and unveils a negative impact on bank performance. 
The reason for this relationship is that country-level regulation is not like the bank specific 
regulation (Barth et al., 2002; Barth et al., 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) and plays a 
role as investor protection in the financial market (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008), so 
that its aim is not to supervise bank performance. Additionally, the results in Table 10 are 
consistent with the previous findings in Tables 7, 8 and 9 that bank regulations improve 
bank performance, while the positive impact of investor protection on bank performance 
should be based on the transmission mechanism (Haw, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012; 
Delis, 2012), such as competition.  
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Table 10: Robustness: The impact of bank regulations and investor protection standards on bank cost 
inefficiency     
 Panel A – Regulation index Panel B – Institution index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
ACTR -0.002***          
 (0.001)          
CAPR  -0.003***         
  (0.001)         
SPR   -0.006***        
   (0.001)        
PMON    -0.007***       
    (0.001)       
BRI     -0.003***      
     (0.000)      
GE      0.032**      
     (0.016)     
RL       0.020**     
      (0.010)    
CC        0.032***   
        (0.011)   
RQ         0.037***  
         (0.003)  
IPI          0.012*** 
          (0.004) 
PSC  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR -0.001* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BS 0.001 0.004 -0.015* 0.009 0.007 -0.022* -0.022** -0.027** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
          (Continued) 
56 
 
  
Table 10-Continued          
Robustness: The impact of bank regulations and investor protection standards on bank cost inefficiency     
 Panel A – Regulation index Panel B – Institution index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
FI -0.022* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
NPL -0.024 -0.023 -0.029 -0.032 -0.034 -0.021 -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.025 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
ETA 0.014 0.017 0.004 0.024 0.019 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.013 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
GDP -0.086** -0.082** -0.060* -0.048* -0.031* -0.115*** -0.091** -0.097*** -0.081** -0.091** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.027) (0.017) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) 
cons 0.182*** 0.136** 0.223*** 0.143** 0.189*** 0.172** 0.149** 0.187*** 0.146** 0.141** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.063) (0.067) (0.068) (0.065) (0.070) (0.064) (0.064) 
r2_a 0.073 0.069 0.093 0.099 0.099 0.072 0.069 0.076 0.068 0.071 
F 7.549 6.869 9.143 8.316 8.681 7.001 6.875 8.119 6.842 6.941 
Notes: This table shows the impact of bank specific regulation and institution on cost inefficiency. GE is governance effectiveness. RL is rule of law and CC is control 
of corruption. RQ is regulatory quality. The first five models (Panel A) are panel regressions with fixed effects for the relationship between bank specific regulation 
and bank performance. The models (6) to (10) are fixed effect models for the relationship between institutions and bank performance.  
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2.5.4 Robustness: Whether over-regulation exists between credit ratings and 
investor protection standards 
According to Tables 7, 8 and 9, we find that Credit rating agencies enhance bank 
performance more when there is stronger investor protection embedded in the 
institutional environment in emerging markets. In order to test whether over-regulation 
exists in banking industry, we analyse the relationship between bank cost inefficiency and 
the interactive term for credit ratings as well as each institutional variable. We focus on 
the three aspects: rule of law reflecting the quality of the judicial system for controlling 
moral hazard; control of corruption reflecting the transparency of banking sector; the GR 
index 12 reflecting the policy implementation of corporate governance and private 
development.   
Table 11 shows that credit ratings could improve bank efficiency. While all institutional 
variables have a positive impact on cost inefficiency and these results are different from 
Barth et al. (2004), which means that high investor protection standard represents a net 
cost burden to banks operating in countries with such standards. However, the interaction 
between credit ratings and rule of law has a significantly negative impact on cost 
inefficiency, and the interaction between ratings and corruption has the same effect on 
bank performance. More importantly, for analysing country-level governance and 
regulation, we find that the interaction between ratings and GR index has a significantly 
negative impact on cost inefficiency as well. Therefore, credit ratings could have a 
positive impact on efficiency and play a role as transmission mechanism for institutions 
to utilize to improve bank performance in an advanced institutional environment. Our 
findings show that an advanced institution provides a transparent environment in which 
                                                          
12 We use an aggregate institution index (Governance effectiveness + Regulatory quality) to reflect the 
impact of policy on bank governance and regulation. 
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to improve the strength of competitiveness and financial integration (Haw, 2010; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2012; Delis, 2012), but it needs an instrument to realise the benefits 
of high investor protection standards embedded in the general institutional environment 
in emerging markets (Delis, 2012). This impact is in line with our hypothesis H2. There 
is no over-regulated banking industry if credit ratings and country regulations jointly 
supervise bank performance. 
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Table 11: Robustness: The impact of investor protection standards on bank cost inefficiency     
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – AB GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
CR -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
RL 0.041***   0.026***   
 (0.012)   (0.008)   
CR * RL -0.004***   -0.002***   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   
CC  0.052***   0.028***  
  (0.013)   (0.010)  
CR * CC  -0.003**   -0.003***  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
GR   0.042***   0.017*** 
   (0.009)   (0.006) 
GR * GR   -0.002**   -0.001** 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
PSC  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BS 0.016* 0.010 0.008 -0.008*** -0.005* -0.005** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FI 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.008 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
NPL -0.022 -0.021 -0.019 -0.045 -0.007 0.015 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.109) (0.096) (0.085) 
ETA 0.026 0.023 0.016 -0.143*** -0.129*** -0.139*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.041) (0.046) (0.044) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 11-Continued       
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – AB GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
GDP  -0.066** -0.079** -0.111*** 0.059* 0.093** 0.095** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.044) (0.043) 
L.BCIE    0.656*** 0.295*** 0.282** 
    (0.063) (0.107) (0.113) 
cons 0.059 0.126* 0.118* 0.112** 0.192*** 0.157*** 
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.066) (0.052) (0.043) (0.044) 
r2_a 0.110 0.107 0.114    
F 10.269 11.741 11.587    
AR(1)    0.000 0.009 0.011 
AR(2)    0.106 0.342 0.263 
Hansen(p-value)    0.879 1.000 1.000 
Notes: This table shows whether credit ratings moderate the impact of investor protection standards on bank performance. RL is rule of law and CC is control of 
corruption. GR (Governance effectiveness + Regulatory quality) is an aggregate index of governance regulation. We use the GR index to reflect the quality of 
governance supervision. The first three models in Panel A are panel regressions with fixed effects. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) in the 
Panel B. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and 
rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at 
the 10% level. 
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2.5.5 Robustness: Whether over-regulation exists between credit ratings and bank-
specific regulations 
According to Tables 7, 8 and 9, we find that Credit rating agencies enhance bank 
performance less when bank regulations are stricter in emerging markets. In order to test 
whether over-regulation exists in the banking industry, we analyze the relationship 
between bank cost inefficiency and the interactive term for between credit ratings as well 
as each of regulatory variable. We focus on these three aspects: whether credit ratings 
mitigate the impact of bank restrictions; whether credit ratings mitigate the impact of 
capital requirements; whether credit ratings mitigate the impact of private supervision13.   
Table 12 shows that credit ratings could improve bank performance. Regulatory factors, 
such as activity restriction, capital requirement and SP index could improve bank 
performance as well in both models. However, the interaction term between credit ratings 
and activity restriction has a positive impact on cost inefficiency. It means that credit 
ratings mitigate the impact of restriction on bank performance, and conflict exists between 
these two supervision (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). 
Both of them restrict the bank from taking excessive risk and reduce diversification in the 
financial service, which reduces the bank profitability. The economic scale that enhances 
bank efficiency is also influenced by both the market discipline and bank regulation. 
Furthermore, the impact of capital requirement on bank performance is also mitigated by 
credit ratings. As higher capital requirement reduces risk-weighted assets and credit 
ratings reduces risk-taking behaviour, bank would choose conservative strategy that 
influences profitability and performance (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). Finally, credit 
ratings also mitigate the impact of the power of private monitoring on bank efficiency. A 
                                                          
13 We use an aggregate regulation index (SPR + PMON) to reflect the impact of bank private supervision, 
in order to reflect power of private monitoring and quality of private disclosure.  
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high level of monitoring and intervention reduce a manager’s incentives to exert effort, 
which worsens a firm’s valuation and performance (Zhang, 2007). Therefore, our results 
support the hypothesis H3 and suggest that strict bank regulation, as a relatively less 
flexible approach to monitor bank activities, can offset the benefits of credit ratings 
(which represent a more flexible approach) in the monitoring of banks. In other words, 
credit ratings moderate the impact of bank-level regulation on bank performance, and 
indicate that the banking industry is over-regulated, if credit ratings and bank regulation 
jointly supervise bank performance. The findings align with the view that well-
performance banks with lower regulation, such as capital requirement, are assigned with 
higher ratings, as capital requirement may increase risk-taking (Pasiouras et al., 2006). 
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Table 12: Robustness: The impact of bank specific regulations on bank cost inefficiency     
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – AB GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
CR -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.009** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ACTR -0.006***   -0.003***   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   
CR * ACTR 0.001***   0.001***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
CAPR  -0.005***   -0.008***  
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
CR * CAPR  0.001**   0.001***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
SP   -0.007***   -0.005*** 
   (0.002)   (0.001) 
CR * SP   0.001*   0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
PSC  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BS 0.016* 0.017* 0.018* -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
FI 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NPL -0.024 -0.023 -0.032 -0.046 -0.186 -0.139 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.061) (0.124) (0.115) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 12-Continued       
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – AB GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
ETA 0.031 0.029 0.060* -0.114*** -0.139*** -0.111*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.032) (0.038) (0.042) (0.036) 
GDP  -0.063* -0.060* -0.023 0.095*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) 
L.BCIE    0.551*** 0.641*** 0.561*** 
    (0.096) (0.060) (0.090) 
cons 0.109* 0.077 0.121* 0.237*** 0.259*** 0.295*** 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.068) (0.038) (0.052) (0.047) 
r2_a 0.102 0.102 0.131    
F 11.868 10.830 12.392    
AR(1)    0.001 0.000 0.001 
AR(2)    0.687 0.110 0.878 
Hansen(p-value)    1.000 0.854 1.000 
Notes: This table shows whether credit ratings moderate the impact of regulation on bank performance ACTR is bank restriction on activities. CAPR is capital 
requirement. SP (SPR+PMON) is an aggregate index of private monitoring. We use SP index to reflect power of private supervision. The first three models in Panel 
A are panel regressions with fixed effects. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) in the Panel B. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Furthermore, in Table 13, we also use the two exogenous variables as instruments to 
assess whether exist over-regulated banking industry. Our findings are in line with the 
results in Tables 5, 6 and 7 that an over-regulated banking industry may exist if crediting 
ratings and bank-level regulation jointly supervise bank performance. Additionally, the 
results also support the findings that credit ratings play a role as a transmission 
mechanism to transfer the positive impact of investor protection to banking sector. 
As our research includes the period of crisis, we may need to consider the emergency 
regulation during the time. Therefore, we add a dummy variable (Crisis(𝛽9)) to capture 
this impact. The findings show that bank inefficiency was increased during crisis.  
Furthermore, since WTO is likely to have an impact on the applications of these 
regulations, we create a dummy variable WTO(𝛽10) to capture this impact. In order to 
consider the impact of difference between local and international regulation, we create a 
dummy variable Regulation-gap(𝛽11)
14 to capture it. Finally, we also assess whether the 
international banks are more likely to be subject to international regulations, by adding a 
dummy variable International-bank (𝛽12)
15. In Table 14, after capturing these factors, our 
findings are still in line with the results in Tables 5, 6 and 7, and support our hypotheses 
H2 and H3.   
Moreover, for measuring whether our findings are different in different samples, we run 
a robustness test by dividing my database into three samples, such as, state-owned, private 
and quoted banks. In Table 15, the results in model 1 and 2 show that bank efficiency can 
be improved by crediting rating, investor protection standards and bank regulation. 
However, the interactional terms in model 1 and 2 do not have significant relationship 
                                                          
14 Based on the database that has been updated by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2012), we take a value of one for 
a country where international regulations are voluntary for all banks while we take a value of zero for a 
country where international regulations are mandatory for all banks. International regulations are 
mandatory in a country meaning that local and international regulation are really similarities.  
15 We take a value of one for international banks, otherwise zero.  
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with bank efficiency, meaning that the moderated role of CRAs in restrict bank regulation 
and high level institutional environment is not significant. According to past papers 
(Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006b; Barth et al., 2007), state-owned bank may be 
regulated more by government than market discipline, and then the moderated role of 
CRAs may be ambiguous.  In the model 3 and 4, we use sample of private bank to estimate 
whether our findings are consistent. The results show that bank efficiency does not have 
significant relationship with CRAs and investor protection standard, but bank regulation 
could improve bank efficiency. Private banks may suffer less regulation from regulator 
and they are not forced to use external rating (Firth et al., 2008; De Jonghe et al., 2015). 
Finally, we use sample of quoted bank to estimate whether our findings are consistent. 
We find that the results are line with our hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, and the moderated 
role are significant. According to previous papers (Ceuster and Masschelein, 2003; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Karas and Schoors, 2013), quoted banks are subject 
to market monitoring and they need to be transparent as they need to disclose information. 
Therefore, the impact of credit rating is obvious in quoted banks, and the monitoring role 
of CRAs and regulation may be mitigated. 
In the Table 16, we have a robustness test by using Non-performance Loan as a dependent 
variable. In previous models, Non-performance Loan represents the default risk of a bank, 
while we use this variable as additional measurement of bank performance in Table 16. 
Lower value of Non-performance Loan means better performance of a bank with less bad 
loan.  The results show that credit rating has a negative impact on Non-performance Loan, 
which is in line with H1 that credit rating agencies improve bank performance in 
emerging markets. Furthermore, The findings in model 2 and 4 support our hypotheses 
H2 and H3 respectively, and show that credit ratings play a role as a transmission 
mechanism to transfer the positive impact of investor protection to banking sector, and 
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an over-regulated banking industry may exist if crediting ratings and bank-level 
regulation jointly supervise bank performance.  
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Table 13: Instrumental variables Estimates: Whether exists over-regulation between credit ratings, bank-specific and country-level 
regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
CR -0.067** -0.033*** -0.035* -0.010** -0.016** -0.017** 
 (0.029) (0.012) (0.020) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
ACTR -0.046**      
 (0.020)      
CR * ACTR 0.006**      
 (0.003)      
CAPR  -0.030***     
  (0.011)     
CR * CAPR  0.004**     
  (0.002)     
SP   -0.015**    
   (0.006)    
CR * SP   0.002*    
   (0.001)    
RL    0.066***   
    (0.019)   
CR * RL    -0.008***   
    (0.003)   
CC     0.113***  
     (0.040)  
CR * CC     -0.013**  
     (0.006)  
GR      0.075*** 
      (0.021) 
CR * GR      -0.005*** 
      (0.002) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 13-Continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE BCIE 
PSC  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR -0.002* -0.001* 0.002 0.001 0.001* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BS 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.036** 0.057** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) 
FI 0.001 0.003** 0.003* 0.003 0.005 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
NPL -0.036* -0.023*** -0.034** -0.021 -0.016 -0.040* 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.013) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
ETA 0.030** 0.032 0.038 0.051** 0.050** 0.101* 
 (0.012) (0.049) (0.051) (0.023) (0.022) (0.058) 
GDP  -0.003 -0.035 -0.009 -0.032 -0.039 -0.053 
 (0.057) (0.043) (0.039) (0.047) (0.049) (0.054) 
Cragg–Donald(F-statistic) 33.867 53.856 37.156 178.008 114.238 157.270 
Sargan test(p-value) 0.169 0.287 0.732 0.666 0.776 0.171 
r2_a 0.370 0.630 0.148 0.142 0.105 0.113 
F 15.75 16.33 19.92 18.29 15.53 16.65 
Notes: The table reports the second stage of a 2SLS model where the dependent variable is bank cost inefficiency used to reflect a bank's performance, which is 
calculated from translog cost function (SFA). SP (SPR+PMON) is an aggregate index of private monitoring. GR (Governance effectiveness + Regulatory quality) is 
an aggregate index of governance regulation. We use SP index and GR index to reflect the power of private supervision and quality of governance supervision 
respectively. We use the Cragg–Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there is one endogenous regressor as in our models (i.e., credit 
ratings), the Cragg–Donald statistic has an F distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments have no explanatory power in the first stage regression. With 
one endogenous regressor and two excluded instruments, the critical value (Stock–Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg–Donald statistic for 10% maximal size distortion 
is 19.93. Since we have two unique instruments and one endogenous regressor in each IV regression model, we use the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to 
assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 14: Robustness check - The effect of credit ratings, bank regulation and investor protection standards on bank cost inefficiency   
 Panel A (Sum-Index) Panel B (PCA-Index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CR (𝛽1) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.015*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
IPI (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼) 0.018*** 0.023***   0.035*** 0.046***   
 (0.004) (0.005)   (0.009) (0.010)   
CR * IPI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼)   -0.004***    -0.005***   
  (0.001)    (0.002)   
BRI (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼)    -0.002*** -0.005***   -0.004*** -0.009*** 
   (0.000) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
CR*BRI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼)    0.001***    0.001*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
BS (𝛽2) 0.017* 0.015 0.015 0.019* 0.016 0.016 0.018* 0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
FI (𝛽3) 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
NPL (𝛽4) -0.023 -0.022 -0.027 -0.029 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) 
ETA (𝛽5) 0.027 0.023 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.030 0.028 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
PSC (𝛽6) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UR (𝛽7) 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP (𝛽8) -0.117*** -0.108*** -0.057* -0.059* -0.115*** -0.107*** -0.070** -0.064* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Crisis(𝛽9) 0.004* 0.004* 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.005* 0.004* 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
WTO(𝛽10) 0.017 0.015 0.024 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 14-Continued       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regulation-gap(𝛽11) 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.009* 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
International-bank(𝛽12) 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
_cons -0.027 -0.011 0.052 0.111 -0.027 -0.011 0.044 0.100 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.075) (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.076) (0.075) 
r2_a 0.115 0.108 0.116 0.134 0.095 0.107 0.101 0.117 
F 15.5625 16.383 19.9335 18.765 15.6555 16.437 18.946 18.378 
Notes: The dependent variable bank cost inefficiency is used to reflect a bank's performance; a lower value illustrates better bank performance. Variable definitions 
refer to Table 2. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
  
Table 15: Robustness check - The effect of credit ratings, bank regulation and investor protection standards on bank cost inefficiency on 
different samples  
 State-Owned Bank Private Bank Quoted Bank 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CR (𝛽1) -0.010** -0.012* 0.001 0.003 -0.004*** -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) 
IPI (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼) -0.041***  0.037  0.020***  
 (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.005)  
CR * IPI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼)  -0.001  0.000  -0.003**  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
BRI (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼)   -0.004***  -0.004*  -0.004** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
CR*BRI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼)  0.001  -0.001  0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
BS (𝛽2) -0.001** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FI (𝛽3) 0.009** 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
NPL (𝛽4) 0.018 0.034 0.023 0.014 0.015** 0.021*** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.022) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) 
ETA (𝛽5) -0.011 -0.011 -0.039* -0.042* 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) 
PSC (𝛽6) -0.072*** -0.060** -0.945** -0.362 0.066 0.039 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.438) (0.397) (0.091) (0.096) 
UR (𝛽7) -0.040 0.019 0.775*** 0.748*** -0.044 -0.033 
 (0.056) (0.046) (0.073) (0.069) (0.027) (0.025) 
GDP (𝛽8) -0.178* -0.229* -0.213* -0.043 -0.089*** -0.033 
 (0.108) (0.129) (0.118) (0.161) (0.034) (0.034) 
_cons 0.044 -0.189 -0.235 0.003 0.120* 0.183*** 
 (0.285) (0.425) (0.161) (0.160) (0.064) (0.071) 
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N 929 929 634 634 735 735 
r2_a 0.432 0.389 0.300 0.421 0.160 0.227 
F 63.524 141.164 52.393 47.446 10.690 16.360 
Notes: The dependent variable bank cost inefficiency is used to reflect a bank's performance; a lower value illustrates better bank performance. Variable definitions 
refer to Table 2. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 16: Robustness check - The effect of credit ratings, bank regulation and investor protection standards on Non-Performance Loan  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
CR (𝛽1) -0.003* -0.001* -0.001* -0.023* -0.003* -0.003* -0.001* -0.011* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
IPI (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝐼) 0.006 0.006   0.012 0.012   
 (0.004) (0.004)   (0.008) (0.009)   
CR * IPI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐼𝑃𝐼)   -0.002*    -0.002*   
  (0.001)    (0.001)   
BRI (𝛽𝐵𝑅𝐼)    -0.001** -0.002***   -0.002** -0.003*** 
   (0.000) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
CR*BRI (𝛽𝐶𝑅∗𝐵𝑅𝐼)    0.001*    0.001* 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
BCIE -0.034 -0.035 -0.048 -0.052 -0.035 -0.035 -0.041 -0.045 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.081) (0.080) 
PSC  -0.002* -0.003* -0.001* 0.000 -0.002 -0.002* -0.003* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
UR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
BS -0.043* -0.046* -0.047* -0.042* -0.046* -0.043** -0.042* -0.041* 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021) (0.026) (0.024) 
FI -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
ETA 0.069* 0.069* 0.070* 0.070* 0.069* 0.069* 0.071* 0.070* 
 (0.046) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
GDP -0.033* -0.039* -0.006 -0.004 -0.037* -0.039* -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) 
_cons 0.398* 0.398* 0.427** 0.441** 0.398* 0.399* 0.422** 0.436** 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.213) (0.214) (0.209) (0.212) (0.210) (0.210) 
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N 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 
r2_a 0.109 0.108 0.093 0.093 0.109 0.111 0.091 0.101 
F 5.076 4.726 4.556 4.174 5.064 4.711 4.569 4.232 
Notes: The dependent variable bank cost inefficiency is used to reflect a bank's performance; a lower value illustrates better bank performance. Variable definitions 
refer to Table 2. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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2.6. Discussions and conclusions  
This research examines the impacts of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) on bank 
performance in general, and in particular how their impact can be moderated by bank 
regulation strictness and investor protection quality embedded in different institutional 
environments. Using 2398 observations from 389 banks in 11 South-East Asian countries 
during the period 2000-2012, we find CRAs enhance bank performance. CRAs’ positive 
monitoring impacts are further enhanced by high investor protection standards but 
mitigated by strict bank regulation.  
From a theoretical point of view, we document why CRAs can mitigate different types of 
agency conflicts and enhance bank performance in the banking industries of emerging 
economies. More importantly, we reveal CRAs as the transmission mechanism linking 
bank industry level regulation and country level investor protection to individual bank 
performance. The interaction between CRAs and investor protection standards mitigates 
AP1 and AP2, which ultimately enhances bank cost efficiency. The interaction between 
CRAs and bank regulation reveals the conflicts of regulators and societies and 
shareholders, which ultimately reduce bank costs efficiency. Thus we enhance our 
understanding of the overall benefits and costs of monitoring and discipline bundles 
composed of CRAs, bank regulations and investor protection standards, especially in 
emerging economies.  
Our analysis has important policy implications. From a wider governance perspective, we 
reveal that too much bank regulation and discipline may not achieve optimal public policy 
(Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Bruno and Claessens, 2010). Rather, the banking industry 
can benefit from less strict bank industry regulations but with a wider coverage of active 
CRAs to issue the credit ratings for individual banks. Such a monitoring combination or 
bundle represents a much more efficient system to improve bank performance. However, 
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for many emerging economies with weak institutional environments, policy makers, by 
enhancing their overall investor protection standards, can further enhance the benefits of 
CRAs in their banking industries.   
Our research may be extended in several ways. We focus on bank performance, however, 
further research might also look into bank stability aspects and investigate whether and 
how CRAs affect the stability of the banking industry. Given the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms may vary across different institutional environments (Aslan and 
Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Zattoni, 2015), our analysis could also be replicated in the 
context of other emerging (and advanced) economies to establish whether or not our 
findings are more generally applicable. 
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Chapter 3: Market power and revenue diversification in South-
East Asian countries: the effects of these two strategies on bank 
performance and stability  
 
3.1 Introduction 
As financial liberalisation has increased in emerging markets over the last two decades, 
the increase in competition from foreign banks drove domestic banks gradually to 
enhance their market power or increase their non-interest income activities for the 
purpose of maintaining future cash flows and franchise values (Nguyen et al., 2012). 
Market power, in developed countries, allows banks to earn monopoly rents (Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2007), and provides a “capital buffer” to reduce the deteriorating 
impact of the financial crunch (Anginer et al., 2014a). Meanwhile, revenue diversification 
increases fee income and reduces revenue volatility (Lepetit et al., 2008). However, banks 
with greater market power charge higher loan rates leading to greater default (Fiordelisi 
and Mare, 2014) and revenue diversification involves in security market rises in exposure 
to systemic shocks (De Jonghe, 2010), which was especially the case in the 2007 
subprime crisis. It raises policymakers’ concerns about whether these two banking 
strategies could still enhance a company’s performance and stabilize a financial system, 
particularly in an emerging market where these two strategies are seen as competent and 
popular.  
The previous papers (e.g. Berger, 1995; Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Auh and 
Menguc, 2006; Koetter et al., 2012) suggest that market power provides incentives for 
banks to enhance performance for greater profitability. While others (e.g. Berger and 
Hannan, 1998; Casu and Girardone, 2006; Delis and Tsionas, 2009) argue that higher 
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market power inspires managers to work on the behalf of owners and as a result they may 
pursue objectives instead of profit maximization. For revenue diversification, some 
literature (e.g. Lewellen, 1971; Stein, 1997; Milbourn, 1999) finds that this strategy 
improves reallocation of resources through the internal capital market and effectively 
reduces the cost of capital, and construct the scale of operations as well as decrease 
portfolio risk (Landskroner et al., 2005; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012). 
However, the resource allocation may increase the probability of malfunctioning capital 
markets and trigger the moral hazard of managers reducing efficiency (Lamont, 1997; 
Rajan et al., 2000), and expending activities in different markets enhance the possibility 
of overall risk (Stiroh, 2006a; Stiroh, 2006b; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Diversified banks 
may raise their leverage and may pursue riskier activities, such as risky lucrative loans or 
speculative derivatives positions, due to competitive pressures (Demsetz and Strahan, 
1997; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). Obviously, most of the above literature focusing on 
developed areas still cannot provide a consensus on the impact of market power and 
revenue diversification, and the relationship between these two strategies remains 
unexplored and ambiguous. Thus, our study is motivated by these knowledge gaps and 
examines how banks utilize these strategies to improve performance and decrease 
fragility.  
In developing countries, capital markets are relatively underdeveloped, and banks 
represent the main providers of credit to the economy (Turk-Ariss, 2010). These areas 
provide a fertile laboratory for deregulation and financial liberalization, allowing 
commercial banks to compete in a wider range of market segments (Nguyen et al., 2012), 
and this process strongly suggests scale economies and consolidation in the banking 
industry (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Hughes and Mester, 1998). Enhancing market power is 
one type of consolidation process which can exploit scale economies (Hughes et al., 2001; 
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Humphrey and Vale, 2004). Given a bank’s observable scale economies, an increase in 
financial capital and non-traditional services could convey a credible signal to depositors 
and, thus, reduce the probability of a liquidity crisis. Furthermore, as the bank’s scale 
increases, its loan portfolio and deposit base become more diversified, which provides 
incentives for a bank to diversify their activities that is likely to reduce the marginal cost 
of risk management (Hughes and Mester, 1998; Hughes et al., 2001).  
We contribute to bank strategies literature in a few important ways. First, a majority of 
the previous papers focus on the impact of market power on net interest margins (Maudos 
and Fernández-de-Guevara; 2004) and on bank regulation (Beck et al., 2006b). Only two 
empirical studies show the impact of market power related to diversification, and these 
analysis were limited to five developed countries (Carbó-Valverde and Rodríguez-
Fernández; 2007) and four Asian countries (Nguyen et al., 2012) without considering the 
whole emerging market. The existing literature focus on the relationship between bank 
non-interest income and net interest margins (Lepetit et al., 2008), technology advances 
(DeYoung and Rice 2004) and earnings volatility (Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 
2006). However, they do not consider the bank strategies, such as market power and 
revenue diversification, as a bundle to influence bank performance and stability at the 
same time. Our findings suggest that banks utilize market power to enhance its cost 
efficiency, and the increase of fragility caused by market power can be offset through 
employing the strategy of diversification at the same time. Secondly, we employ a 
dynamic panel threshold methodology to identify possible threshold-effects of the two 
strategies with respect to bank performance and stability over a period of significant 
liberalization in the emerging market. We find that there exists the values of threshold in 
the two strategies to achieve desired effect. Finally, we move away from an isolated 
perspective focusing on bank efficiency (Turk-Ariss, 2010; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 
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2010) and stability (Stiroh and Rumble 2006; Nguyen et al., 2012). We consider the 
banking regulations and institutional environment, since the different monitoring and 
investor protection quality influences banks’ strategy (Barth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2007; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Delis, 201216). 
The rest of this chapter is structured along the following lines. Section 3.2 provides our 
paper hypotheses development. Section 3.3 presents the explanatory variables used to 
investigate the relationships. Section 3.4 discusses the methods used to estimate the 
impact of market power and revenue diversification on bank performance and stability. 
Section 3.5 analyses the empirical results. Section 3.6 is the conclusion.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis development  
Recently, there has been a lot of research focusing on what factors can improve bank 
performance and financial stability, which has not reached a consensus. Our paper 
contributes to the extant literature by providing theoretical analysis and empirical results 
to explain how market power and revenue diversification drive bank efficiency and 
maintain financial stability.  
     
                                                          
16  When measuring the countries’ characteristics, we need to consider the extent of government 
involvement in the financial sector, regulation and the degree of regulation of financial market activities. A 
well-regulated banking industry is an important pre-requisite for a well-functioning financial system. For 
example, activity restrictions are a key determinant of the scope of a bank’s ability to provide fee-paying 
services. This measure reflects the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in the securities 
market, insurance activities, real estate activities, and the ownership of non-financial firms (Barth et al., 
2002; Barth, 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2014). In order to analyse the benefit of 
national policy, the previous literature such as Dietsch et al., (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2008) 
suggest that a bank working in a more conducive institutional environment may face less cost of trade and 
even the probability of moral hazard may be reduced. Furthermore, Delis (2012) indicates that institutional 
factors such as low corruption and the high quality of the rule of law, which are prerequisites for embarking 
on financial reforms, can improve transparency. He believes that bank cannot effectively connect with other 
financial institutions in a market with a weak legal system and the high level of corruption, especially in 
developing and transition countries, and hence there is a significant limit of strength of competition.  
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3.2.1 Market power and bank performance 
From a traditional perspective of the connection between market power and efficiency, 
the arguments in favour of greater competition (lower market power) have been supported 
by early papers (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1998; Delis and Tsionas, 2009)17. They provide 
a quiet life theory that when banks have higher market power, there are less incentives 
for managers to work on the behalf of owners and they may pursue objectives instead of 
profit maximization, which may increase cost inefficiency. Similarly, Casu and Girardone 
(2006) use Data Envelopment Analysis methodology and PR H-statistic model to 
estimate the bank efficiency and competition, and support that if the competition is lower 
in the market, managers do not have incentives to work as hard to keep costs under control. 
The early study of Hicks (1935) find that high market power may have a negative impact 
on bank efficiency, because managers may forgo some of the monopoly rents. 
Furthermore, lower market power may make a huge contribution to efficiency by 
reallocating profits from weak bank to strong one (Schaeck and Cihák, 2014), while 
higher market power gives managers incentives to act on their wealth instead of 
considering the cost of company (Turk-Ariss, 2010). With innovation intensifying 
competition, banks may start to react to the competitive stress and improve their product 
so that efficiency can be improved by less market power (Chen, 2007; Dick and Lehnert, 
201018; Duygun et al., 2013).  
However, other papers (e.g. Berger, 1995; Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Auh and 
Menguc, 2006; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; Pasiouras, 2008; Schaeck and 
Cihak, 2010; Koetter et al., 2012) find that market power has a positive effect on 
                                                          
17 Berger and Hannan (1998) argue that banks not exposed to competition tend to be less efficient than 
banks subject to more competition. Delis and Tsionas (2009) show a methodology for the joint estimation 
of market power and efficiency. 
18 Not only can competition raise lending efficiency but also reduce bank probability of credit risk.  
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efficiency, because firm profitability is positively correlated with market share. The most 
efficient banks obtain both greater profitability and market shares and, as a consequence 
the market becomes more concentrated. They also suggest that the managers may have 
incentives to manage the firm efficiently because the capacity to establish a price above 
marginal cost generates sufficient profits to justify their management. Comparing to the 
literature (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1998; Delis and Tsionas, 2009; Turk-Ariss, 2010), 
although market power may induce managers to pursue objectives other than the 
maximization of profit, the objectives includes the growth of the firm, compensation of 
the staff, or the reduction of labor conflict at the expense of efficiency. As the above-
discussion, there is still a strong debate about whether market power improves bank 
efficiency or decreases that efficiency. Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows:     
Hypothesis 1. There is a significant relationship between market power and efficiency.  
 
3.2.2 Revenue diversification and bank performance 
The previous papers (e.g. Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012) suggest that when 
a bank expands their services into different activities or industries where competition is 
high, diversification may enhance its anti-risk capacity and efficiency. Furthermore, 
diversification creates competitive pressures amongst banks across a wider range of 
market segments, which increases innovation and efficiency in the provision of services 
(Landskroner et al., 2005; Acharya et al., 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008). Banks might increase 
production and sale of fee-based financial services to exploit cost scope economies by 
sharing input in joint production (Shim, 2013). More importantly, banks can reinforce 
their role as delegated monitors to increase the volume of intermediation when they 
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diversify across both interest-and non-interest income activities. Thus, it could limit 
information asymmetry and then increase the efficiency.  
However, the recent papers (e.g. Stiroh, 2006a; Mercieca et al., 2007; Lozano-Vivas and 
Pasiouras, 2010; Elsas et al., 2012) find that there are no direct diversification benefits 
within and across business lines and an inverse association between non-interest income 
and bank performance, comparing to Landskroner et al., (2005) who use the special case 
of Israel. They suggest that diversification may worsen risk-adjusted performance, 
particularly when banks over expand into industries where they face higher competition 
or lack expertise. The subsequent inability to effectively monitor loans may increase 
asymmetric information between a bank and its pool of borrowers. The effectiveness of 
a bank does not depend on whether diversification was achieved through organic growth 
or through M&A activity. In addition, if banks expand new services by using limited 
internal capital and resource, it would influence profitability and efficiency of existing 
services. Revenue diversification could not improve the efficiency directly but this 
strategy could help banks increase their market power in different activities (Turk-Ariss, 
2010). As a result, the increase in efficiency has benefited from market power instead of 
diversification. There is still a strong debate about whether revenue diversification 
improves bank efficiency or decreases that efficiency. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a significant relationship between revenue diversification and 
efficiency. 
 
85 
 
  
3.2.3 Market power and bank stability  
The previous literatures (e.g. Caminal and Matutes, 2002; Beck et al., 2004; Schaeck et 
al., 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014)19  argue that market power may increase bank 
fragility, because monopoly banks are inclined to take risky loan portfolios and the 
monitoring cost of these banks is high. Furthermore, banks with more loan market power 
are in a position to charge higher rates for loan customers, which may increase borrowers’ 
difficulties to repay principals (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005;20 Schaeck and Cihak, 2008). 
As a result of higher interest rates, it may be easy to increase the riskiness of loan 
portfolios, adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Bank becomes more similar by 
taking similar action or sharing highly correlated portfolios, which could enhance bank’s 
market power. This similarity caused by high level of market power may make the 
financial sector more susceptible (Nicoló and Kwast, 2002; Wagner, 2010). Hence, 
market power may increase the fragility of individual bank. Banks with greater market 
power are more likely to receive public guarantees, which may encourage risk-taking 
behaviour and generate a moral hazard problem.   
However, the traditional ‘‘competition-fragility” view suggests that market power can 
allow banks to earn monopoly rents, despite possible ensuing efficiency losses. The 
previous studies (e.g. Marcus, 1984; Allen and Gale 2004; Jimenez et al., 2010), deem 
that competition may not be a good tool to ensure bank stability due to lower market 
power forces banks to reduce their profit margins by taking excessive risk. In a more 
competitive market, banks may earn less economic rent and be reluctant to conduct 
                                                          
19 The study of Schaeck et al., (2009) find that financial crisis may be less likely to occur in a more 
competitive banking industry, or it may need a long to occur, by investigating banks operating in 45 nations 
over 1980–2005. Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) focus on cooperate banks and suggest that bank market power 
has negative effect on bank’s soundness.  
20 Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) find that market power may be exacerbating moral hazard incentives to shift 
into riskier projects and possibly resulting in a riskier set of bank clients due to adverse selection 
considerations. 
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monitoring, which may give rise to greater fragility. A less concentrated market may be 
more likely to trigger a financial crunch, since the absence of powerful market leader who 
could serve as a buffer against deterioration of financial environment. Banks with greater 
market power may be less likely to suffer financial problem because higher market power 
may provide a “capital buffer” to reduce the deteriorating effect of the financial crunch 
(Anginer et al., 2014a; Fu et al., 2014). Additionally, as banks gain market power, their 
franchise value increases. The increase in the franchise value may create high opportunity 
costs of bankruptcy so that such banks become more reluctant to engage in risky activities. 
As the above-discussion, there is still a strong debate about whether market power 
improves bank stability or decreases that stability. Therefore, our third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3. There is a significant relationship between market power and stability.     
 
3.2.4 Revenue diversification and bank stability  
Cornett et al., (2002) also support the view that revenue diversification is associated with 
an increased return on assets without any change in bank risk. Based on ensuring bank 
stability, diversifying portfolios could create extra profit in emerging markets. However, 
if loan services cannot be monitored effectively, asymmetric information may be 
increased. If banks diversify their portfolios into the property market like real estate, it 
would increase illiquidity and banks would not be able to cope with the public panic. It is 
obvious that diversifying into the security market may increase the volatility of banks’ 
income and the exposure to systemic shocks (Stiroh and Rumble 2006; De Jonghe, 2010). 
They conclude that generated higher and more volatile returns report a higher probability 
of insolvency than for banks with traditional product mixes. 
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However, revenue diversification enables banks to increase their capital buffer, which 
reduces the probability of fragility (Shim, 2013), and hedges against insolvency risk that 
reduces the occurrence of costly financial distress (Stiroh, 2006a; Stiroh, 2006b). They 
consider that expanding banks’ activities may reduce risk, with the main risk-reduction 
gains arising from insurance rather than securities activity. Scida and Vagheti (2018) 
indicate that bank mergers as a diversification mechanism, through increasing the extent 
of diversification at individual institutions has positive impact on bank stability. But it 
may also increase the similarity of banking industry. Furthermore, the literatures (e.g. 
Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Lepetit et al., 2008; Nguyen et al., 2012) suggest that the purpose 
of banks may be not to use revenue diversification to earn economic rent, but they may 
use these non-profit activities to intentionally reduce their revenue volatility.  
Interestingly, if banks involve fewer diversified activities, the gains from diversification 
are offset by the increased exposure to more volatile non-interest income activities for 
more diversified US banks (Stiroh and Rumble 2006). More importantly, the studies (e.g. 
Froot and Stein, 1998; Cebenoyan, and Strahan, 2004) find that banks engaging in active 
credit risk management can hold riskier loans, while consequently they suggest that 
diversified banks take on more risk and operate with greater financial leverage. As the 
above-discussion, there is still a strong debate about whether revenue diversification 
improves bank stability or decreases that stability. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is as 
follows:  
Hypothesis 4. There is a significant relationship between revenue diversification and 
stability. 
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3.3 Data description 
3.3.1 Estimating market power, bank performance and stability     
We use data on the bank-level variables from BankScope and select the accounting 
information from 11 South-East Asian countries (Australia, China, Hong Kong China, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) 
including 329 commercial and saving banks. In terms of the time span of the database, 
We use the data from the period of 2000 to 2012 and all of them are reported in $US. 
Panel A, Panel B and Panel C in Table 1 presents the summary values for estimating bank 
market power, cost inefficiency and Z-score. For evaluating revenue diversification, we 
use the ratio as non-interest income to total assets21, which is collected from BankScope.   
 
3.3.2 Control variables 
3.3.2.1 Regulatory variables 
Beck et al., (2006b) indicate that regulations provide a simple robustness test for 
analysing whether competition and revenue diversification influence financial stability. 
It also offers additional information about their relationship. Following the studies of 
Barth et al., (2004), Laeven and Levine (2009) and Pasiouras et al., (2009), we includes 
four regulatory variables such as ACTR, CAPR and SPR, PMON22 for investigating the 
stability. Information on regulation is obtained from a database, which has been updated 
                                                          
21 Maudos and Solís (2009) and Nguyen et al., (2012) think that because of BankScope’s data limitation, 
non-interest income may be a good indicator to represent revenue diversification. 
22  ACTR indicates the level of restrictions on the banks’ activities. CAPR is an indicator of capital 
requirements, accounting for both overall and initial capital stringency. For the overall capital stringency, 
it determines whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value 
losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy. SPR is a measure of the power of the supervisory 
agencies. Greater values indicates more power of supervisions. It is examined on the basis of the answers 
and the aim of this measurement is to discover whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to 
take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. PMON indicates whether there are incentives for the 
private monitoring of firms. A higher value suggests higher disclosure requirements and more incentives 
to increase private monitoring. 
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by Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2012) in the World Bank to provide regulatory responses to a 
broad number of questions. In our sample, regulation denotes a vector of four regulatory 
indicators. Since the indicators are highly correlated, we use the BRindex as an aggregate 
regulation index (BRindex = ACTR + CAPR + SPR + PMON). Panel E in Table 1 shows 
a summary of the regulatory variables.  
 
3.3.2.2 Institutional variables 
When estimating the quality of institutions, we use the institutional variables, which are 
database covered by Abiad et al (2010). These correspond to a number of indices, which 
evaluate institutional quality in the countries examined. We use five indexes obtained 
from the World Bank to reflect the institutional environment23 , such as governance 
effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and regulatory quality. 
All of them take values between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher values reflecting greater 
institutional quality. The previous papers (e.g. Beck et al., 2006a; Lensink et al., 2008; 
Houston et al., 2011; Delis 2012) indicate that the high income countries about the impact 
of foreign investment on efficiency depends on the quality of institutions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to control the impact of institutions. Since the indicators are highly correlated, 
we use an aggregate institutional environment index (IEindex = Governance 
                                                          
23 Governance effectiveness represents the quality of public services. This variable includes the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The variable rule 
of law, in turn, reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society. It also means that it is an assessment of the law’s quality, with higher values representing greater 
quality of the judicial system but lower ratings indicating inferior enforcement. The variable of control of 
corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption. Political stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. Regulatory quality reflects perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
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Effectiveness + Rule of Law + Control of Corruption + Political stability + Regulatory 
quality). Panel E in Table 1 shows these variables.    
 
3.3.3 Other control variables 
Panel E in Table 1 also shows the other control variables. In this paper, we control a 
number of macroeconomic and bank-specific variables, which can have an impact on the 
bank performance. Thus, in order to represent the macroeconomic environment and 
monetary conditions, we use variables such as GDP growth, inflation and domestic credit 
to the private sector as control variables, which are obtained from the World 
Development and the International Monetary Fund indicators. The variable GDP growth, 
and inflation rate can represent countries’ characteristics respectively, while domestic 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP represents the level of development of the 
financial sector. We also control the ‘crisis effect. in our model, which is measured as a 
dummy variable24. The crisis dummy is positively and significantly related to bank risk, 
which implies that banks are more fragile during financial turmoil (Fu et al., 2014). 
The control variables of bank-specific variables, which are obtained from BankScope, are 
used for reflecting individual bank characteristics. We use the natural logarithm of total 
assets to represent bank size and the ratio of total equity to total assets to control bank 
capitalization. Delis (2012) points out that the large and well-capitalized banks are 
probably able to have access to a cheaper source of funds, due to scale economies, 
informational asymmetries and moral hazard issues. Furthermore, large banks can play 
an effective role in institutions in enhancing their effectiveness and may have a positive 
impact on cost efficiency. Therefore, this control variable can highlight banks’ 
                                                          
24 Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. 
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characteristics on certain regulations. In addition, we use the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets to represent bank liquidity for controlling the differences in bank assets. It is 
obvious that banks with high levels of liquid assets in cash and government securities 
may receive lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 STD 
Panel A - Estimation of Market power 
Total cost (TC) 1878 1.741 0.724 1.516 2.662 5.501 
Price of loans (W1) 1878 0.033 0.011 0.035 0.039 2.321 
Price of labor (W2) 1878 0.103 0.052 0.113 0.151 1.538 
Price of capital (W3) 1878 0.022 0.001 0.026 0.041 1.187 
Panel B - Estimation of Cost inefficiency       
Total cost (TC) 1878 1.741 0.724 1.516 2.662 5.501 
Price of labor (P1) 1878 0.103 0.052 0.113 0.151 1.538 
Price of capital (P2) 1878 0.022 0.001 0.026 0.041 1.187 
Net loan (Q1) 1878 3.127 1.741 3.667 4.124 4.609 
Other earning assets (Q2) 1878 3.131 2.168 2.891 3.891 4.842 
Equity (N) 1878 3.134 2.032 2.915 3.517 2.262 
GDP per capital 1878 9.350 5.132 8.889 11.22 1.065 
Panel C - Estimation of Stability 
    
ROA 1878 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.015 2.183 
Equity to total asset (E/TA) 1878 0.102 0.075 0.121 0.164 2.179 
Panel D - Determinant of Efficiency and Stability 
  
Lerner index 1878 0.430 0.340 0.447 0.534 0.164 
RD 1878 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.126 
Panel E – Control variables 
ACTR 1878 8.613 3.415 8.902 10.56 2.331 
CAPR 1878 6.743 2.345 7.032 8.994 1.635 
SPR 1878 10.19 5.321 11.02 13.68 2.017 
PMON 1878 8.768 4.322 8.654 10.88 1.235 
BRindex 1878 35.036 32.500 35.000 40.000 4.671 
      (Continued) 
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Table 1-(Continued)       
Summary statistics       
Variables N Mean P25 Median P75 STD 
Governance effectiveness 1878 0.281 -0.845 0.199 1.321 0.706 
Rule of law 1878 0.153 -1.033 0.245 1.452 0.758 
Control of corruption 1878 -0.141 -1.115 -0.169 0.227 0.916 
Political stability  1878 -0.645 -1.244 -0.763 -0.477 0.867 
Regulatory quality 1878 0.107 -0.333 -0.219 0.237 0.762 
IEindex 1878 0.164 -1.001 0.178 1.512 1.243 
Crisis dummy 1878 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.399 
GDP % 1878 6.403 3.654 6.548 8.441 0.033 
Inflation % 1878 4.942 1.035 5.032 7.652 0.033 
Private sector credit  1878 8.792 8.122 8.492 9.114 0.974 
Bank Size 1878 9.816 6.541 9.561 11.23 0.855 
Liquidity 1878 0.232 0.112 0.255 0.303 0.166 
Panel F – Instrument variables 
Fee income 1878 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.003 
Equity to total asset (E/TA) 1878 0.102 0.075 0.121 0.164 2.179 
ROE 1878 13.77 7.129 11.36 15.25 25.03 
Concentration ratio (CR5) 1878 63.51 21.28 58.31 88.35 14.73 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics (number, mean, P25, median, P75, minimum, maximum and standard deviation) for the variables used in estimating bank 
inefficiency, competition and stability, used in the determinant of inefficiency, competition and stability, and control variables. Units of the variables for estimation 
are as follows: price of loans, price of capital, price of labor, GDP per capita, ROA and equity to total assets are ratios; Total cost, Net loan, other earning assets and 
equity are log variables. The variables for determinant efficiency, competition and stability are revenue diversification (RD) and the Lerner index. The control 
variables are activity restrictions, capital requirement, power of the supervisory agencies and private monitoring. The institutional variables are governance 
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption. BRindex is an aggregate regulation index (BRindex = ACTR + CAPR + SPR + PMON). IEindex is an aggregate 
institutional environment index (IEindex = Governance Effectiveness + Rule of Law + Control of Corruption + Regulatory quality). GDP growth, inflation and Private 
sector credit are in % terms. Bank size is the log of variables while CR5, liquidity, ratio of fee income, non-performance to total asset and ROE are simple ratios. 
Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise 
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Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of variables that are shown in Table 1. Prior to 
carrying out the data analysis, we check for the issue of multicollinearity. The highest 
correlation value is between government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, 
political stability and regulatory quality, which are more than 0.85 respectively. 
Furthermore, the regulatory variables are also found to have a higher correlation. 
Therefore, we use the aggregate index, such as BRindex and IEindex, in order to prevent 
the issue of multicollinearity. However, other values are within an acceptable level 
because all of them are lower than 0.70. 
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Table 2                   
Correlation matrix                   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
LI 1                      
RD -0.04 1                     
AR 0.01 -0.08 1                    
CR -0.06 -0.16 0.26 1                   
SPR -0.17 0.20 0.18 -0.12 1                  
PM -0.11 -0.21 0.31 0.52 0.12 1                 
BR -0.12 -0.06 0.75 0.60 0.54 0.66 1                
GE -0.02 -0.12 -0.57 -0.21 -0.10 0.02 -0.41 1               
RL -0.03 -0.09 -0.61 -0.20 -0.20 -0.12 -0.50 0.94 1              
CC -0.04 -0.09 -0.59 -0.18 -0.10 -0.02 -0.40 0.97 0.96 1             
PS -0.04 -0.20 -0.44 -0.07 -0.20 0.16 -0.28 0.89 0.85 0.88 1            
RQ -0.05 -0.09 -0.63 -0.22 -0.10 0.01 -0.44 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.88 1           
IE -0.04 -0.12 -0.58 -0.18 -0.20 0.01 -0.42 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.98 1          
GDP 0.17 -0.16 0.29 0.29 -0.20 0.25 0.21 -0.30 -0.30 -0.31 -0.15 -0.33 
-
0.28 1         
IF -0.09 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.24 -0.15 0.16 -0.43 -0.43 -0.45 -0.58 -0.49 
-
0.50 0.09 1        
DCR 0.05 -0.31 -0.21 -0.07 -0.40 0.31 -0.22 0.67 0.56 0.60 0.72 0.64 0.66 
-
0.04 
-
0.64 1       
BS 0.09 -0.21 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.08 0.17 0.28 0.18 0.19 0.02 
-
0.27 0.33 1      
LR 0.24 -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.50 -0.09 -0.30 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.25 
-
0.15 0.23 
-
0.21 1     
                    
(Continued) 
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Table 2- Continued                   
Correlation matrix                   
FI -0.01 0.76 -0.15 -0.19 0.27 -0.32 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.27 -0.10 
-
0.15 
-
0.24 0.28 
-
0.44 
-
0.17 
-
0.17 1    
ETA -0.01 0.23 -0.19 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.21 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01 
-
0.01 0.02 
-
0.47 0.18 0.19 1   
ROE 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 
-
0.10 0.09 0.07 
-
0.11 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.1 1  
CR5 -0.04 -0.18 -0.24 -0.15 0.10 0.33 -004 0.55 0.35 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.53 
-
0.08 
-
0.46 0.52 0.33 
-
0.05 
-
0.17 -0.04 -0.06 1 
Notes: This table reports the correlation matrix of selected variables of banks during 2000–2012. LI is Lerner index. RD is revenue diversification. AR, CR, SPR and PM are activities 
restriction, capital requirement, supervisor power and private monitoring. BR is BRindex. GE is governance effectiveness. RL is rule of law and CC is control of corruption. PS is political 
stability. RQ is regulatory quality. IE is IEindex. GDP is GDP ratio IF is inflation. DCR is Private sector credit of GDP. BS is bank size. LR is liquidity ratio. FI is fee income. ETA is 
equity to total asset. ROE is return on asset. CR5 is concentration ratio.  
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3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Estimating market power 
In this study, we use the Lerner index to measure banks’ market power, according to 
Turk-Ariss (2010), Anginer et al., (2014a) and Fu et al., (2014). This approach has been 
widely used in recent bank research, because it captures the capacity of pricing power by 
evaluating the difference between price and marginal cost. The reason for using the 
Lerner index is that it is more accurate than the approach of concentration (HHI), 
according to the studies of Berger and Hannan (1998) and Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2007). Moreover, the advantage of the Lerner index over other indicators of 
competition (such as the PR model) is that it allows market power to be proxied at a bank 
level and its evolution over time can be analysed. We focus on the marginal costs and 
inputs as well as outputs on the basis of a frontier costs function, like what is usual in the 
literatures (Turk-Ariss 2010; Fiordelisi and Mare 2014). This value ranges between 0 and 
1. If the Lerner index=1, the market is pure monopoly while if the Lerner index=0, the 
market is perfect competition. This indicator is calculated as follows: 
𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                                            (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price of the output of bank 𝑖 at year 𝑡, which is calculated as the ratio of 
total revenue (sum of interest income, operating income and non-interest income) to total 
asset. and 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the marginal cost. Higher value implies lower competition. In line with 
Anginer et al. (2014a), we estimate the conventional marginal cost by using a translog 
cost function:  
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ln𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1ln𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(ln𝑄𝑖,𝑡)
2 + 𝛽3ln𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4ln𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5ln𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6ln𝑄𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7ln𝑄𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8ln𝑄𝑖,𝑡ln𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9(ln𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡)
2 + 𝛽10(ln𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡)
2 + 𝛽11(ln𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽12ln𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡ln𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13ln𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡ln𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14ln𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡ln𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽15𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                           (2) 
where 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total cost, which is calculated as total expense (non-interest expenses plus 
interest expenses). 𝑄𝑖,𝑡  is the quantity of output, which is evaluated as total asset. 
Consistent with previous studies of bank competition, we select the following three inputs:   
𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡 (the price of loans) is the ratio of interest expense to total assets. 𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡 (the price of 
labor) is calculated as the ratio of personnel expense to total assets. 𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡 (the price of 
capital) is measured as non-interest expense to total assets. The subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 mean 
each bank and year respectively. We also ensure homogeneity in the above formula25. 
According to equation (2), we can estimate the marginal cost as follows: 
𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑄𝑖,𝑡
[𝛽1 + 2𝛽2ln𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6ln𝑊1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7ln𝑊2,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8ln𝑊3,𝑖,𝑡 ]                                     (3) 
Lerner index measures are superior to concentration as measures of market power, 
because it is more inclusive in capturing the factors that drive market power (Borenstein 
and Bushnell, 1999; Dell’Ariccia, 2001; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
Aghion et al. (1996) point out that Lerner Index has several advantages over indicators 
such as market share since it is a measure that tests differences between prices and 
                                                          
25 We impose: 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 + 𝛽5 + 1; 𝛽6 + 𝛽7 + 𝛽8 = 0; 𝛽10 + 𝛽12 + 𝛽14 = 0; 𝛽11 + 𝛽13 + 𝛽14 = 0 
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marginal costs and does not depend so critically on geographic and product market 
definitions. Market share often produces spurious results (Ribon and Yosha, 1999). 
3.4.2 Estimating performance 
For estimating bank performance, we use cost inefficiency. When analysing bank 
performance (inefficiency), we opt for stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) rather than data 
development analysis (DEA). The method of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is better 
than the approach of data development analysis (DEA), as one of the reasons is that it can 
allow us to distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic shocks in the estimation 
of efficiency scores (Pasiouras et al., 2009). In addition to this, our sample selects panel 
data rather than cross-section data, which is more suitable for the efficiency frontier 
method26. Comparing to other studies (e.g. Brissimis et al., 2008 and Delis et al., 2011)27 
for estimating the efficiency of banks by using productivity measure, we use cost 
efficiency28. In contrast to the study of Barth et al., (2002), Pasiouras et al., (2006) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2008), which mainly use general methods and financial ratios for 
evaluating bank performance, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is more accurate and 
considers inputs and outputs. The specific model for examining the cost frontier can be 
written as follows:  
                                                          
26 The reason why the efficient frontier approach is superior is that it can simultaneously account for 
relevant inputs and outputs of a bank, as well as for differences in the input prices (Pasiouras et al 2009). 
27 Brissimis et al., (2008) examines bank performance by investigating efficiency, productivity growth and 
net interest margin, and mainly focuses on the impact of the banking sector reform among European 
countries. Similarly, Delis et al., (2011) also analyses banking performance through estimating the total 
factor productivity growth, but the aim of Brissimis et al., (2008) is to examine whether banking industry 
reform influences banking efficiency. 
28 Cost efficiency is a wider concept than technical efficiency because it refers to both technical and 
allocative efficiency (Pasiouras et al., 2009). 
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ln 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑖
ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑖
ln 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ln 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ln 𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑖
ln 𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜉𝑖,𝑗 ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗
𝑗𝑖
ln 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ln 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜀𝑖
𝑖
ln 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                              (4) 
where 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 , which is calculated as total expense (non-interest expenses plus interest 
expenses), is the total cost for bank 𝑖 at year 𝑡; 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of inputs. We select the 
following two inputs: price of labor (𝑃1), calculated as the ratio of personnel expense to 
total assets; price of financial capital (𝑃2), calculated as total interest expense to total 
interest bearing borrowed funds; 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 denotes a vector of values of outputs. We choose 
two outputs which include loans (net of provisions) and other earning assets (government 
securities, bonds, investment, CDs and T-bills); 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of fixed netput
29; while 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variable. The term 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is symmetric error and represents that 
management of a bank cannot deal with this random fluctuation. 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 captures the effects 
of inefficiency relative to the stochastic cost frontier30. We utilize GDP per capita31 to 
capture country-level heterogeneity.  
 
3.4.3 Estimating of stability 
For estimating individual bank stability, we use the Z-score, which has been used 
extensively in the previous literature as a stability indicator (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
                                                          
29 Following Berger and Mester (1997) idea, we use the equity of each bank in the model as a fixed netput 
(N) to control for differences in risk preferences. 
30 It is assumed to be independently distributed on one-side, meaning that this effect has the potential to 
enhance the costs of banks over the best-practice level. 
31 GDP per capita may be an indicator of the dynamism of each economy. 
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Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2014). Unlike most of the previous 
papers using probability of bankruptcy to denote an individual bank’s risk, we analyse 
the insolvency risk of a bank by using Z-score. This method, which is inversely related to 
the probability of bank insolvency, captures the distance from insolvency, combining 
accounting measures of profitability, leverage and volatility (Beck et al., 2013a; Uhde 
and Heimeshoff, 2009). The advantages are as follows: (1) it can avoid the impact of cash 
flows and stock prices fluctuation; (2) regulators may be more inclined to consider 
insolvency risk because this indicator may quickly reflect the effect of policy. Following 
their methodology, we use accounting ratios to estimate the Z-score as follows: 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑐,𝑡
                                                                    (5) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the return on assets; 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of equity to total assets; 
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation of return on assets within each individual country 𝑐 in 
time 𝑡.  
The z-score measures the distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952). Insolvency is defined as 
a state in which losses surmount equity (E < π) (where E is equity and π is profits). The 
probability of insolvency, therefore, can be expressed as prob(−ROA < CAR), where 
ROA ( = π/A) is the return on assets and CAR (= E/A) is the capital assets ratio. If 
profits are normally distributed, then the inverse of the probability of insolvency equals 
(ROA+CAR)/ 𝜎 (ROA), where 𝜎(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. The Z-score 
provides an approach to estimate a bank’s soundness and it is inversely related to the 
probability of a bank’s insolvency (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
According to Čihák and Hesse (2010)’s study, an important feature of the z-score is that 
it is a fairly objective measure of soundness across different groups of financial 
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institutions. It is an objective measure because it focuses on the risk of insolvency, i.e., 
on the risk that a bank (whether commercial, stated-own, or other) runs out of capital and 
reserves. The z-score applies equally to banks that use a high risk/high return strategy and 
those that use a low risk/row return strategy, provided that those strategies lead to the 
same risk adjusted returns. If an institution “chooses” to have lower risk-adjusted returns, 
it can still have the same or higher z-score if it has a higher capitalization. In this sense, 
the z-score provides an objective measure of soundness. 
 
3.4.4 Fixed effect estimator 
3.4.4.1 Determinant of bank performance  
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐          (6) 
In this equation, 𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 which is calculated by the translog function model (equation 4), we 
use cost inefficiency to reflect bank performance. Lower value means greater 
performance. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡  includes two strategies, such as market power and 
revenue diversification. We use 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡  to reflect a bank’s market power in interest 
activities. 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 which is calculated by the translog function model (the equation 1,2,3) 
is the value of the competition of a bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡; We use 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  to reflect revenue 
diversification in non-interest activities. 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 measures as non-interest income to total 
assets to present the overall diversification of bank 𝑖 operation in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝑀𝑡,𝑐 
is a set of variables reflecting the macroeconomic conditions in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 
is a set of variables representing individual bank characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is the error item.  
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3.4.4.2 Determinant of bank stability  
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                                (7) 
In this equation, we use 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡, which is calculated from equation 5, to reflect bank 
stability. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 includes two strategies, such as market power and revenue 
diversification. We use 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡  to reflect a bank’s market power in interest activities. 
𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 which is calculated by the translog function model (the equation 1,2,3) is the value 
of the competition of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡; We use 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 to reflect revenue diversification in 
non-interest activities. 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 measures as non-interest income to total assets to present the 
overall diversification of bank 𝑖 operation in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝑀𝑡,𝑐 is a set of variables 
reflecting the macroeconomic conditions in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is a set of variables 
representing individual bank characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is the error item. 
 
3.4.5 Dynamic Panel Model  
For the sake of addressing the simultaneous relationship in the above model, we use a 
dynamic panel model to eliminate the potential endogenous problem by employing 
instrumental variables. Therefore, according to Arellano and Bover (1995) approach, we 
employ an instrumental variable technique with a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator, for addressing the likely endogeneity in formulas (6) and (7). 
Furthermore, when facing heteroskedasticity and endogeneity problems, the GMM 
estimator introduced by Hansen (1982) may be more efficient. The dynamic panel model 
are as follows: 
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                  (8) 
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In this equation, 𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of bank performance as proxied by cost inefficiency. 
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged performance independent variable. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 includes two 
strategies, such as market power and revenue diversification. 𝑀𝑡,𝑐 is a set of variables 
reflecting the macroeconomic conditions in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is a set of variables 
representing individual bank characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is the error item. 
And: 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐                                                                                                              (9) 
In this equation, we use 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡, which is calculated from equation 5, to reflect bank 
stability. 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the lagged stability independent variable. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
includes two strategies, such as market power and revenue diversification. 𝑀𝑡,𝑐 is a set of 
variables reflecting the macroeconomic conditions in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is a set of 
variables representing individual bank characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 is the error item. 
 
3.4.6 Instrumental variables estimation 
We run a two-stage least squares instrumental variable analysis (2SLS) 32by using the lag 
variable of the Lerner index33, one bank-level variable (ETA) and one country-level 
variable (CR5) as our instruments to measure the impact of the Lerner index. A higher 
                                                          
32 We use the Cragg-Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there is one 
endogenous regressor as in our 2SLS models, the null hypothesis is that the instruments have no explanatory 
power in the first stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and two excluded instruments, the 
critical value (Stock–Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg–Donald statistic for 10% maximal size distortion is 
19.93. Since we have two instruments and one endogenous regressor, we use the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. If 
the test statistic exceeds the critical value, we reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the structural error and conclude that at least one of the instruments is not exogenous.  
33 We use the lag variable of the Lerner index as instruments to control the autocorrelation problem.  
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bank profitability leads to greater market power and the ratio of equity to total asset is a 
good proxy for profitability (Mirzaei et al., 2013). Furthermore, a bank’s market power 
is closely related to the industry competition (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009). If the 
competition is great in the banking sector, it would give banks an incentive to increase 
their market share. They also use Lerner index as a competition indicator to reflect a 
bank’s market power and employ CR5 to reflect the degree of competition in the banking 
system. Therefore, we can account for bank-specific and country-level characteristics to 
avoid weak instrument biases and invalid inferences. 
For analysing the impact of revenue diversification, we run a two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable analysis (2SLS) by using two bank-level variables (ROE and fee 
income) as our instruments. ROE is an indicator of Profitability, which encourages banks 
to diversify their sources of revenue (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). Additionally, 
fee income belongs to non-interest income activities, so it affects the degree of revenue 
diversification. (Nguyen et al., 2012). Therefore, we account for these two bank-specific 
characteristics to avoid weak instrument biases and invalid inferences. 
 
3.4.7 Robustness: One-step estimation model of efficiency 
Except with the two-step estimation to analyse the relationship between inefficiency and 
external factors. We also employ inefficiency explanatory variables in the specification 
using the method of Battese and Coelli (1995). Previous papers (e.g. Jiang et al., 2013; 
Tabak et al., 2012) suggest that considering external factors for measuring efficiency by 
using one-step estimation may be more accurate, so that the efficiency score may reflect 
whether bank performance could be influenced by other external factors. Thus, bank 
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efficiency can not just can be affected by individual operations. The model for estimation 
and determinant of bank efficiency is following: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝐿𝑛(𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝛾𝑖𝑡
+ (𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 𝑈𝑖𝑡)                                                                           (9) 
where t is a time trend; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of external variables. We employ institutional 
environment variables to control the cross-country heterogeneity of the banking markets. 
The above papers consider the use of macroeconomic variables in the translog functions 
to be important for the correct estimation of cross-country efficiency scores. 
 
3.4.8 Dynamic panel threshold model 
As a further step, we use a dynamic panel threshold model that enables us to identify any 
regime shifts due to bank strategy. We build on the dynamic panel threshold model of 
Kremer et al. (2013) based on the cross-sectional balanced panel threshold methodology 
introduced by Hansen (1999). This model identifies changes in coefficients of the main 
regressors of our interest, whilst it detects thresholds and thereby different regimes 
endogenously. In addition, comparing this to the study of Nguyen et al., (2012), this 
model can allow us to reveal if and when there is a break in the data process. According 
to the papers (e.g. Hansen, 1999; Kremer et al., 2013; Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016), 
we would be able to identify the exact value of the structural break, and detect possible 
shifts. Therefore, the equations are as follows:  
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (10) 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝑞𝑖,𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (11) 
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where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , are the dependent variables and stand for the 
cost inefficiency and Z-score respectively. 𝜇1 is the bank-specific fixed effect, while 𝜆1 
and 𝜆2 stand for the two reverse regression slopes based on the assumption that exists two 
regimes, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the random error. 𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of explanatory variables that include 
bank-specific and country-level control variables. 𝛿1 is the regime dependent intercept as 
introduced by Bick (2007) and its inclusion is essential for estimating both the threshold 
value and the coefficient magnitude of the two regimes. 𝐼  is the indicator function 
suggesting the regime specified by the threshold variable 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 and the threshold value 𝛾 . 
The 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
∗  takes the following transformation: 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
∗ = √
𝑇 − 𝑡
𝑇 − 𝑡 + 1
[𝜀𝑖,𝑡
−
1
𝑇 − 𝑡
(𝜀𝑖(t+1) + ⋯ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑇)]                                                                (12)  
In the equation (12) the threshold variable is 𝑞𝑖,𝑡, and herein refers to the two measures 
of bank strategy: (1) bank’s market power and (2) revenue diversification. 𝛾  is the 
threshold value which would indicate those observations above (high regime) and below 
the threshold value (low regime). The above dynamic panel threshold model employs a 
GMM estimation method (Arellano and Bover, 1995) to address issues related to 
endogeneity and avoid the serial correlation in the transformed errors. The estimation of 
the threshold variable follows a two-step procedure; in the first step, the estimation of a 
reduced type regression for the endogenous variable as a function of instruments takes 
place. The predicted values are used to replace the endogenous variable in the equation 
(10). Next, we estimate equation (10) for a fixed threshold value where the threshold 
variable is replaced by its predicted values obtained in the first step. Threshold values are 
then specified by the minimization of the concentrated sum of squared errors as 𝛾𝑖
∗ =
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𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛾𝑆𝑖(𝛾) (Chan, 1993). Lastly, slope coefficients 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 could be estimated with 
the usage of the GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Summary the estimation of bank market power, inefficiency and financial 
stability      
Table 3 shows a summary of estimation of bank market power, inefficiency and financial 
stability from 2000 to 2012 including 11 South-East Asian countries. In order to avoid 
heterogeneous error, we estimate the Lerner index and the bank cost inefficiency (BCIE) 
separately in the advanced countries group and the developing countries group. Advanced 
countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, Japan and Singapore, and others are the 
in developing countries group. 
In panel A, values of three indexes vary across countries. The highest value on the Lerner 
index is China, which means that there is the lowest level of competition in the banking 
industry. While Australia has the lowest value of the indicator, meaning that competition 
in the banking sector is fiercest in these 11 countries. The results from the Philippines and 
Thailand are similar to the studies of Fu et al., (2014) but the value of India is higher that 
the result of Soedarmono et al., (2013). For bank performance, Indonesia has the lowest 
cost inefficiency so that their banks need to improve by 20.6% to assess the cost efficiency 
frontier. Perera et al., (2007) also show that Sri Lanka had an efficiency score higher than 
0.78, which is similar with our result. However, banks in Malaysia and India have the 
largest cost inefficiency levels, with scores of 0.251 and 0.256 respectively, while banks 
in Australia have the better performance with inefficiency scores at about 0.210 which is 
a little lower than the results from Berger et al., (2009b). We use Z-score to represent 
financial stability and find that Indonesia has the largest value (50.17) comparing with 
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Japan (38.21). It is interesting that Indonesia has a more stable financial market with the 
lowest cost inefficiency and lower Lerner scores. Hence, we can expect that higher 
competition and efficiency may improve financial stability.   
In panel B, the Z-score decreases dramatically between 2007 and 2009, which implies 
that the international crunch has a huge impact on bank stability, in this region. This 
finding is also supported by Fu et al., (2014). When comparing the competition by year, 
the results show that there is a decreasing trend in the Lerner index during the financial 
crisis, meaning that competition is declining significantly. In addition, market power is 
lower between 2002 and 2004, when some South-East Asian countries decrease 
restrictions for foreign institutions’ entry. The rising trend for competition over the same 
period may be caused by financial liberalization and trade integration in this region 
(Dooley et al., 2004; Williams and Nguyen 2005)34.  
Table 3A shows the Chi-square test for different samples. The results indicate that Lerner 
Index and Inefficiency score are homogeneous, as the P-values are higher than 5 
percentage. This is because that when we estimate the Lerner index and bank inefficiency 
(IE) separately in the advanced countries group and the developing countries group. 
However, in the Chi-square test, the P-value of Z-score shows that it may exist 
heterogeneous error in two samples, which is lower than 5%. In order to avoid 
heterogeneous error, we separate our samples into advanced countries group and the 
developing countries group by using dynamic panel threshold model. Table 3B shows 
Chi-square test for the differences in means and medians of three independent variables 
across years. 
                                                          
34 Major South-East Asian countries enhance volume of trade with US, which increases their foreign 
exchange reserves and gives them opportunity to improve bank services and competition.  
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Table 3  
Summary of competition, performance and stability 
 N Lerner IE Z-score 
Panel A: mean by country 
Advanced countries 
Australia  77 0.247 0.210 40.56 
Japan 51 0.390 0.217 38.21 
Hong Kong  137 0.489 0.233 41.46 
Singapore 39 0.443 0.240 48.87 
Developing countries     
China 392 0.493 0.226 43.29 
India 409 0.462 0.256 41.13 
Indonesia 396 0.390 0.206 50.17 
Malaysia 54 0.252 0.251 42.97 
Philippines 99 0.421 0.242 40.64 
Sri Lanka 24 0.336 0.221 39.18 
Thailand 200 0.348 0.230 36.82 
Panel B: mean by year 
2000 36 0.450 0.193 35.93 
2001 56 0.442 0.275 38.78 
2002 64 0.411 0.268 40.45 
2003 72 0.430 0.222 43.67 
2004 104 0.427 0.192 46.23 
2005 115 0.445 0.219 44.88 
2006 144 0.453 0.255 42.11 
2007 159 0.423 0.238 39.46 
2008 177 0.421 0.232 36.48 
2009 196 0.447 0.201 38.93 
2010 217 0.458 0.192 40.25 
2011 263 0.430 0.213 43.36 
2012 275 0.432 0.220 44.11 
Notes: The Lerner is a bank-level indicator of bank competition calculated as difference between price 
and marginal cost as a percentage of price. The IE (cost inefficiency) is a bank-level indicator of bank 
performance calculated by stochastic frontier analysis approach. The Z-score is an accounting-based 
bank level indicator of financial stability. The results are calculated from the total sample, showing the 
values of each country and each year. 
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Table 3A    
Chi-square test for different samples   
Variables Lerner IE Z-score 
T-test -1.661 1.203 6.337 
P-value 0.097 0.229 0.000 
Countries (Number)    
Advanced 304 304 300 
Developing 1574 1574 1570 
Notes: 95% Conf. Interval    
 
Table 3B   
Chi-square test across years   
Variables N Lerner IE Z-score 
2000 36 0.365 1.916 4.295* 
  0.715 0.055 0.000 
2001 56 -0.587 -4.180* 1.144 
  0.557 0.000 0.252 
2002 64 -2.062* -3.889* 0.748 
  0.039 0.000 0.454 
2003 72 -3.201* 0.061 3.546* 
  0.001 0.951 0.000 
2004 104 -4.364* 3.416* -2.577* 
  0.000 0.000 0.010 
2005 115 -1.069 0.390 2.931* 
  0.285 0.696 0.003 
2006 144 1.212 -4.272* 0.976 
  0.225 0.000 0.328 
2007 159 0.496 -3.028* -0.852 
  0.619 0.002 0.394 
2008 177 1.579 -1.911 2.901* 
  0.114 0.056 0.003 
2009 196 2.065 2.131* 2.806 
  0.039 0.033 0.005 
2010 217 0.171 5.087 -1.307 
  0.863 0.000 0.191 
2011 263 1.067 1.019 -4.717* 
  0.285 0.308 0.000 
2012 275 0.871 0.495 -3.880 
  0.383 0.620 0.000 
Notes: Table shows the T-test and P-value. 95% Conf. Interval. 
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3.5.2 Determinant of bank performance 
3.5.2.1 Market power and bank performance 
The first three models in Table 4 show the relationship between bank cost inefficiency 
and market power. It is obvious that a control variable, such as BRindex, is significant at 
1% and has a negative impact on cost inefficiency. It means that these results support the 
study of Barth et al., (2007) that banking regulation could improve bank performance.35 
Furthermore, the macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and Private sector credit of 
GDP, are significant at 1% and have a negative effect on cost inefficiency. It means that 
a higher rate of inflation and a higher level of development can enable a boost in economic 
growth, which can be an incentive for banks to pursue effectiveness. However, the bank 
specific-level data, such as bank size, has a positive relationship with inefficiency. Large 
banks may be more likely to a suffer moral hazard problem and lack the incentive to 
manage effectively (Schaeck and Cihak, 2008). Importantly, the fixed effect model shows 
that the Lerner index has a negative impact on cost inefficiency in the first model. In the 
second model, we use the lag variable of cost inefficiency and market power as 
instruments in the GMM model for dealing with an endogenous problem.36 The result 
suggests that the Lerner index is significant at the 1% level and has a negative relationship 
with cost inefficiency. Finally, by using the lag variable of the Lerner index, one bank-
level variable (ETA) and one country-level variable (CR5) as our instruments, the IV 
model also shows a negative connection between market power and inefficiency. 
                                                          
35 Restriction on bank activities, capital requirement, powerful agency and private monitoring may improve 
bank performance Barth et al., (2004). If banks engage in diverse activities such as securities underwriting, 
real estate investment and insurance underwriting, it may create conflicts of interest with their fundamental 
business. Capital requirement helps banks to increase their probability of survival and market share. Bank 
supervisors can maintain the efficiency, integrity and transparency of the banking industry and then 
motivate bank management to provide high quality financial reports. PMON may establish disclosure 
requirements for banks, and then allow private agents to assess banking information and transaction costs 
that could enhance the profitability and productivity of banks. 
36 We test for the relevance of these instruments or the endogeneity of competition using the Arellano-Bond 
test, which estimates whether autocorrelation exists, and the Hansen test replaces the Sargan test to reveal 
whether the instruments are valid. 
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According to the results from models (1) to (3), higher market power can improve bank 
performance, which is in line with our hypothesis H1 that there is a significant 
relationship between market power and efficiency. Higher market power is closely related 
to profitability and allow banks to earn economic rent so that it may drive a bank to work 
effectively (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; Pasiouras, 2008). Additionally, 
Banks controlled by an authority may be the performance leader in the sector (Turk-Ariss, 
2010). Since our sample focuses on South-East Asian countries and most of them are 
transition economies, a large majority of banks are dominated by government and occupy 
a huge proportion of the market share (Claessens and Horen 2014).  
 
3.5.2.1 Revenue diversification and bank performance 
The last three models in Table 4 show the relationship between bank cost inefficiency 
and revenue diversification. It is obvious that the control variables, such as BRindex and 
inflation, are significant at 1% and have a negative impact on cost inefficiency while bank 
size has a statistically positive effect on inefficiency. The fixed effect model in the fourth 
model shows that the coefficient of revenue diversification is significant at the 1% level 
and positive in relation to cost inefficiency. In the fifth model, we use a lag variable of 
cost inefficiency and revenue diversification as instruments in the GMM model for 
dealing with the endogenous problem. This model also displays a positive connection 
between diversification and cost inefficiency. Finally, we run a two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable analysis (2SLS) by using two bank-level variables (ROE and fee 
income) as our instruments. The IV model suggests that revenue diversification decreases 
bank performance, which is in line with the hypothesis H2 that there is a significant 
relationship between revenue diversification and efficiency. Our results are different from 
the studies (e.g. Landskroner et al. 2005; Acharya et al., 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008), 
114 
 
  
because diversification may worsen risk-adjusted performance, when banks over expand 
into industries where they lack expertise, particularly in developing countries. 
Furthermore, our sample focuses on Asian countries where banks are more likely to suffer 
asymmetric information in traditional services, let alone new activities.  
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Table 4      
The determinant of Cost Inefficiency      
 Fixed effect GMM IV Fixed effect GMM IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IE IE IE IE IE IE 
Lerner -0.089** -0.424*** -0.103*    
 (0.036) (0.071) (0.054)    
RD    0.777** 2.677*** 0.669* 
    (0.331) (0.646) (0.376) 
BRindex -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
IEindex 0.001 0.009* 0.007* 0.006 0.008* 0.006* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inflation -0.259*** -0.505*** -0.314*** -0.212** -0.299** -0.208*** 
 (0.094) (0.145) (0.079) (0.091) (0.149) (0.072) 
GDP -0.074 0.408*** -0.016 -0.091 0.339*** -0.092 
 (0.070) (0.120) (0.082) (0.070) (0.099) (0.083) 
DCR -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank size 0.030** 0.071*** 0.021** 0.037*** 0.069*** 0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) 
Liquidity 0.038 0.181*** 0.052 0.027 0.032 0.026 
 (0.042) (0.050) (0.032) (0.042) (0.042) (0.031) 
Crisis_dummy 0.002 -0.012 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.043) (0.016) (0.044) (0.005) (0.012) 
L.IE  0.470***   0.553***  
  (0.054)   (0.046)  
      (Continued) 
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Table 4-Continued       
The determinant of Cost Inefficiency      
 Fixed effect GMM IV Fixed effect GMM IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IE IE IE IE IE IE 
_cons 0.264** -0.068  0.138 -0.339**  
 (0.125) (0.207)  (0.123) (0.145)  
N 1878 1469 1401 1878 1469 1847 
r2_a 0.116  0.196 0.106  0.109 
F 9.351  22.024 11.054  18.337 
AR(1)  0.000   0.000  
AR(2)  0.955   0.275  
Hansen(p-value)  0.149   0.117  
Cragg–Donald(F-statistic)   226.645   658.066 
Sargan test(p-value)   0.359   0.451 
Notes: The table presents coefficients for the relationship between cost inefficiency, competition, revenue diversification (RD). The dependent variables are cost 
inefficiency used to reflect a bank's performance, which is calculated from translog cost function (SFA); a lower value illustrates greater bank performance. The control 
variables include regulatory variables, macroeconomic variables and bank specific variables.  BRindex is an aggregate regulation index (BRindex = ACTR + CAPR 
+ SPR + PMON). IEindex is an aggregate institutional environment index (IEindex = Governance Effectiveness + Rule of Law + Control of Corruption + Regulatory 
Quality). DCR is Private sector credit of GDP. We run the Fixed effect model, GMM model and the second stage of a 2SLS model with robust separately. L.IE is the 
lag variable of cost inefficiency. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. For the GMM model, the Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that 
the instruments are not valid. We use the Cragg–Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there are two endogenous regressors as in our 
models (i.e., the Lerner index in model (3) and revenue diversification in model (6)), the Cragg–Donald statistic has an F distribution under the null hypothesis that 
the instruments have no explanatory power in the first stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and more than one excluded instrument, the critical value 
(Stock–Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg–Donald statistic for 10% maximal size distortion is 19.93. Since we have two unique instruments and one endogenous 
regressor in each IV regression model, we use the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage 
error. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
117 
 
  
3.5.3 The determinant of bank stability 
3.5.3.1 Market power and bank stability 
The first three models in Table 5 show the relationship between bank stability and market 
power. It is obvious that control variables, such as GDP, Private sector credit of GDP and 
liquidity, have a significantly positive impact on stability. It means that a higher level of 
economic growth and development can ensure job creation, investor’s confidence and 
reduce the pressure of shortage of funding, which decreases the probability of the default 
risk of banks. Greater liquidity is an improved ability to sell assets, and should make 
banks less vulnerable to liquidity shocks, and is further expected to reduce the level of 
risk on banks’ balance sheets. While the macroeconomic variable (inflation) has a 
negative impact on bank stability, because excessive inflation gives a sign of recession to 
the financial market and influences the activities of financial intermediation.  
More importantly, the fixed effect model shows that the Lerner index has a negative 
impact on stability in the first model. In the second mode, we use the lag variable of cost 
stability and market power as instruments in the GMM model for dealing with the 
endogenous problem. The result also suggests a negative relationship between Lerner 
index and stability. Furthermore, we run the two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
model to analyse the impact of market power on stability, by using the lag variable of the 
Lerner index, one bank-level variable (ETA) and one country-level variable (CR5) as our 
instruments. The IV model also shows that higher market power reduces bank stability. 
The findings from three different models are in line with our hypothesis H3 that there is 
a significant relationship between market power and stability. Our results are different 
from the studies (e.g. Anginer et al., 2014a; Fu et al., 2014), because banks with greater 
market power are more likely to charge higher rates for loan customers, which increases 
borrowers’ difficulties to repay principals. In addition, banks with greater market power 
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are more likely to receive public guarantees, which may encourage risk-taking behaviour, 
generate a moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; 
Schaeck and Cihak, 2008; Schaeck et al., 2009). 
 
3.5.3.2 Revenue diversification and bank stability 
The last three models in Table 5 show the relationship between bank stability and revenue 
diversification. Similarly, the control variables, such as GDP, private credit sector of GDP 
and liquidity, have a significantly positive impact on stability. Interestingly, the BRindex 
are significant at the 5% or 1% level and have a positive relationship with stability from 
models (4) to (6). Bank regulation restricts banking risk activity, intensifies monitoring 
and reduces excessive risk-taking behaviour (Barth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2007), which 
reduces individual fragility.   
More importantly, we use fixed effect, the GMM and IV model37 to analyse the impact 
of revenue diversification on stability. The results suggest that there is a significantly 
positive relationship between revenue diversification and stability, which is in line with 
our hypotheses H4. The strategy of expanding activities helps banks build up their capital 
buffer (Shim, 2013), and hedge against insolvency risk that reduces the occurrence of 
costly financial distress (Stiroh, 2006a; Stiroh, 2006b). Our findings are different from 
the studies (Stiroh and Rumble 2006; De Jonghe, 2010)38, because the purpose of banks 
may not use revenue diversification to earn economic rent and they use these non-profits 
activities to reduce their revenue volatility, particularly in developing countries.  
                                                          
37 We use lag variable of stability and revenue diversification as instruments in the GMM model for dealing 
with the endogenous problem. Moreover, we run a two-stage least squares instrumental variable analysis 
(2SLS) by using two bank-level variables (ROE and fee income) as our instruments. 
38 They suggest that if banks diversify their portfolio into the security market, it may increase the volatility 
of a bank’s income. More volatile returns report a higher probability of insolvency than for banks with 
traditional product mixes. 
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Table 5      
The determinant of Stability      
 Fixed effect GMM IV Fixed effect GMM IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore 
Lerner -0.976* -0.875* -27.086*    
 (0.580) (0.500) (15.945)    
RD    19.445*** 29.179*** 19.430*** 
    (4.303) (4.155) (6.962) 
BRindex 0.025* 0.042** -0.098 0.031** 0.028** 0.031*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.073) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
IEindex -0.185** 0.037 -1.473* -0.114* 0.030 -0.114** 
 (0.072) (0.028) (0.791) (0.065) (0.025) (0.057) 
Inflation -3.821** -2.606* -26.062* -3.719*** -1.700 -3.719*** 
 (1.578) (1.420) (13.358) (1.432) (1.359) (1.428) 
GDP 4.986** 2.773* 11.546** 4.895** 3.155** 4.895** 
 (2.027) (1.590) (5.420) (2.015) (1.588) (1.980) 
DCR 0.024*** 0.003* 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.004** 0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Bank size -0.460 -0.298** -0.950 -0.313 0.124** -0.313 
 (0.298) (0.143) (0.732) (0.304) (0.062) (0.284) 
Liquidity 0.971* 1.415* 5.154* 0.893* 1.114** 0.893** 
 (0.526) (0.854) (2.880) (0.511) (0.434) (0.445) 
Crisis_dummy -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.011* -0.013** -0.027** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) 
L. Z-sore  0.242***   0.166***  
  (0.065)   (0.050)  
      (Continued) 
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Table 5-Continued       
The determinant of Stability       
 Fixed effect GMM IV Fixed effect GMM IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore 
_cons 3.798 2.863**  1.597 -1.477**  
 (2.879) (1.284)  (2.857) (0.741)  
N 1870 1462 1838 1870 1462 1838 
r2_a 0.046  0.048 0.053  0.057 
F 11.272  2.255 12.882  12.329 
AR(1)  0.000   0.000  
AR(2)  0.182   0.100  
Hansen(p-value)  0.935   1.000  
Cragg–Donald(F-statistic)   19.953   651.681 
Sargan test(p-value)   0.163   0.247 
Notes: The table presents coefficients for the relationship between bank stability, competition, revenue diversification (RD). The dependent variables are the Z-score 
in used to reflect individual bank's stability; a higher value illustrates greater bank stability. The control variables include regulatory variables, macroeconomic 
variables and bank specific variables. BRindex is an aggregate regulation index (BRindex = ACTR + CAPR + SPR + PMON). IEindex is an aggregate institutional 
environment index (IEindex = Governance Effectiveness + Rule of Law + Control of Corruption + Regulatory Quality). DCR is Private sector credit of GDP. We run 
the Fixed effect model, the GMM model and the second stage of a 2SLS model with robustness separately. L.Z-score is the lag variable of Z-score. Crisis is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. For the GMM model, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. We use the Cragg–
Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there are two endogenous regressor as in our models (i.e., the Lerner index in model (3) and revenue 
diversification in model (6)), the Cragg–Donald statistic has an F distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments have no explanatory power in the first 
stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and more than one excluded instrument, the critical value (Stock–Yogo weak ID test) for the Cragg–Donald statistic 
for 10% maximal size distortion is 19.93. Since we have two unique instruments and one endogenous regressor in each IV regression model, we use the Sargan test 
for over-identifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical 
significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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3.5.4 Robustness: one-step estimation model of efficiency 
Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of parameters are obtained using FRONTIER4.1 
(Coelli, 1996). Table 6 reports estimation results from the cost frontier. We use bank 
specific and macroeconomic variables as control variables for estimating the efficiency 
score. For the advanced countries, estimated average cost efficiency are 0.811 and 0.779 
respectively in the first two models. While the efficiency scores are 0.765 and 0.738 in 
developing countries. The scores are similar with the results from the translog cost 
function model in Table 3. All models in Table 6 include external factors. Based on the 
papers (e.g. Jiang et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2012), they suggest that except banking 
internal factors, external factors may also directly affect the bank performance. In models 
(1) and (3), the Lerner index has a positive impact on cost efficiency, which is similar to 
the finding in Table 4. Thus, the finding is in line with our hypothesis H1 that there is a 
significant relationship between market power and efficiency. It also supports the views 
of previous studies (e.g. Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; and Pasiouras, 2008) 
that if banks occupy huge proportion of market share, they would like to improve their 
performance to maintain their market power, particularly in the Asian market. However, 
the models (2) and (3) show that revenue diversification has a negative relationship with 
bank efficiency. Our finding is different from the studies (e.g. Landskroner et al., 2005; 
Acharya et al., 2006). Revenue diversification may trigger a cost for expanding a new 
service, branch and transaction so that the cost efficiency may be reduced by higher 
original investment and operating expense (Elsas et al., 2012). Therefore, the results from 
the one-step estimation model are similar to the findings from Table 4 that market power 
can improve their efficiency while revenue diversification increase inefficiency. We run 
a robustness test by dividing my database into three sub-samples, such as, state-owned, 
private and quoted banks. The results are no difference between these three sub-samples. 
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Table 6 
  
  
Robustness: The determinant of efficiency (one step model)  
Advanced countries Developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CE CE CE CE 
Ln(cost) 0.117*** 0.173*** 0.221*** 0.321** 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.103) (0.158) 
Constant 1.715* 1.320*** 0.825* 1.665** 
 (0.720) (0.427) (0.442) (0.678) 
External factors: 
 
  
Lerner 0.154*** 
 
0.234**  
 (0.045)  (0.102)  
RD 
 
-0.123**  -0.201** 
  (0.062)  (0.098) 
Brindex 0.256* 0.225*** 0.524** 0.152* 
 (0.134) (0.098) (0.247) (0.088) 
Ieindex -0.110 -0.153 -0.217 -0.135 
 (0.134) (0.564) (0.365) (0.099) 
Inflation  -0.045* -0.054 -0.053 -0.065 
 (0.028) (0.076) (0.086) (0.061) 
GDP 0.006** 0.004** 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
DCR 0.001* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bank size 0.031 0.002** 0.011** 0.005* 
 (0.055) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
Liquidity  0.022 0.073* 0.076 0.033 
 (0.057) (0.041) (0.072) (0.051) 
Crisis_dummy 0.012 0.022 0.026 0.102 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.031) (0.086) 
Sigma-squared 0.242*** 0.545** 0.349** 0.335** 
 (0.083) (0.295) (0.173) (0.097) 
Gamma 0.281** 1.514** 0.372* 1.122** 
 (0.122) (0.733) (0.202) (0.582) 
Log likelihood -2897.9 -4862.3 -3125.3 -4385.7 
Mean efficiency 0.811 0.779 0.765 0.738 
N 304 304 1574 1574 
Notes: The table presents the relationship between cost efficiency, competition and revenue 
diversification (RD). Advanced countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, Japan and Singapore, 
and others are in the developing countries group. The bank specific control variables Bank size and 
liquidity. Macroeconomic variables include BRindex; Inflation; GDP; DCR is Private sector credit of 
GDP. Sigma-squared is the sum of variance of error terms. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. The ratio between the variance of the inefficiency 
variance and total variance is equal to Gamma. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical 
significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level.     
 
123 
 
  
3.5.5 Dynamic threshold results 
Our results in the fixed effect model indicate the presence of an impact of market power 
on efficiency and stability respectively, and the presence of an impact of revenue 
diversification on efficiency and stability as well. Based on these results and the 
discussion above, we believe that there is a threshold value of the two strategies creates a 
different effect on bank performance and stability. Therefore, we implement the dynamic 
panel threshold model introduced by Kremer et al. (2013) which allow us to identify the 
presence of potential threshold-effects of the two strategies with regard to bank efficiency 
and stability. This potential effect would be able to allow us to analyse in depth a period 
of structural changes for banking institutions. We use the two banking strategies, such as 
market power and revenue diversification, as threshold variables.  
 
3.5.5.1 Market power and bank performance 
In Table 7, our dynamic threshold analysis reveals threshold values of the Lerner index 
to be 0.37575 in the advanced countries group and 0.33547 in the developing countries 
group respectively. These values split the sample of 1878 observations into two regimes. 
For the advanced countries, the high regime comprises 304 observations based on the 
level of the market power is above the 0.37575, while the rest of the observations (124) 
belongs to the low regime, whereby the value of market power is below the 0.37575. 
These results show that market power has a significantly negative relationship with bank 
inefficiency in both regimes in the advanced countries group. However, the market power 
is more significantly negative related with bank inefficiency when the coefficient estimate 
is =-0.351 in the high regime. It means that a 1% increase of market power is related 
with 0.351 percentage point decrease in cost inefficiency.  
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For the developing countries group, our results show that market power has a significantly 
negative relationship with bank inefficiency in the high regime and the coefficient 
estimate is =-0.149. It means that a 1% increase in market power is related with a 0.149 
percentage point decrease in cost inefficiency. While the negative relationship between 
market power and cost inefficiency is not significant in the low regime and the coefficient 
estimate is =-0.027. Thus, our findings are in line with our hypotheses H1, and suggest 
that a positive relationship between market power and bank performance would be more 
pronounced under higher levels of market power.  
At the same time, we also find a negative relationship between the BRindex and inflation 
and private sector credit of GDP and cost inefficiency. In addition, we observe both the 
IEindex and bank size are associated positively with cost inefficiency. All these results 
are consistent with our previous findings. Furthermore, Fig. 1. and 2. describe the 
volatility of market power and suggests a threshold value to distinguish from a low to a 
high regime.  
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Table 7   
   
Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with the Lerner index as a threshold 
variable on cost inefficiency 
Threshold estimate 
  
Countries Advanced Developing  
Lerner  0.37575 
 
0.33547 
 
95%Confidence interval (0.35268-0.37819) (0.21299-0.39632) 
Impact of Lerner  S.E 
 
S.E 
 
 
-0.221* (0.132) -0.027 0.059 
 
 
-0.351** (0.142) -0.149*** (0.039) 
Impact  of covariates S.E 
 
S.E 
ETA 0.333 (0.579) 0.141 (0.192) 
BRindex -0.049* (0.027) -0.175*** (0.027) 
IEindex 0.061*** (0.018) 0.001 (0.003) 
Inflation 1.186 (0.354) -0.367*** (0.076) 
GDP -0.111 (0.098) 0.009 (0.089) 
DCR -0.241*** (0.085) -0.183*** (0.027) 
Bank size 0.101** (0.053) 0.059*** (0.015) 
Liquidity 0.123* (0.071) 0.001 (0.039) 
Crisis_dummy 0.033 (0.021) 0.027 (0.033) 
δ -0.102 (0.094) -0.021 (0.024) 
Observations 304 
 
1574 
 
Low regime 124 
 
345 
 
High regime 180   1229 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at 
least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). Advanced countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, 
Japan and Singapore, and others are the in developing countries group. We denote as dependent variable 
banks’ performance (𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡), whilst as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we impose the 
bank’s Lerner index (𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) which represents market power. Following Bick (2007), the model 
accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is cost inefficiency. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: Lerner index. Other bank-specific independent control 
variables: bank size (log of total asset); liquidity (liquid asset to total asset). Country level and state 
level independent variables: BRindex, IEindex, inflation GDP and DCR (Private sector credit of GDP). 
ETA (equity to total asset) is an endogenous variable. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical 
significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors given are 
in parentheses. 
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Fig. 1.  Threshold value of the Lerner index (bank’s market power) and the classification 
of low and high regime in advanced countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of the Lerner index on bank performance (cost inefficiency) 
which splits into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Threshold value of the Lerner index (bank’s market power) and the classification 
of low and high regimes in developing countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of the Lerner index on bank performance (cost inefficiency) 
which splits into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
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In Table 8, the percentage of banks classified as low-regime is consistently below the 
percentage of banks classified as high-regime with respect to the Lerner index. There is 
a significantly negative trend in the number of banks with greater market power after the 
recent financial crisis.  
Table 8 Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into the two identified regimes based on threshold 
value of Lerner index 
Threshold: Lerner index (Market power)         
Advanced countries        
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low regime 35% 36% 37% 42% 35% 29% 36% 31% 35% 37% 41% 47% 38% 
High 
regime 65% 64% 53% 58% 65% 71% 64% 69% 65% 63% 59% 53% 62% 
Developing countries            
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low regime 25% 16% 11% 11% 12% 17% 26% 27% 26% 30% 24% 27% 27% 
High 
regime 75% 84% 89% 89% 88% 83% 74% 73% 74% 70% 76% 73% 73% 
Notes: The table shows the classification of the bank based on the Lerner index threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. The dependent of the dynamic panel threshold 
model is bank cost inefficiency. 
 
3.5.5.2 Revenue diversification and bank performance 
In the table 9, the threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the revenue 
diversification to be 0.00216 in the advanced countries group. This value splits the sample 
304 observations into two regimes. The high regime includes all the observations in which 
the value of the revenue diversification is above the 0.00216. While the rest of the 
observations belongs to the low regime, whereby the threshold value is below the 0.00216. 
In this group, the revenue diversification has a significantly positive relationship with 
bank inefficiency in both regimes, while the positive association is more pronounced in 
the low regime when the coefficient estimate is =4.736. However, the positive 
relationship is not significant in the low regime and the coefficient estimate is =1.845 
in the low regime in developing countries group, and the positive association is more 
pronounced in the high regime when the coefficient estimate is =1.212.   
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Therefore, our findings not only support our hypotheses H2, but also suggest that the 
positive relationship between revenue diversification and bank inefficiency is more 
pronounced in advanced economies in the low regime while this relationship is more 
pronounced in the high regime in developing countries.  
At the same time, we also find a negative relationship between the BRindex and inflation 
and private sector credit of GDP and cost inefficiency. In addition, we observe bank size 
and IEindex are associated positively with cost inefficiency. All these results are 
consistent with our previous findings. Furthermore, Fig. 3. and 4. describe the volatility 
of revenue diversification and suggest a threshold value to distinguish it from low to high 
regimes. 
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Table 9 
  
  
Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with revenue diversification as 
threshold variable on cost inefficiency 
Threshold estimate   
Countries Advanced Developing  
Revenue 
diversification 
0.00216  0.00966 
95%Confidence 
interval 
(0.00201-0.00232) (0.00923-0.01042) 
Impact of revenue 
diversification 
 S.E  S.E 
𝜆1 4.736*** (1.807) 1.845 (1.361) 
𝜆2 1.336** (0.560) 1.212*** (0.289) 
Impact  of covariates  S.E  S.E 
ETA 0.644 (0.484) 0.135 (0.189) 
BRindex -0.016 (0.049) -0.151*** (0.027) 
IEindex 0.045** (0.018) 0.006** (0.003) 
Inflation -1.338*** (0.312) -0.241*** (0.077) 
GDP -0.113 (0.101) -0.035 (0.086) 
DCR -0.338*** (0.063) -0.158*** (0.026) 
Bank size 0.171*** (0.046) 0.062*** (0.015) 
Liquidity 0.145** (0.073) -0.027 (0.038) 
Crisis_dummy 0.066 (0.070) 0.077 (0.051) 
δ -0.048 (0.033) 0.026** (0.013) 
Observations 304 
 
1574  
Low regime 40 
 
841  
High regime 264 
 
733  
Notes: The table presents the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at 
least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). Advanced countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, 
Japan and Singapore, and others are in the developing countries group. We denote as dependent variable 
banks’ performance ( 
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ), whilst as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we impose the bank’s revenue 
diversification (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ) which represents non-interest income activities. Following Bick (2007), the 
model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is cost inefficiency. 
Independent variables of our main interest: revenue diversification. Other bank-specific independent 
control variables: bank size (log of total asset); liquidity (liquid asset to total asset). Country level and 
state level independent variables: BRindex, IEindex, inflation GDP and DCR (Private sector credit of 
GDP). ETA (equity to total asset) is an endogenous variable. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. We check that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. Our 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard 
errors given are in parentheses. 
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Fig. 3. Threshold value of revenue diversification (bank’s non-interest income activities) 
and the classification of low and high regime in advanced countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of revenue diversification on bank performance (cost 
inefficiency) which splits into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Threshold value of revenue diversification (bank’s non-interest income activities) 
and the classification of low and high regime in developing countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of revenue diversification on bank performance (cost 
inefficiency) which splits into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
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In Table 10, the percentage of banks classified as low-regime is consistently below the 
percentage of banks classified as high-regime in advanced countries. While the low-
regime is consistently above the high-regime in developing countries. 
 
Table 10 Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into the two identified regimes based on 
threshold value of Revenue diversification 
Threshold: Revenue diversification         
Advanced countries         
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low regime 25% 20% 17% 15% 13% 22% 20% 7% 18% 21% 13% 9% 9% 
High 
regime 75% 80% 83% 85% 87% 78% 80% 93% 82% 89% 87% 81% 81% 
Developing countries            
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low regime 51% 53% 57% 51% 51% 50% 53% 53% 58% 55% 52% 67% 60% 
High 
regime 49% 47% 43% 49% 49% 50% 47% 47% 42% 45% 48% 33% 40% 
Notes: The table shows the classification of the bank based on the threshold value of revenue diversification that we 
obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. The dependent of the dynamic panel 
threshold model is bank cost inefficiency. 
 
3.5.5.3 Market power and bank stability 
In Table 11, the threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the market power to be 
0.47488 in the advanced countries group. This value splits the sample 304 observations 
into two regimes. The high regime includes all the observations in which the value of the 
revenue diversification is above 0.47488. While the rest of observations belongs to the 
low regime, whereby the threshold value is below 0.47488. In this group, the market 
power is has a significantly negative relationship with bank stability in lower regimes and 
the coefficient estimate is =-5.562, while the positive association is not significant in 
the low regime. 
For the developing countries, the threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the 
market power to be 0.28825, which splits the observation (1574) into two regimes. Our 
results show that market power has a significantly negative relationship with bank 
stability in the low regime and the coefficient estimate is =-3.929. It means that a 1% 
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increase in market power is associated with a 3.929 percentage point decrease in stability. 
However, there is no significantly positive relationship between market power and 
stability in the high regime and the coefficient estimate is =2.801. Thus, our results are 
in line with our hypotheses H3, and suggest that the negative relationship between market 
power and stability is more pronounced in low regime. 
At the same time, consistent with our previous findings, BRindex, GDP and DCR are 
related positively with bank stability. Moreover, we find that inflation is significant at 10% 
level and has a negative link with stability. Finally, Fig. 5. and 6. describe the volatility 
of market power and suggests a threshold value to distinguish from a low to a high regime.  
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Table 11 
  
  
Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with the Lerner index as a threshold 
variable on stability  
Threshold estimate   
Countries Advanced Developing  
Lerner index 0.47488 
 
0.28825  
95%Confidence interval (0.47230-0.53445) (0.20664-0.32231) 
Impact of Lerner   S.E  S.E 
𝜆1 -5.562* (3.485) -3.929*** (0.771) 
𝜆2 4.166 (4.150) 2.801 (1.869) 
Impact  of covariates  S.E  S.E 
ETA -27.612* (16.372) -1.050 (2.801) 
BRindex 2.762* (1.547) 0.848*** (0.421) 
IEindex 1.487 (1.462) 0.148 (0.160) 
Inflation -3.121*** (1.021) -1.028 (1.363) 
GDP 15.618*** (3.958) 2.860** (1.403) 
DCR 10.039*** (2.742) 2.351*** (0.633) 
Bank size -4.583** (1.851) -0.318 (0.471) 
Liquidity 1.722 (2.800) 0.389 (0.354) 
Crisis_dummy -0.011* (0.006) -0.018** (0.007) 
δ 1.111 (2.268) 1.571*** (0.324) 
Observations 304 
 
1574  
Low regime 180 
 
206  
High regime 124 
 
1368  
Notes: The table presents the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at 
least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). Advanced countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, 
Japan and Singapore, and others are in the developing countries group. We denote as dependent variable 
banks’ stability(𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡), whilst as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we impose the 
bank’s Lerner index (𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ) which represents market power. Following Bick (2007), the model 
accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is Z-score. Our independent 
variables of our main interest: Lerner index. Other bank-specific independent control variables: bank 
size (log of total asset); liquidity (liquid asset to total asset). Country level and state level independent 
variables: BRindex, IEindex, inflation GDP and DCR (Private sector credit of GDP). ETA (equity to 
total asset) is an endogenous variable. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 
2008–2009 and zero otherwise. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 
5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors given are in parentheses. 
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Fig. 5. Threshold value of Lerner index (bank’s market power) and the classification of 
low and high regime in advanced countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of Lerner index on bank stability (Z-score) which splits into 
the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Threshold value of Lerner index (bank’s market power) and the classification of 
low and high regimes in developing countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of the Lerner index on bank stability (Z-score) which splits 
into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
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In Table12, the percentage of banks classified as low-regime is consistently below the 
percentage of banks classified as high-regime with respect to the Lerner index after a 
financial crisis in the advanced countries group. In the developing countries group, the 
percentage of banks classified as low-regime is consistently below the percentage of 
banks classified as high-regime. There is a stable trend in the number of banks with 
greater market power after the recent financial crisis.  
 
Table 12 Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into the two identified regimes based on 
threshold value of Lerner index 
Threshold: Lerner index (Market power)         
Advanced countries         
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low 
regime 45% 56% 60% 62% 58% 53% 61% 59% 55% 51% 49% 48% 46% 
High 
regime 55% 44% 40% 38% 42% 47% 39% 41% 45% 49% 51% 52% 54% 
Developing countries            
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low 
regime 22% 16% 10% 10% 9% 12% 21% 19% 20% 21% 21% 18% 20% 
High 
regime 78% 84% 90% 90% 91% 88% 79% 81% 80% 79% 79% 82% 80% 
Notes: The table shows the classification of the bank based on the Lerner index threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. The dependent of the dynamic panel 
threshold model is bank stability (Z-score). 
 
 
3.5.5.4 Revenue diversification and bank stability 
In Table 13, the threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the revenue diversification 
to be 0.00787 in the advanced countries group. This value splits the sample 304 
observations into two regimes. The high regime includes all the observations in which the 
value of the revenue diversification is above the 0.00787. While the rest of the 
observations belong to the low regime, whereby the threshold value is below the 0.00787. 
In this group, the revenue diversification has a significantly positive relationship with 
bank stability in lower regimes and the coefficient estimate is =27.851, which means 
that a 1% increase in revenue diversification is associated with a 3.929 percentage point 
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increase in stability. However, the positive association is not significant in the low regime. 
The positive association is more pronounced in the low regime in advanced countries. 
For the developing countries, the threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the 
revenue diversification to be 0.00131. Our findings suggest that the revenue 
diversification has a positive relationship with bank stability for both regimes. In 
particular, coefficient estimates on the association between diversifying strategy and bank 
stability are =19.698 for the high regime and =14.449 for the low regime in the 
developing group. Interestingly, we find that based on the terms of magnitude, the 
diversifying strategy has a stronger relationship with bank stability for banks that belong 
to the high regime compared to those that belong to the low regime. Thus, the positive 
association is more pronounced in the high regime. 
According to the results in Table 13, we find that lower revenue diversification in 
advanced countries could improve stability while a greater diversifying strategy could 
reduce bank fragility in developing countries. Banks’ diversification in developed 
economies may involve many risky investments, such as securitization and real estate 
(Stiroh and Rumble 2006). Greater diversification may provide the incentive for a bank 
to take more risk. However, in developing countries, there are few risky investing markets 
and banks’ activities are restricted by government (Nguyen et al., 2012). The purpose of 
banks using these non-profits activities is to reduce their revenue volatility (Lepetit et al., 
2008; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011). Thus, greater diversification could improve bank stability 
in emerging markets. As a result, our findings are in line with our hypotheses H4 that 
revenue diversification has a significant impact on bank stability.  
Finally, Fig. 7. and 8. describe the volatility of revenue diversification and suggests a 
threshold value to distinguish it from a low to a high regime.  
137 
 
  
Table 13 
  
  
Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with revenue diversification as a 
threshold variable on stability 
Threshold estimate   
Countries Advanced Developing  
Revenue diversification 0.00787 
 
0.00131  
95%Confidence interval (0.00787-0.00823) (0.00130-0.00160) 
Impact of revenue 
diversification 
 S.E  S.E 
𝜆1 27.851** (11.786) 14.449* (8.619) 
𝜆2 5.71 (13.937) 19.698*** (5.294) 
Impact  of covariates  S.E  S.E 
ETA -18.845 (12.631) 2.529 (2.792) 
BRindex 2.422* (1.373) 0.438 (0.437) 
IEindex 1.314** (0.433) 0.190*** (0.056) 
Inflation -27.412*** (6.971) -3.212** (1.266) 
GDP 15.913*** (3.415) -1.402 (1.441) 
DCR 8.066*** (1.888) 1.865*** (0.625) 
Bank size -3.728** (1.450) -0.271 (0.451) 
Liquidity 1.463 (2.907) 1.047*** (0.355) 
Crisis_dummy -0.052* (0.028) -0.267** (0.135) 
δ -0.337 (0.587) -0.658 (0.595) 
Observations 304 
 
1574  
Low regime 175 
 
92  
High regime 129 
 
1482  
Notes: The table presents the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at 
least 5% of the observations (Hansen, 1999). Advanced countries include Australia, Hong Kong China, 
Japan and Singapore, and others are in the developing countries group. We denote as dependent variable 
banks’ stability (log of 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡), whilst as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we 
impose the bank’s revenue diversification (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ) which represents non-interest income activities. 
Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable 
is Z-score. Our independent variables of our main interest: revenue diversification. Other bank-specific 
independent control variables: bank size (log of total asset); liquidity (liquid asset to total asset). 
Country level and state level independent variables: BRindex, IEindex, inflation GDP and DCR (Private 
sector credit of GDP). ETA (equity to total asset) is an endogenous variable. Crisis is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. We check that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard 
errors given are in parentheses. 
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Fig. 7. Threshold value of revenue diversification (bank’s non-interest income activities) 
and the classification of low and high regime in advanced countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of revenue diversification on bank stability (log of Z-score) 
which splits into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Threshold value of revenue diversification (bank’s non-interest income activities) 
and the classification of low and high regime in developing countries.  
Notes: The figure shows the threshold value of revenue diversification on bank stability (log of Z-score) 
which splits into the high and low regimes (2000-2012). 
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In Table 14, the percentage of banks classified as low-regime is consistently above the 
percentage of banks classified as high-regime with respect to revenue diversification 
before the financial crisis, in advanced countries. However, the percentage of banks 
classified as low-regime is consistently below the percentage of banks classified as high-
regime during the period 2000-2012. 
 
Table 14 Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into the two identified regimes based on threshold 
value of Revenue diversification 
Threshold: Revenue diversification         
Advanced 
countries             
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low 
regime 46% 44% 45% 50% 51% 42% 48% 44% 47% 51% 55% 58% 56% 
High 
regime 54% 56% 55% 50% 49% 58% 52% 56% 53% 49% 45% 42% 44% 
Developing countries            
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Low 
regime 6% 4% 5% 6% 1% 2% 6% 4% 7% 7% 8% 6% 6% 
High 
regime 94% 96% 95% 94% 99% 98% 94% 96% 93% 93% 92% 94% 94% 
Notes: The table shows the classification of the bank based on the threshold value of revenue diversification that we 
obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for the dynamic panel. The dependent of the dynamic panel 
threshold model is bank stability (Z-score). 
 
3.5.6 Robustness: the interactive term for effect 
The results from models (1) to (3) estimate the association between bank performance, 
market power and revenue diversification in Table 15. Market power and revenue 
diversification have a negative and positive impact on cost inefficiency, which are in line 
with my previous findings in Table 4. It is interesting that the interactive term for between 
Lerner index and revenue diversification has a significantly negative impact on bank 
inefficiency. As we know, market power has a positive effect on efficiency, because firm 
profitability is positively correlated with market share (Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara, 2007; Pasiouras, 2008; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010; Koetter et al., 2012). While 
over-diversifying may reduce bank efficiency because it may reduce bank concentration 
on traditional service (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). However, our results suggest 
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that a bank with a higher market power implementing the individual strategy (revenue 
diversification) can still improve its performance. It is reasonable that according to the 
results from the dynamic panel threshold mode, higher market power may drive a bank 
to reach an optimal level of economic scale. Therefore, banks diversifying their revenue 
based on the original cost could make better use of the opportunity cost, which may 
reduce cost inefficiency.  
The last three models in Table 15 show that the two strategies (market power and revenue 
diversification) have a different effect on bank stability, which is in line with our previous 
findings in Table 5. Banks with more loan market power are in a position to charge higher 
rates for loan customers, which may increase borrowers’ difficulties to repay principals 
(Schaeck and Cihak, 2008; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). While revenue diversification 
helps banks build up their capital buffer, which reduces the probability of fragility (Shim, 
2013). It is interesting that the interactive term for Lerner index and institutions has a 
positive impact on bank stability. Thus, a bank with higher market power can implement 
the individual strategy (revenue diversification) to improve its stability. As the results in 
Table 13 shows, banks with a higher level of diversification ratio in high regime could 
ensure a stable environment. Generally, banks in developing countries employ market 
power to earn economic rent and control the market benefit. Likewise banks may not use 
revenue diversification to earn economic rent and use these non-profits activities to 
indeed reduce their revenue volatility (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012). 
Therefore, banks could comprise these two strategies to enhance performance and reduce 
probability of fragility.  
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Table 15      
Robustness: Interaction effect of Lerner index and revenue diversification  
 Fixed effect GMM IV Fixed effect GMM IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IE IE IE Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore 
Lerner*RD -1.556** -12.611** -7.462*** 31.364*** 41.546* 190.666** 
 (0.623) (5.190) (1.422) (10.090) (23.528) (76.982) 
Lerner -0.064* -0.158** 0.033 -1.479** -1.694* -13.223*** 
 (0.035) (0.077) (0.058) (0.609) (1.025) (4.849) 
RD 1.137*** 7.117*** 4.337*** 12.873*** 20.878* -19.908 
 (0.318) (2.639) (0.634) (3.636) (11.224) (26.662) 
BRindex -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.025** 0.030 -0.023 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.026) (0.023) 
IEindex 0.002 -0.001 0.011*** -0.158** 0.151** -0.591*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.071) (0.073) (0.201) 
Inflation -0.269*** -0.334*** -0.322*** -4.905*** -2.464 -14.550*** 
 (0.091) (0.100) (0.074) (1.527) (2.233) (4.218) 
GDP -0.074 0.189*** -0.028 5.256*** -0.047 8.154*** 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.078) (2.011) (2.015) (2.660) 
DCR -0.001*** -0.000* -0.001*** 0.024*** -0.003 0.027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Bank size 0.033** 0.018** 0.031*** -0.275 0.202** -0.154 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.304) (0.099) (0.357) 
Liquidity 0.044 0.158*** 0.055* 0.999* 2.337*** 2.216*** 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.030) (0.525) (0.659) (0.837) 
Crisis_dummy (0.022) 0.041** 0.018 -0.084*** -0.029*** -0.036*** 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.051) (0.025) (0.010) (0.012) 
L.Inefficiency  0.448***     
  (0.055)     
L.Z-score     0.357***  
     (0.093)  
      (Continued) 
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Table 15-Continued       
Robustness: Interaction effect of Lerner index and revenue diversification  
 Fixed effect GMM IV Fixed effect GMM IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IE IE IE Z-sore Z-sore Z-sore 
_cons 0.219* 0.099  1.930 -1.485  
 (0.129) (0.083)  (2.957) (1.050)  
N 1878 1469 1401 1870 1462 1838 
r2_a 0.128  0.071 0.062  -0.787 
F 11.659  36.210 13.386  6.851 
AR(1)  0.001   0.000  
AR(2)  0.388   0.169  
Hansen(p-value)  0.830   0.291  
Cragg–Donald(F-statistic)   141.002   27.964 
Sargan test(p-value)   0.100   0.101 
Notes: The table presents the interaction effect of Lerner index and revenue diversification (RD). In the first three mdoels, the dependent variables are cost inefficiency 
used to reflect a bank's performance, which is calculated from the translog cost function (SFA); a lower value illustrates greater bank performance. The control 
variables include regulatory variables, macroeconomic variables and bank specific variables. From the models (4) to (6), the dependent variables are Z-score used to 
reflect individual bank's stability; a higher value illustrates greater bank stability. The control variables include regulatory variables, macroeconomic variables and 
bank specific variables. BRindex is an aggregate regulation index (BRindex = ACTR + CAPR + SPR + PMON). IEindex is an aggregate institutional environment 
index (IEindex = Governance Effectiveness + Rule of Law + Control of Corruption + Regulatory Quality). DCR is Private sector credit of GDP. We run the Fixed 
effect model, the GMM model and the second stage of a 2SLS model with robust separately. L.IE is the lag variable of cost inefficiency. L.Z-score is the lag variable 
of Z-score. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. For the GMM model, the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments 
are not valid. We use the Cragg–Donald statistic to assess whether the instruments are weak. When there is two endogenous regressor as in our models (i.e., Lerner 
index in model (3) and revenue diversification in model (6)), the Cragg–Donald statistic has an F distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments have no 
explanatory power in the first stage regression. With one endogenous regressor and more than one excluded instrument, the critical value (Stock–Yogo weak ID test) 
for the Cragg–Donald statistic for 10% maximal size distortion is 19.93. Since we have two unique instruments and one endogenous regressor in each IV regression 
model, we use the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to assess whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. ***Statistical 
significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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3.6 Conclusion  
This paper analyses whether the two strategies, such as market power and revenue 
diversification, influence bank performance and stability, by using data from 11 South-
East Asian countries during the period from 2000 to 2012. First, we find that market 
power could improve bank performance but increase individual bank fragility in an 
emerging market. In other words, market power may attract managers to pursue the 
maximization of profit and reduction of labor conflict at the expense of efficiency, but it 
provides incentives for managers to take excessive risk. Second, although revenue 
diversification reduces banks efficiency, it improves individual stability. When a bank 
expands its service in a new industry, it may use resources from its traditional activity 
and increase cost inefficiency, but the bank could participate in non-profit activities to 
reduce its revenue volatility at the same time. Our findings not only provide support for 
the neutral view of the competition-fragility theories applying to the emerging market, 
but also suggest that market power and revenue diversification should be simultaneously 
employed as a bundle to improve bank efficiency and stability. More interestingly, the 
dynamic panel threshold analysis further reveals important changes in the percentages of 
banks that fall within each threshold regime before and after the financial crisis. Finally, 
our results suggest that the positive effect of the two strategies is more significant in a 
well regulated market after controlling the macroeconomic, institutional and bank-
specific factors.   
These findings provide some important implications for bank managers and regulators in 
emerging markets. First, to improve efficiency and stability at the same time, bank 
managers should expand their market share and diversify their activities at the same time. 
As financial liberalisation increases in an emerging market, to prevent the competition 
from foreign banks, managers consolidate market power through merger and acquisition. 
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Simultaneously, managers should expand services in not-profit activity in order to offset 
portfolio risk caused by market power.  
For regulators, our findings highlight that a prudential banking regulation is a pre-
requisite for banks to employ individual strategy. A certain level of entry restriction is 
needed for foreign bank entrants, in order to protect domestic small banks with lower 
market power and maintain financial soundness. Second, regulators should adjust an 
appropriate capital requirement and encourage banks to diversify their non-interest 
activities instead of only focusing on traditional lending services. However, regulators 
still need to issue some regulations to restrict larger banks’ activities, since the 
institutional environment in an emerging market is little far from complete, which may 
provider a wrong incentive to take excessive risk. In addition, when strengthening the 
regulation and monitoring, policymakers should ensure a good quality of institutions in 
an emerging market, through improving the efficiency of the government, issuing 
prudential law and reducing corruption, because the quality of investor protection is still 
at a low-level and even has a negative impact on bank performance and stability. Finally, 
policymakers should encourage financial innovations among banks based on prudential 
regulation to allow resource allocation within an economy effectively, in order to expand 
their services, reduce non-performance loans and exploit economies of scale. 
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Chapter 4: Do deposit diversification and insurance reduce the 
impact of liquidity risk on interest expense, deposit inflow, 
lending amounts and liquid ratio? Evidence from G7 and 
BRICS countries. 
 
4.1 Introduction and Literature review 
The liquidity of banks is the lifeblood of financial markets, since banks resembled 
liquidity regulators to satisfy the supply and demand of funding, particularly in a financial 
crisis. As we know, the international financial crisis during the period between 2007 and 
2009 brought massive devastation to global economies. Financial and related markets 
around the world experienced credit boom and a banking panic that were triggered by the 
meltdown of securitized products and subprime mortgages. This global crunch raised a 
lot of concern about the liquidity of financial institutions. Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) 
believe that the liquidity of banks is a red flag that implies financial fragility. Furthermore, 
the banking industry provides credit to the corporate sector. Briefly, banks definitely play 
a role as liquidity providers in the financial system. 
The argument against why banks can work as liquidity providers is that banks with natural 
strength can offer liquidity to business via credit lines commitments (Acharya and Mora, 
2015). For other financial institutions, liquidity management tools (e.g. credit lines) are 
essential components of their corporate policy (Lins et al., 2010). Under a credit line 
contract, a bank provides the firm with loan funds when the firm faces a liquidity shortfall. 
In exchange, the bank charges a commitment fee as compensation for guaranteeing a loan 
for the firm at a specific date in the future. Consequently, credit lines have become an 
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important source of firm financing (Sufi, 2009) and play an important role in bank lending 
services (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). Firms would like to use credit lines to manage 
their liquidity needs because they find it costly to hold cash. Moreover, banks may use 
credit commitment to enhance their liquidity, which expands their services and increases 
profit (Acharya et al., 2013a).  
During periods of normality, establishing credit commitments is a benefit for banks to 
provide liquidity to businesses. Gatev and Strahan (2006) suggest that banks have no 
difficulty meeting the increased credit demands, even if they experience significant and 
synchronized drawdowns during market stress. Furthermore, Gatev et al. (2009) find that 
deposit-taking and commitment drawdowns are negatively related. They think that banks 
may be seen as a safe haven because of deposit insurance, when investors and depositors 
forecast high risks in other investments.     
However, the period 2007-2009 was a period of crisis for banks as liquidity providers, 
which decreased the stability of the financial market (Brunnermeier, 2009). Banks may 
not be treated as a safe haven because of tightened lending and runs on deposits. It is 
obvious that after the initial subprime shock, investors started to lose confidence in their 
ability to identify low- from high-risk banks; this leads to huge withdrawals from deposit 
accounts (Covitz et al., 2013). Additionally, banks that co-syndicate credit lines with 
Lehman Brothers would be more vulnerable to drawdowns on these credit lines after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy. The credit lines syndicate members would be exposed to 
additional drawdowns by the failure of Lehman, because the firm may be panicked into 
choosing to draw on these credit lines. 
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The banking panic in the Autumn of 2008 threw economies around the world into severe 
recession (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 201039). This meltdown increased the insolvency and 
illiquidity risk of banks. Moreover, Acharya et al. (2013b) agree that a significant portion 
of firm’s “toxic” liabilities transfer to bank balance sheets; this may increase the pressure 
for banks to conduct their commitment obligations. It may then increase the solvency risk 
of these firms as well. As the solvency risk of a bank increases, it may offer higher interest 
rates to attract deposits.  
Acharya and Mora (2015) find that a bank with greater pre-existing commitments 
increased deposit rates far more dramatically than those with lower commitments. They 
also find that banks with unused commitments lost their systematic advantage at gaining 
core deposits (including transaction, saving and time deposit). Banks with fewer core 
deposit inflows have to seek brokered deposits to satisfy the liquidity demands. 
Additionally, banks with high pre-existing commitments reduce overall credit (the sum 
of loans and commitments). They agree that the spread between loans and deposits is 
widened in commitment-exposed banks, and it means that banks are unable to meet 
liquidity agreements with deposit funding alone. Additionally, compared with previous 
crises, banks did not expand total loans and credit lines, but they utilized support from 
government and government agencies to cover a majority of liquidity commitments.40 
Accordingly, the financial crunch was banks’ liquidity crisis between 2007 and 2009.  
                                                          
39 They consider the impact of credit-line drawdowns on new lending but do not directly observe credit-
line drawdowns. 
40 Tanking the example of the US, Acharya and Mora (2015) indicate that Federal Reserve loans increased 
$559 billion between 2007 and 2009, and 65% of non-deposit borrowing of commitment-exposed banks 
came from Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB). It is obvious that the banking industry was heavily reliant 
on Federal sources of funds.  
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Although the liquidity demand risk41 did exist between 2007 and 2009, it just focused on 
the US. Longstaff (2010) indicates that the subprime crisis in the US was transmitted to 
other countries so that it became a global financial turmoil. In this case, there may also 
exist a liquidity demand risk of banks in other regions in the world. Our first contribution 
is that banks in other countries may also be confronted by liquidity demand risk during 
this financial disaster. Because of banks’ exposure to more credit commitments, the 
probability of withdrawals and drawdowns may be higher. When funding conditions are 
stressed, banks would confront runs on deposit and huge drawdowns on commitments. 
Therefore, this is liquidity demand risk of banks during the crisis.     
As mentioned above, potential liquidity demand risk forces banks to increase their deposit 
rate or even ask for help from the government; this demand risk is caused by a lack of 
funding. During normal periods, banks have sufficient funding resources, such as retail 
and wholesale funding, corporate deposits and deposits from other banks. However, the 
onset of the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis triggered runs on deposits, which increased the 
difficulty for banks to supply liquidity to the financial markets. Banks then needed to 
increase their costs to attract deposits. During a crisis, banks with more sources of funding 
may be able to use lower interest rates to gain deposits, when compared to banks with 
fewer sources of funding (Grossman, 1994)42. 
However, Laeven and Levine (2007) indicated that diversification may bring advantages 
for banks when they were in financial distress, because not only can it reduce non-
systematic risk but also provide cost saving and opportunities for banks to expropriate 
                                                          
41 This risk is defined by Acharya and Mora (2015) that when funding conditions are stressed, firms’ 
uncertainty to demand liquidity from banks by using pre-existing loan commitments, triggers this demand 
risk.    
42 Grossman (1994) suggests that banks that have a more diversified deposit base may be less likely to fail 
due to purely local deposit runs. The banks have better supply capacity since it is easy for them to attract 
funding. 
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financing resources. It could conjecture that although banks may be confronted with a 
shortage of funds, they could use diversified portfolios as a buffer to access to additional 
capital. Therefore, our second contribution is that diversification in a deposit base may 
provide a buffer so that it may reduce the cost of funding and decrease the impact of 
liquidity demand pressure.   
Previous papers (e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) also support that banks with low 
deposits will decrease their lending. They use the failure of Lehman Brothers to suggest 
that banks with more revolving credit may be under pressure to cut corporate lending. 
However, if the banks have sufficient funding resources, they may be able to maintain 
previous lending decisions.  De Haas and Iman Van (2014) suggest that access to a stable 
deposit base was particularly important during a crisis when wholesale funding dried up, 
because a diversified deposit base may allow banks to use spare money to sustain the 
original lending strategy. Our third contribution is that the diversified deposit base may 
provide additional channels for banks to access to funding so they are able to maintain 
their original lending strategy.    
The cost of funding and lending strategies are essential factors that may influence banks’ 
performance, but the most important factor is liquidity. Banks must have sufficient 
liquidity to survive when their financial condition is distressed. Some papers (e.g. 
Diamond and Rajan, 2005; Brunnermeier, 2009) suggest that if the banks cannot fulfil 
their obligation to provide liquidity to the financial markets, they may also be struggling 
against liquidity problems themselves. Rochet and Vives (2004) indicate that these banks 
may become illiquid if investors received a negative signal on the future realization of 
return on the banks’ assets and withdraw early. It is reasonable to assume that if a large 
number of pre-existing commitments appear in a bank, it may be like a potential time 
bomb when the bank loses its advantage in attracting funding. However, if the banks are 
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able to maintain their advantages, it may reduce the risk of liquidity even though they are 
involved in an economic downturn. Banks with more channels to attract funding may 
increase their ability to insure against liquidity problems. Furthermore, it is worth 
mentioning that even solvent banks need a diversification strategy. Our fourth 
contribution is that diversification may give more opportunity for banks to access capital 
so that it may reduce the possibility of illiquidity.  
In addition to analysing the structure of the deposit base, we also consider the impact of 
deposit insurance. Some papers (e.g. Chernykh and Cole, 2011; Anginer et al., 2014b) 
find that the “stabilization” effect of deposit insurance protects the interests of 
unsophisticated depositors and helps prevent bank runs which can improve social welfare. 
However, our finding is different from the study of those who found that deposit insurance 
could restore depositor confidence and avert panic in the banking sector. Because the lack 
of market discipline of deposit insurance may lead to excessive risk taking culminating 
in banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010), and 
the “safety net” may create aggravate the “moral hazard effect”. Finally, our fifth 
contribution is that deposit insurance may operate in the opposite direction, which causes 
banks to be more likely to suffer liquidity demand risk. Our findings show that the “moral 
hazard effect” of deposit insurance is greater than the “stabilization effect” on liquidity 
demand risk.  
The remainder of this paper is structured along the following lines. Section 4.2 provides 
our paper’s hypotheses. Section 4.3 gives the data description and methodology. Section 
4.4 analyses the empirical results. Section 4.5 contains the conclusions. 
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4.2 Hypothesis development 
4. 2.1 Relationship between diversification and cost of deposit 
When the run on deposits erupted, banks with high pre-existing commitments had to 
increase their deposit rate to attract funding in order to relieve the demand pressure. In 
contrast to wholesale and corporate funding, deposits provide a relatively cheap source 
of funding for banks. Therefore, banks were willing to meet the demand by increasing the 
costs of their deposits. However, if banks had a diversified deposit base, they may receive 
the benefit from cost saving (Laeven and Levine, 2007).  If this were the case, banks 
would move away from the more expensive sources of funding and there would be 
additional demand for cheaper types of funding. It is reasonable that if a bank has limited 
funding sources, it has to raise expenses to absorb sufficient funding to meet liquidity 
demand; otherwise it would face an insolvency problem. Traditional theory supports the 
idea that the rate of interest depends on the present supply of money and the demand 
schedule (Keynes, 1937).  
Although Cerasi and Daltung (2000) argue that diversification may increase the cost of 
portfolios, such as monitoring costs and transaction costs, these costs may be eliminated 
by savings from lower deposit rates. Moreover, Hughes and Mester (2013) find that 
diversification may help banks to take advantage of economies of scale. It is obvious that 
economies of scale derived from a larger portfolio of loans and a larger base of deposits 
not only reduce the probability of default risk of loans, but also utilize lower monitoring 
costs to obtain greater capital inflows. This is also the reason why Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) suggest that diversification may provide more incentives for investors to deal with 
higher risks. Thus, we can anticipate that if banks have a diversified deposit base and 
could provide sufficient supply to borrowers, they would obtain extra benefits during a 
crisis. Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: When banks have a diversified deposit base, the impact of a bank’s liquidity 
demand risk on the costs of deposit is reduced during the crisis.  
 
4.2.2 Relationship between diversification and deposit inflow 
Previous papers (e.g. Diamond and Rajan 2005; Acharya et al. 2013) indicate that banks 
might be unable to guarantee liquidity since the demand for funds under the outstanding 
lines (drawdowns) may exceed the supply of funds. When the realized liquidity demand 
exceeds supply, banks have to fail. This means that if banks with a limited deposit base 
cannot fulfil the demand of loan commitments, they would go bankrupt. However, if 
banks have plenty of funding sources, they may be able to relieve the demand pressure. 
For example, if massive commitment drawdowns occur at the onset of a crisis, banks with 
limited retail deposits would utilize the deposits from the government or other banks to 
meet this demand. Furthermore, Hahm et al. (2013) support that when credit is growing 
faster than the pool of available retail deposits, the bank will turn to other sources of 
funding to support its credit growth. It is obvious that banks with a diversified funding 
base may increase their capacity of supply.  
Additionally, the traditional theory of Hughes et al. (1996) suggest that interstate 
branching was better than intrastate branching because it's extensive branching network 
lowers the relative deposit volatility. It means that geographic diversification of deposit 
base may increase liquid asset and deposit inflow. The increase in number of branches 
could diversify deposit base. It can believe that diversification of deposit may increase 
capital inflow. However, banks with a diversified funding model may rely less on deposits 
and more on short-term borrowing (King, 2013). They think that relying on short-term 
funding could increase the liquidity. But during the crisis, banks in many countries 
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suffered liquidity shortages and were unable to rollover their borrowing short-term debt 
(Acharya and Merrouche, 2013). Therefore, when the funding condition was stressed, 
banks with a diversified funding base still need to rely on deposits.     
Although Wagner (2011) argues that bankruptcy may be driven by insolvency and not 
necessarily because of the result of under-diversification, this paper ignores the stressed 
funding condition. As mentioned above, a bank with an undiversified deposit base may 
be illiquid, because it may be difficult to attract capital when investors lose confidence in 
a financial market. If the bank has many pre-existing commitments, it cannot fulfil its 
obligations to meet the demand43 and will become bankrupt. The studies of Rochet and 
Vives (2004) also support the view that a bank’s liquidity demand risk can be collapsed 
into solvency risk. 
Furthermore, Rossi et al. (2009) find that although diversification in portfolios cannot 
improve the cost efficiency and reduce the cost of operations, it may reduce a bank’s 
realized ex-post risk because of sufficient funding inflow. Briefly, it is reasonable that 
diversification may play a role as a buffer when banks face heavy demand pressure. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: When banks have a diversified deposit base, the impact of a liquidity 
demand risk on deposit inflows is reduced during the crisis.  
 
4.2.3 Relationship between diversification and lending decision 
As mentioned above, banks with large pre-existing commitments reduced their overall 
credit (the sum of loans and commitments) by cutting down the extension of new loan 
commitments and term loans. Since the shortfall between lending and deposits was 
                                                          
43 According to economic theory, there should be an equilibrium between supply and demand (Lange, 1936).  
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widened, banks were unable to meet lending demands with deposits alone. Lending 
decisions suffered dual influences of commitment drawdowns and runs on deposits. 
Similarly, Brei and Schclarek (2015) suggest that if banks suffer fewer deposit 
withdrawals, they would provide more loans to the real sector during the crisis. However, 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) oppose that bank runs cause real economic problems, and 
even “healthy” banks can fail. It is reasonable that even “healthy” banks suffer large 
withdrawals, even while commitment-exposed banks can suffer fewer. As a consequence, 
Brei and Schclarek (2015) put forward another finding that if banks have a stable deposit 
base, they can insulate their slowdown of lending. It means that banks with abundant 
deposits are able to supply the lending demand during the recession. According to 
Grossman’s (1994) study, it may be easier for banks with a more diversified deposit base 
to attract funding so that they have sufficient funding sources (lower supply risk) 
sustaining their lending schedule. This conjecture is related to the studies of Kang (2013) 
and García-Kuhnert et al. (2015)44 that diversification could mitigate risk exposure on 
lending. Therefore, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: When banks have a diversified deposit base, the impact of a bank’s liquidity 
demand risk on lending decisions is reduced during the crisis.  
 
4. 2.4 Relationship between diversification and liquidity risk 
The liquidity risk arises as a result of banks that are in financial straits and find it difficult 
to liquidate their assets in financial markets, especially when there is a run on deposits. 
Liquidity demand risk means that banks with pre-existing loan commitments cannot fulfil 
the contractual obligation of these credit lines, when the funding condition is stressed 
                                                          
44 Kang (2013) and García-Kuhnert et al. (2015) suggest that diversification brings benefits to stakeholders 
and shareholders by adjusting risk respectively. According to the impact of diversification on risk-taking, 
we can expect that a diversified deposit base may reduce the possibility and risk of funding shortages.    
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(Acharya and Mora, 2015). There is no doubt that if banks fail to honour the pre-existing 
credit commitments, depositors may receive a bad signal on these banks’ condition, which 
may trigger a run on deposits. Because of banks’ exposure to liquidity demand risk (a 
large number of undrawn credit commitments), they would take offsetting draws on its 
liquid assets and borrowings for the sake of controlling liquidity risks. Actually, banks 
may become involved in a liquidity bottleneck since the funding condition is stressed in 
the market during the crisis. Therefore, liquidity risk may be influenced by the synergistic 
effect of the potential liquidity demand risk and the run on deposits.  
In addition, some papers (e.g. Rochet and Vives 2004; Diamond and Rajan 2005) find 
that banks with a higher illiquidity risk may react to the liquidity demand risk by raising 
deposit rates more than banks with lower illiquidity risk. They also suggest that investors 
may withdraw early by realizing a negative signal on the future return on a bank’s assets, 
which may make a “healthy” bank illiquid. Therefore, there is a relationship between 
liquidity demand risk and liquidity risk.  
Based on the study of Hughes et al. (1996), liquidity risk can be reduced when the deposit 
base is diversified by increasing the number of branches and deposit accounts. In addition, 
DeYoung and Torna (2013) imply that non-traditional banking activities may be able to 
increase the higher illiquidity risk than traditional banking activities. Obtaining deposits 
is a traditional service, and if banks could diversify their deposit base, they would be able 
to control the insolvency risk effectively. Combining with the studies of Kang (2013) and 
García-Kuhnert et al. (2015), we anticipate that if banks make a diversification in their 
deposit base, it would reduce the risk of funding shortages, and then banks with enough 
deposit supply to meet liquidity demand may transmit a good signal for investors so that 
it may reduce the market panic and risk of illiquidity. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is 
as follows: 
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Hypothesis 4: When banks have a diversified deposit base, the impact of a liquidity 
demand risk on liquidity ratio is reduced during the crisis.   
 
4.2.5 Relationship between insurance and liquidity risk 
Many previous papers (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Karas et al., 2013; 
Anginer et al., 2014b) suggest that deposit insurance could restore depositor confidence 
and avert panic in the banking sector. They also find that explicit deposit insurance 
reduces the deposit interest rates required and increases the deposit inflows. Pennacchi, 
(2006) deems that deposit insurance could hedge liquidity risk. These positive 
stabilization effect of deposit insurance is important during financial downturns.  
However, there is also a considerable consensus in the literature that deposit insurance 
exacerbates moral hazard problems in the banking sector by incentivizing banks to take 
on excessive risk. The papers (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Anginer et al., 
2014b) support the view that deposit insurance can protect the interest of depositors and 
reduce the possibility of bank runs, but they also argue that the lack of market discipline 
on this “safety net” leads to excessive risk taking culminating in banking crises. Therefore, 
banks with deposit insurance may be immoderate to increase lending and issue 
commitment loans, which raise the potential of liquidity risk. Furthermore, when deposits 
are insured, however, bank depositors lack incentives to monitor (Ioannidou and Penas, 
2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2013; Shapiro and Skeie, 2015). If depositors try to limit bank 
risk, interest rates may be increased, which enhance the cost of funding. It is reasonable 
that the “moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance may trigger the huge financial problem. 
Therefore, our fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 5. The “moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance may be greater than the 
“stabilization effect” on the liquid demand risk during the crisis.  
 
4.3 Data description and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data description 
This paper uses bank-level variables, collected from the annual Reports accessed by 
Bloomberger. Our database includes 12 countries (Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, South Africa); 
these countries belong to the G7 or BRICS groups respectively. Since the financial crisis 
in 2007-2009 was an international level crunch, our database is typical in representing 
worldwide economic conditions. Furthermore, the G7 and BRICS groups are the 
countries whose financial actions could have a significant impact on the global economy. 
We use data from the period 2005 -2014 because we can divide the period into two groups; 
financial crisis and normal times respectively. According to Berger and Bouwman’s 
(2013)45 study, we suggest that the period between 2008 and 2009 is a crisis and other 
years are normal periods because of the yearly data in our database. Through dividing 
into two groups, we can estimate whether the recent crisis is a special case that a crisis of 
liquidity providers. Table 1 shows the variable definitions.    
                                                          
45 They suggest that the recent subprime lending crisis occurred between 2007-Q3 and 2009-Q4.  
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Table 1   
Variables  
Interest rate, time 
deposit rate 
Time deposits (also known as certificate of deposit or term deposits). Interest expense on time deposits is 
divided by annual average time deposits. Expressed as % annual rate and collected from the annual report.  
Deposits inflow ratio  
The deposits inflow ratio is measured as the difference between this year total deposit and last year total 
deposits divided by this year total deposit. Collected from the annual report. 
Lending decision  
Lending decision which is a ratio that the difference between this year total loans and last year total loans, 
divided by this year total assets. Collected from the annual report. 
Liquidity ratio  Liquidity ratio is measured as liquid assets to total assets. Collected from the annual report.  
Unfunded commitment 
ratio 
Unfunded commitment ratio (also known as undrawn commitments, unused commitments or guaranteed 
commitments) is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused 
commitments. Collected from the annual report.  
Deposit diversification 
(-HHI) 
Deposit diversification is measured by (-HHI). This ratio includes personal deposits, deposits from banks, 
corporate deposits and other deposits.  
Deposit insurance  Natural logarithm of deposit insurance. Collected from the World Bank. 
Bank level control variables 
Non-performing loan 
ratio  
Non-performing loan ratio is measured as loan loss provision divided by total loans. Collected from the annual 
report.    
ETA ratio  
ETA ratio is measured as total equity to total assets and used to reflect the difference of bank size. Collected 
from the annual report. 
Bank size Bank size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Collected from the annual report.  
Government 
borrowings 
Government borrowings is measured as government borrowings to total assets. Collected from the annual 
report. 
Other borrowings  
Other borrowings (including short-term borrowings) is measured as other borrowings to total assets. Collected 
from the annual report. 
Country level control variables 
GDP growth rate The GDP growth rate is expressed as annual rate collected from the World Bank. 
Inflation rate Inflation rate is expressed as annual rate collected from the World Bank. 
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The main deposit rate used in the analysis is the rate on time deposits. It is the implicit 
rate based on annual reports, represented as interest expenses on the deposits divided by 
the interest-bearing deposits. We use banks’ undrawn commitments ratio to represent the 
exposure to liquidity demand risk46. The ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan 
commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments.47 As mentioned above, when 
runs on deposits occurred, banks with more pre-existing commitments would have been 
more likely to be exposed to drawdown. For estimating the diversification, we subdivide 
the total deposits into personal deposits, deposits from bank, corporate deposits and other 
deposits. Through subdividing, we can analyse whether a diversified deposit base could 
provide a sufficient supply to liquidity demand.  
We also consider a bank’s liquidity and solvency factors, including liquidity asset and 
non-performing loans. We choose the variable non-performing loans to total asset, which 
is a proxy for default risk.48 We use the ratio of liquid assets to total assets to represent 
bank liquidity for controlling the differences in bank liquidity risk.49 For estimating the 
bank size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets and the ratio of total equity to total 
assets. Large banks may be big enough to be considered “too-big-to-fail”, so we need to 
control their bank size. Additionally, we also use the indicators of government borrowing 
and other borrowings as control variables to distinguish the different characteristics of 
banks’ capital inflows. For controlling different characters at the country level, we use 
variables GDP growth rate and inflation rate to reflect the macroeconomic environment. 
                                                          
46 Liquidity demand risk is when banks with pre-existing loan commitments cannot fulfil the contractual 
obligation of these credit lines, when funding conditions are stressed. 
47 We excludes credit card commitments. This measure follows the studies of Gatev and Strahan (2006) 
and Acharya and Mora (2015), because most credit card commitments are unlikely to be drawn.  
48 Shim (2013) and Bennett et al. (2015) indicate that non-performing loans are a good indicator of a bank’s 
individual risk in times of crisis. They think that a large increase in non-performing loans at the beginning 
of a crisis may cause a deterioration in asset and increase the probability of bankruptcy.  
49 We control liquidity risk and bank size following the measures of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013). They 
suggest that liquidity asset ratio is a good index for estimating whether financial institutions have the 
necessary assets on hand to deal with a sudden shortage of funds.  
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4.3.2 Methodology  
4.3.2.1 Diversification measure 
According to the studies of De Jonghe et al. (2015) and García-Kuhnert et al. (2015), we 
use the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (-HHI) measure for each bank in order to estimate 
whether they have a diversified deposit base. If banks have higher values in (-HHI), which 
means that they have a diversified deposit base and a diversified loan portfolio 
respectively, they are more likely to face a lower supply risk. The formula for estimating 
deposit -HHI (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑃) for each bank is as follows: 
(−𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑃,𝑖,𝑡) = (
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡
+
𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡
+
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡
+
𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡
)
∗ (−1)                                                                                                               (1) 
where 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 is total deposit and total borrowings (government borrowings and other 
borrowings); 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡  is individual deposit; 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡  is deposit from banks or 
financial institutions; 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is the corporate deposit; 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is other 
deposit..  
 
4.3.2.2 The impact of diversification on liquidity demand risk 
We investigate whether banks with a diversified deposit base could suffer a lower impact 
of liquidity demand risk during the crisis. Therefore, we use deposit rate, deposit inflows, 
lending amounts and liquid ratio as the dependent variables to test whether a diversified 
base is a buffer when banks face liquidity demand pressures. Therefore, the model is as 
follows: 
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𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠, 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(−𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝐷𝐸𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(−𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝐷𝐸𝑃,𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3(−𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝐷𝐸𝑃,𝑡−1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4(−𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝐷𝐸𝑃,𝑡−1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (2) 
where (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝐷𝐸𝑃,𝑡−1 represents the diversification of deposit calculated by equation (1) 
times minus one. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of unused loan commitments 
to the sum of loans and unused commitments in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1;  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1 is the control 
variable in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1.  
Firstly, when the funding condition is stressed, banks need to increase their deposit rate 
in order to obtain deposit inflows to cover the pre-existing commitments demand. 
Therefore, we use time interest rate as the dependent variable to estimate the impact of 
diversification on liquidity demand risk. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is deposit rate (time deposit 
rate).  
Secondly, we use deposit inflow as the dependent variable to estimate whether Banks 
with more pre-existing loan commitments may confront a shortage of deposits during the 
financial crisis. The systemic expected shortfall will force banks to experience a capital 
shortage during a crisis. This shortage of capital is not only dangerous for an individual 
bank, but also becomes dangerous for the global economy if the banking industry is 
undercapitalized. Furthermore, deposits are one of the most important channels for banks 
to attract capitals. Obviously, if a “healthy” bank lacks sufficient deposit inflows; even it 
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may confront liquidity pressure, let alone a bank with potential liquidity demand risk 
(commitment-exposed banks). 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a ratio of the difference between 
total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 divided by total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. 
Thirdly, in addition to test deposit actions, we test the banks’ lending decisions. As 
mentioned above, when the funding condition is stressed, banks may reduce making loans 
in order to sustain sufficient funding to meet demand pressure. However, there is no 
consensus on what can help banks’ lending decisions during a crisis. We expect that if 
banks have sufficient funding, they would like to maintain their lending. Therefore, we 
also use a diversification measure to estimate whether a lower supply risk can improve 
lending decisions. 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is a ratio of the difference between total loans 
in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 divided by total assets in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. 
Finally, we test whether, when banks have a diversified deposit base, the impact of a 
bank’s liquidity demand risk on liquidity risk is reduced. As mentioned above, liquidity 
demand risk may increase liquidity risk; but there is no consensus on whether banks with 
a diversified deposit base could reduce the impact of liquidity demand risk on liquidity 
risk. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is represented as a ratio of liquid asset to total asset in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. 
 
4.3.2.3 The impact of insurance on liquidity demand risk 
We investigate whether banks with a deposit insurance could suffer a lower impact of 
liquidity demand risk or this “safety net” may have an opposite effect, during the crisis. 
Therefore, we also use deposit rate, deposit inflows, lending amounts and liquid ratio as 
the dependent variables to test whether “moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance may 
be greater than the “stabilization effect”. Therefore, the model is as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠, 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠  
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𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
+  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                             (3) 
where 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 is the natural logarithm of deposit insurance in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1. 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1  is the ratio of unused loan commitments to the sum of 
loans and unused commitments in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1;  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1 is the control variables in 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 ; 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is deposit rate (time deposit rate);  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is a 
ratio of the difference between total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  and total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 
divided by total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 ; 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is a ratio of the difference 
between total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 divided by total assets in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡; 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is represented as a ratio of liquid asset to total asset in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. 
 
4.3.2.4 Dynamic Panel Model 
For the sake of further examination into the impact of deposit diversification and 
insurance on liquidity demand risk, we use a dynamic panel model to eliminate potential 
endogenous problems by employing instrumental variables. We employ an instrumental 
variable technique with a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator and account 
for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, this model 
enhances the significance of the impact of the interactive term for during the crisis.   
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4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of variables used in this paper. An average bank 
in the sample has an unfunded commitment ratio of 0.105, time deposit interest expense 
of 0.023, Non-performance loan of 0.006, and a liquid ratio of 0.169. Comparing these 
numbers to those in previous studies such as Acharya and Mora (2015), their values are 
a little lower because our sample includes some developing countries. For example, banks 
in India and China usually conduct traditional services for a living so they may issue 
fewer credit commitments. In addition, traditional services bring an advantage for 
attracting capital for them so that the interest rates are lower 
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Table 2        
Summary statistics      
Variable     N   Mean    P25 Median    P75    STD 
Time expense 1200 0.023 0.008 0.014 0.024 0.028 
Deposit inflows 1080 0.128 -0.002 0.083 0.175 0.547 
Lending Decisions 1080 0.040 -0.006 0.033 0.083 0.101 
Liquid ratio 1200 0.169 0.05 0.134 0.248 0.147 
Unfunded 
commitments 
1200 0.105 0.017 0.054 0.159 0.128 
Deposit (-HHI) 1200 -0.732 -0.854 -0.771 -0.652 0.171 
Deposit insurance 1200 8.676 7.683 10.666 11.643 4.321 
Non-performing loan 1200 0.022 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.086 
ETA ratio  1200 0.102 0.047 0.067 0.119 0.103 
Government 
borrowings 
1200 0.010 0 0 0.051 0.002 
Other borrowings 1200 0.005 0 0 0.011 0.031 
Total asset 1200 17.276 14.981 16.903 19.865 2.912 
GDP growth rate 1200 0.031 0.011 0.024 0.051 0.039 
Inflation rate 1200 0.037 0.016 0.027 0.054 0.032 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (number, mean, P25, median, P75, minimum, maximum 
and standard deviation) for the variables used in this paper. The sample consist of 1200 banks in 12 
countries over the time period 2005-2014. Time expense is that interest expense on time deposits is 
divided by annual average time deposits. Deposit inflows is a ratio that the difference between total 
deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
 and total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡−1
 divided by total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
. Lending Decisions is 
a ratio that the difference between total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
 and total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡−1
 divided by total assets 
in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
. Liquid ratio is liquid asset to total asset. Equity to asset is total equity divided by total assets. 
Unfunded commitments is a ratio that is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum 
of loans and unused commitments. Deposit (-HHI) is a proxy for representing diversification in a deposit 
base Non-performing loan is loan loss provision divided by total loans. Government borrowings and 
other borrowings are expressed as a ratio. Total asset is the log value of total assets. GDP growth rate 
and inflation rate are expressed as an annual rate.  
 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of variables that are shown in table 2. Before the 
data analysis, we check for the issue of multicollinearity. The highest correlation value is 
between total assets and equity to total assets, which is 0.512, while these values are 
within an acceptable level. 
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Table 3                             
Correlation matrix                             
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Time expense  1                           
2 Deposit inflows -0.043 1 
            
3 Lending Decisions -0.011 0.213 1 
           
4 Liquid ratio 0.010 -0.046 -0.021 1 
          
5 Unfunded commitments -0.030 0.016 -0.001 0.11 1 
         
6 Deposit (-HHI) 0.181 0.034 0.080 -0.171 -0.012 1         
7 Deposit insurance 0.102 -0.058 -0.139 -0.132 0.207 -0.235 1 
       
8 Non-performing loan -0.003 0.078 -0.071 0.101 0.019 -0.076 0.018 1 
      
9 ETA ratio 0.087 -0.040 -0.052 0.053 -0.019 -0.006 -0.037 0.173 1 
     
10 Government borrowings 0.063 -0.011 0.063 0.031 0.229 -0.096 0.053 0.017 0.229 1 
    
11 Other borrowings -0.029 0.009 0.068 0.008 -0.009 0.031 -0.020 0.013 0.056 0.268 1 
   
12 Total asset -0.166 0.068 -0.063 -0.024 -0.039 0.058 -0.044 -0.167 -0.512 -0.238 0.004 1 
  
13 GDP growth rate -0.091 0.115 0.260 -0.091 -0.109 0.109 -0.550 -0.087 -0.039 -0.075 0.011 0.045 1 
 
14 Inflation rate 0.083 0.050 0.008 -0.12 -0.051 0.257 -0.336 0.043 0.123 0.025 0.147 -0.110 0.333 1 
Note: This table reports the correlation matrix of selected variables of banks during 2005–2014. All correlations above 0.6 are significant at least at 0.10 level. 
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4.4.2 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, diversification and time 
expense ratio  
Table 4 shows the impact of an unfunded commitment ratio on deposit rates. Models 1, 2 
and 3 report the results for fixed effect model, while the last three models show those for 
GMM model. The table show that there is a negative relationship between the unfunded 
commitment ratio and deposit interest rates during normal times. This means that it is not 
necessary for banks with pre-existing undrawn commitments to increase deposit rates to 
attract capital for fulfilling the credit obligations during normal periods. However, the 
interesting thing is that all the models show a significant positive relationship between 
the interactive term for an unfunded commitment ratio and the crisis dummy and deposit 
interest rates (𝜌 <0.01). This means that banks with greater pre-existing commitments 
raise interest rates to obtain funding during crisis periods. The finding also supports other 
studies (e.g., Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Acharya and Mora, 2015) that the banks may 
borrow from outside to make good on promised loans. Furthermore, the results argue with 
the study of Avery and Berger (1991). They indicate that credit commitment loans could 
be safer or riskier because the credit risk depends on the selection of borrowers. However, 
they ignore the distressed financial condition that may instigate good borrowers and poor 
borrowers to execute the commitments at the same time. Therefore, banks with greater 
pre-existing loan commitments offer higher deposit rates to attract funding during crisis 
periods.  
Model 3, Table 4 further shows the impact of diversification on interest rates. There is a 
negative relationship between 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 and time expense ratio. This means 
that banks diversify in deposits base may reduce interest expense. These results support 
the theory of Hann et al., (2013) that diversification may reduce the cost of capital. The 
more interesting thing is that the interactive term for deposit diversification and the crisis 
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dummy ( 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 ) has a negative relationship with the interest 
expense. Furthermore, the interaction between unfunded commitment ratio, deposit 
diversification and crisis dummy (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) 
has a negative effect on time expense ratio. The results align with hypothesis H1, that 
banks with a diversified deposit base have low costs of deposit, but this phenomenon just 
appears during a period of financial crisis.  
According to the studies of Brunnermeier (2009) and Covitz et al. (2013), investors lost 
confidence in financial markets and the banking sector, and even depositors were leaving 
banks, let alone banks could be easily access to capital. Furthermore, lower diversification 
in a deposit base means that banks have fewer channels to access capital when the funding 
condition is stressed. The reason why our finding is different from the study of Singhal 
and Zhu (2013)50 is that a bank is a special firm that works as a financial intermediary by 
obtaining capital and lending it to borrowers. It is reasonable that the cost of funding for 
banks may be reduced as long as they maintain a good capital turnover. Therefore, it can 
be expected that higher diversification (lower concentration) on a deposit base may 
reduce the cost of capital (decrease of deposit rates).  
                                                          
50 Singhal and Zhu (2013) suggest that diversified firms may have higher costs when facing potential 
bankruptcy, because of inefficient segment investment.   
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Table 4 
The relationship between deposit expense rate and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time expense 
ratio 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1  -0.007 -0.014*  -0.047*** -0.056*** 
  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.021) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒  -0.024*** -0.042***  -0.015** -0.053*** 
  (0.009) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.018) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1)* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1   -0.157***   0.319 
   (0.054)   (0.206) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 -0.643***   -1.707*** 
   (0.158)   (0.560) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.078** -0.083** -0.111*** -0.031** -0.041** -0.127*** 
 (0.030) (0.039) (0.033) (0.014) (0.018) (0.048) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 0.096*** 0.076*** 0.149*** 0.074*** 0.038*** 0.247*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.066) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 0.002* 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.072** -0.046* -0.027* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.024) (0.016) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003** -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.022* -0.024* -0.029* 0.056** 0.056 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.045) (0.026) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 4-Continued       
The relationship between deposit expense rate and interactive term for𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time expense 
ratio 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.021 -0.008 -0.008 0.035 0.012 0.126** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.031) (0.050) 
𝐿. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡    0.248*** 0.148** 0.115* 
    (0.091) (0.073) (0.061) 
_cons 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.066*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) 
N 1080 1080 1080 1080 960 1080 
r2_a 0.072 0.078 0.085    
F 26.587 23.767 22.912    
AR(1)    0.091 0.100 0.099 
AR(2)    0.412 0.659 0.876 
Hansen (p-value)    1.000 0.280 0.277 
Note: This table shows the results relating to the reaction on deposit rates to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit diversification and interaction between 
them during the crisis. The dependent variables are interest expense rate of time deposits expressed as % annual rate. Deposit (-HHI) is an indicator of diversification, 
which is a ratio that the ratio of deposit HHI times (-1). Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused 
commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models are panel regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 and regressions 
use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel model (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond 
test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the 
instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.3 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, diversification and deposit 
inflows  
Table 5 shows the impact of interaction between diversification and unfunded 
commitment ratio on deposit inflows. First of all, there is a negative relationship between 
deposit inflows and pre-existing unfunded loan commitments 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒. This means that banks with greater pre-existing commitments face a shortage of 
deposits during crisis periods. When the funding condition is stressed, depositors lose 
their confidence in the banking industry and financial markets (Brunnermeier, 2009), and 
then banks lose their advantage in obtaining capital during this period (Gatev and Strahan, 
2006), worse still, banks have signed commitment contracts with borrowers (Acharya and 
Mora, 2015). As a result, the dual pressure of commitment drawdowns and a shortage of 
deposits leads banks to liquidity risk. 
Interestingly, models 2, 3, 5 and 6 show that 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1  is statistically 
significant at the 5 % level and has a negative impact on deposit inflows. This means that 
banks with an undiversified deposit base in previous years may reduce deposit inflows in 
the normal time. According to Brav’s (2009)51 theory, it is reasonable that concentration 
could have a positive effect on capital inflows. Furthermore, Kahle and Stulz (2013) put 
forward a similar viewpoint that if the firm has a good relationship with a bank, it could 
reduce capital expenditure and is more likely to receive funding from banks. Similarly, 
we can expect that if the bank has a good relationship with a few depositors, it could be 
more likely to access capital from them.  
                                                          
51 Brav (2009) indicates that ownership concentration is an important friction because not only can it reduce 
the cost of accessing capital, but also help firms to be more likely to access external capital.  
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However, the results show that the interactive term 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒  is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and has a positive relationship with deposit 
inflows. This suggests that if banks diversify their deposit base, they could attract 
sufficient capital during the financial crunch. In other words, when the funding condition 
is stressed and even runs on deposit appear in market, the banks lose their advantage at 
obtaining capital. Good relationships with specific depositors may be unable to raise their 
confidence in financial markets. However, banks with a diversified deposit base may 
relieve the pressure of funding shortages during the crisis; this is because they have more 
channels through which to access capital. This is also the reason why Disyatat (2011) 
concludes that the channel is more important when the financial system is repressed. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that banks with a diversified deposit base may reduce the 
probability of funding shortages.   
Table 5 also shows the relationship between deposit inflows, liquidity demand risk and 
diversification. The findings in Table 5 support the idea that banks may not confront 
liquidity demand risk and those with an undiversified deposit base may be more likely to 
attract capital in normal periods. However, interestingly modes 3 and 6 show that the 
interactive term for unfunded commitment and deposit diversification and crisis dummy 
( 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 ) are statistically significant and 
have a positive effect on deposit inflows during the crisis (β=7.671, ρ<0.01; β=26.563, 
ρ<0.01 respectively). This finding aligns with hypothesis H2, that when banks have a 
diversified deposit base, the impact of a bank’s liquidity demand risk on deposit inflows 
is reduced.  
Combining the results in Tables 4 and 5, we can expect that diversification may reduce 
the impact of liquidity demand risk on the cost of funding and funding shortages. It is also 
the reason why the channel is more important when the funding condition is stressed 
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(Disyatat, 2011). A diversified deposit base may offer extra channels for banks to attract 
deposits. It may relieve the pressure of funding demand, and even decrease costs for 
accessing capital when the financial system is distressed.  
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Table 5 
The relationship between 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡 and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1  -0.172** -0.181**  -0.128* -0.254* 
  (0.068) (0.091)  (0.072) (0.137) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒  0.372*** 0.601***  0.274** 0.925*** 
  (0.127) (0.137)  (0.135) (0.134) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1)* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1   -0.472   -7.258*** 
   (0.607)   (1.944) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  7.671***   26.563*** 
   (1.803)   (6.819) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 0.419*** 0.169* 0.254* 0.278*** 0.263** 1.342*** 
 (0.151) (0.098) (0.137) (0.074) (0.106) (0.403) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 -0.928*** -0.725*** -1.542*** -0.815*** -0.569*** -3.724*** 
 (0.119) (0.160) (0.228) (0.113) (0.161) (0.811) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.083** -0.074** -0.075 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.036) (0.048) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.154 0.169* 0.169* 0.033 0.026 0.045 
 (0.099) (0.101) (0.104) (0.101) (0.111) (0.128) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.277** -0.252** -0.177* -0.524** -0.357* -0.290 
 (0.112) (0.114) (0.100) (0.225) (0.200) (0.204) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.130 0.529** 0.521** 0.359** 0.397*** 0.231 
 (0.301) (0.253) (0.256) (0.155) (0.135) (0.148) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 5-Continued       
The relationship between 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡 and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
𝐿. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡    0.178*** 0.148* 0.129* 
    (0.068) (0.076) (0.076) 
_cons 0.120 0.231 0.220 0.029 0.004 0.030 
 (0.127) (0.142) (0.139) (0.047) (0.058) (0.065) 
N 1080 1080 1080 840 840 840 
r2_a 0.252 0.306 0.339    
F 15.748 15.812 16.007    
AR(1)    0.015 0.015 0.017 
AR(2)    0.232 0.180 0.492 
Hansen (p-value)    0.398 0.450 0.403 
Note: This table shows the results relating to the reaction on deposit inflow ratio to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit diversification and interaction 
between them during the crisis. The dependent variables are deposited inflow ratios, which are ratios that the difference between total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
 and total 
deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡−1
, divided by total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
. Deposit (-HHI) is an indicator of diversification, which is a ratio that the ratio of deposit HHI times (-1). 
Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The 
first three models (Panel A) are panel regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 and regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models 
(4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance 
at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.4 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, diversification and lending 
amounts 
Table 6 shows the relationship between lending decisions, unfunded loan commitments 
and deposit diversification respectively. First, in all models, the ratios of undrawn loan 
commitments are statistically significant at the 1% level, and have a positive effect on 
lending decisions. This suggests that banks with greater pre-existing loan commitments 
may increase their lending during normal periods. The increase of lending is caused by 
loan commitments that are converted to loans (Acharya and Mora, 2015). There is no 
significant relationship between lending decisions and deposit diversification during 
normal periods.    
However, the interactive term for unfunded commitment and crisis dummy 
(𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) have a negative relationship with lending. This means 
that banks with higher liquidity demand risk, reduce the extension of new loans. It is 
reasonable that when the funding condition is stressed, banks are unable to meet their 
commitment lending needs with deposit funding, let alone making some new loans 
(Ivashina, and David, 2010). Moreover, models 2, 3, 5 and 6 show that the interactive 
term for deposit diversification and crisis dummy 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 have a 
positive relationship with lending, which means that a higher diversification on deposits 
may increase the number of new loans during a crisis.  
Models 3 and 6, Table 6 further shows whether diversification could reduce the impact 
of potential liquidity demand risk on lending decisions. The interactive term for unfunded 
commitment and deposit diversification and crisis dummy ( 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) have a positive effect on lending decisions and the co-
efficiency are also highly significant (β=4.457, ρ<0.01; β=12.022, ρ<0.01) respectively. 
This aligns with hypothesis H3, that diversification could reduce the impact of liquidity 
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demand risk on lending decisions during a financial crunch, compared to the interaction 
terms without a crisis dummy. The results in Table 6 contrast with previous results (e.g. 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Ivashina, and David, 2010; Acharya et al., 2013; Acharya and Mora, 
2015) that commitment-exposed banks may reduce their lending because of funding 
shortages. However, diversification increases the probability of accessing capital. It is 
possible that banks with more channels to attract funding may be more likely to deal with 
the synergy between deposit-taking and commitment-lending; they may have spare 
funding to make new loans. Therefore, diversification may help banks to maintain their 
original lending decisions.  
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Table 6 
The relationship between 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1  -0.049 -0.009  -0.009 -0.002 
  (0.051) (0.066)  (0.031) (0.029) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒  0.123** 0.249***  0.084** 0.429*** 
  (0.054) (0.088)  (0.042) (0.135) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1)* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1   -0.929   -1.205* 
   (0.630)   (0.649) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  4.457***   12.022*** 
   (1.174)   (3.366) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 0.291*** 0.217* 0.380*** 0.164*** 0.151** 0.278** 
 (0.107) (0.120) (0.142) (0.062) (0.069) (0.137) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 -0.674*** -0.604*** -1.108*** -0.577*** -0.514*** -1.813*** 
 (0.084) (0.104) (0.136) (0.080) (0.090) (0.391) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 0.015 0.016 0.020 -0.029 -0.031 -0.024 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.091 0.095 0.091 -0.095 -0.038 -0.020 
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.098) (0.107) (0.047) (0.050) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.310*** -0.302*** -0.267*** -0.616*** -0.568*** -0.425*** 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.075) (0.150) (0.140) (0.131) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.191 0.323** 0.323** 0.746*** 0.756*** 0.539** 
 (0.140) (0.153) (0.150) (0.263) (0.231) (0.220) 
      (Continued) 
179 
 
  
Table 6-Continued       
The relationship between 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
𝐿. 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡    0.265*** 0.260*** 0.227*** 
    (0.054) (0.054) (0.046) 
_cons 0.329*** 0.363*** 0.395*** 0.055 0.032 0.046 
 (0.102) (0.109) (0.108) (0.048) (0.035) (0.033) 
N 1080 1080 1080 960 960 960 
r2_a 0.308 0.320 0.351    
F 13.948 17.393 12.289    
AR(1)    0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)    0.800 0.975 0.240 
Hansen (p-value)    0.427 0.754 0.811 
Note: This table shows the results relating to the reaction on lending decision to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit diversification and interaction between 
them during the crisis. The dependent variables are lending decision which is a ratio that the difference between total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
 and total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡−1
, divided 
by total assets in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑡
. Deposit (-HHI) is an indicator of diversification, which is a ratio that the ratio of deposit HHI times (-1). Unfunded ratio is measured as the 
ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models (Panel A) are panel 
regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 and regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models 
(GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J 
statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical 
significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.5 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, diversification and liquid 
ratio 
Table 7 shows the relationship between liquidity risk, liquidity demand risk and deposit 
concentration respectively. As models from 1 to 6 show, there is a positive relationship 
between the liquid ratio and undrawn commitment ratio (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1). This 
means that banks with greater pre-existing loan commitments may not face illiquidity 
problem in the normal times. However, the interactive term for unfunded commitment 
ratio and crisis dummy (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) have a negative relationship with 
the liquid ratio (ρ<0.01). It is obvious that liquidity demand risk may transfer to liquidity 
risk during a crisis. When the funding condition is stressed and banks confront a shortage 
of capital, commitment-exposed banks need to take offsetting draws on their liquid assets 
(Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Acharya and Mora, 2015). Therefore, this may increase the 
liquidity risk during a crisis.  
Similarly, models 3, 5 and 6 show that the interactive term for deposit diversification and 
crisis dummy (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) have a positive connection with liquid ratio, 
and suggest that a higher diversification (lower concentration) on deposits may increase 
the liquidity risk during a crisis, while higher concentration on specific deposits increases 
liquidity in the normal times. As shown in Table 5, diversification could help banks 
increase deposit inflows during a financial crunch, therefore, banks may decrease their 
liquidation on liquid assets to meet funding demands.  
The model 3 and 6, Table 7 further show that the interactive terms 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 have a positive connection with liquid ratio and the co-
efficiency are also highly significant in these two models (β=2.988, ρ<0.05; β=9.956, 
ρ<0.01) respectively. It means that diversification could reduce the impact of liquidity 
demand risk on the liquidity risk during the crisis. As shown in the table, the liquidity 
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demand risk may transfer to liquidity risk while diversification may help banks maintain 
their liquidity during a crisis. Previous research from Hughes et al. (1996), Kang (2013) 
and García-Kuhnert et al. (2015) highlights that firms can realize the benefit of 
diversification through adjusting portfolios risk. From a different perspective, our 
findings highlight the deposit base as being a portfolio, helping to realize the benefit of 
diversification on liquidity risk. We can therefore expect that if banks make a 
diversification in their deposit base, it would reduce the risk of funding shortages, and 
banks may then be able to meet liquidity demand. This action may send a good signal to 
investors and could therefore reduce market panic and risk of liquidity. Therefore, this 
finding aligns with hypothesis H4, that when banks have a diversified deposit base, the 
impact of bank’s liquidity demand risk on liquidity ratio is reduced.  
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Table 7 
The relationship between 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1  -0.198*** -0.112*  -0.261*** -0.131* 
  (0.058) (0.065)  (0.079) (0.079) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒  0.082 0.158*  0.243* 0.497*** 
  (0.058) (0.081)  (0.139) (0.103) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1)* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1   -1.471**   -1.544* 
   (0.707)   (0.920) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  2.988**   9.956*** 
   (1.212)   (1.539) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 0.563*** 0.317** 0.574*** 0.312*** 0.196** 0.459* 
 (0.159) (0.149) (0.162) (0.071) (0.099) (0.255) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 -0.695*** -0.710*** -1.087*** -0.544*** -0.517*** -1.577*** 
 (0.061) (0.074) (0.148) (0.054) (0.081) (0.162) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 0.020 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.007 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.025) (0.031) (0.028) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 -0.143** -0.133* -0.142** -0.008 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.066) (0.064) (0.073) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002* 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.072 -0.071 -0.059 -0.488*** -0.393*** -0.355*** 
 (0.070) (0.061) (0.065) (0.108) (0.095) (0.083) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.071 0.138* 0.143* 0.322** 0.420* 0.221* 
 (0.107) (0.077) (0.077) (0.137) (0.245) (0.134) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 7-Continued       
The relationship between 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio 
𝐿. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t    0.466*** 0.363*** 0.378*** 
    (0.054) (0.065) (0.048) 
_cons 0.195* 0.274*** 0.347*** 0.087** 0.176*** 0.155*** 
 (0.106) (0.097) (0.090) (0.036) (0.041) (0.037) 
N 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
r2_a 0.365 0.404 0.434    
F 25.703 25.111 22.478    
AR(1)    0.032 0.035 0.041 
AR(2)    0.845 0.867 0.762 
Hansen (p-value)    0.771 0.745 0.692 
Note: This table shows the results relating to the reaction on liquid ratio to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit diversification and interaction between them 
during the crisis. The dependent variables are liquid ratios that is liquid assets to total assets. It is the indicator of liquidity risk. Deposit (-HHI) is an indicator of 
diversification, which is a ratio that the ratio of deposit HHI times (-1). Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and 
unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models (Panel A) are panel regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 
and regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection 
implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% 
level. 
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4.4.6 Additional results 
Above we show the empirical results that diversification could mitigate the impact of 
liquidity demand risk during the crisis through decreasing the cost of funding, increasing 
the funding inflow, maintaining the total amount of loan lending and enhancing the liquid 
ratio. We also provide additional estimation to show whether bank increases 
diversification to mitigate the liquidity risk during crisis. Comparing to the four types of 
deposits52, we analyse whether bank increases other funding inflows.  
Table 8 shows that a high commitments exposed bank significantly increased its growth 
of government borrowings and other borrowings during the crisis. While a bank, in the 
normal time, is not in financial distress, so that it may not rely on other funding 
borrowings and increase the funding diversification. Therefore, these results support that 
banks need to increase the funding diversification, such as the increase of government 
and other borrowings, in order to attract sufficient capital to satisfy the liquidity demand.   
                                                          
52  The main four type of deposit are individual deposit, deposit from banks or financial institutions, the 
corporate deposit and other deposit. 
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Table 8   
The relationship between outside funding and between 
𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Government 
borrowings 
Other 
borrowing
s 
Governmen
t 
borrowings 
Other 
borrowing
s 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.033* -0.027** -0.025*** -0.034** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 0.142*** 0.091*** 0.101*** 0.090*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 0.012** 0.017*** 0.010** -0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.025** 0.004 0.010 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.005** -0.006*** -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.003 0.004 0.244*** 0.061*** 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.033) (0.017) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.073** 0.088** -0.222*** -0.071 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.048) (0.054) 
𝐿. 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠t   0.732***  
   (0.032)  
𝐿. 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠t    0.347*** 
    (0.067) 
_cons 0.107*** 0.110*** 0.012* 0.018*** 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.007) (0.007) 
N 1080 1080 840 840 
r2_a 0.254 0.198   
F 18.199 18.273   
AR(1)   0.005 0.062 
AR(2)   0.115 0.302 
Hansen (p-value)   0.471 0.114 
Note: This table shows the relationship between the outside funding and a bank’s unfunded loan 
commitments during the crisis. The dependent variables are government borrowings and other 
borrowings, which are the borrowings to total assets respectively. Unfunded ratio is measured as the 
ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is an indicator of 
liquidity demand risk The first two models (Panel A) are panel regressions with fixed effects during the 
period 2005 – 2014 and regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (3) to (4) are 
dynamic panel models (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond 
test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the 
validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical 
significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 
10% level. 
186 
 
  
4.4.7 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, deposit insurance and time 
expense ratio 
As mentioned above, the liquidity demand risk exists in the banking industry and it may 
trigger an increase in the probability of liquidity during a crisis. We find that the structure 
of the deposit base may bring an advantage for banks when they face the synergy effect 
of commitment needs and runs on deposit. This is an individual’s strategy for banks to 
handle the potential liquidity risk and panic. In addition, Anginer et al. (2014b) suggest 
that deposit insurance could restore depositor confidence and avert panic in the banking 
sector. At the country level, we also need to consider whether deposit insurance could 
play its role effectively.  
Table 9 shows the impact of deposit insurance on time expense ratio. Models 2, 3, 5 and 
6 show that deposit insurance has a negative impact on interest rates (β=-0.001, ρ<0.01), 
and suggest that deposit insurance could restore investor confidence (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2004; Karas et al., 2013). This “safety net” may bring a positive signal for 
depositors so that it may reduce the possibility of bank runs, and the stabilization effect 
of deposit insurance is, naturally, more important during economic downturns when 
contagious bank runs are more likely to occur (Anginer et al., 2014b). Banks suffer less 
pressure from shortage of deposits and may decrease the cost of funding.  
However, as models 3 and 6, Table 9 show, the interactive term for deposit insurance and 
unfunded commitment ratio and crisis dummy ( 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) has a positive connection with time expense ratio and the 
co-efficiency are also highly significant (β=0.006, ρ<0.01; β=0.007, ρ<0.01) respectively. 
The funding suggests that banks with greater exposed commitments may still have to 
increase the interest rate to access funding, even though they are secured by deposit 
insurance, and the uncertainty of deposit insurance may be leading to distortions and 
187 
 
  
inefficiencies in the banking sector (Barth et al., 2004). Therefore, the “stabilization effect” 
of deposit insurance may not mitigate the impact of liquidity demand risk.    
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Table 9 
The relationship between deposit expense rate and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Time 
expense ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
𝐿. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 
   
0.936*** 0.911*** 0.895***     
(0.040) (0.049) (0.049) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 
0.003 0.004 
 
0.001*** 0.002***   
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
-0.001** -0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** -0.001***   
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 
  
-0.005** 
  
-0.007**    
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  
0.006*** 
  
0.007*** 
   
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.052** -0.051** -0.062*** -0.008*** -0.015** 0.052**  
(0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007) (0.025) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 0.063*** 0.046** 0.042** 0.028** 0.012** 0.022***  
(0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 -0.007* -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.010*  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 -0.028 -0.031 -0.032 0.026 0.002 0.008  
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.005) (0.008) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 9-Continued       
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Time 
expense ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
Time 
expense 
ratio 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.001* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003** -0.001** -0.001**  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 0.037** 0.027** 0.023*** 0.142*** 0.120*** 0.143***  
(0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.041) (0.028) (0.042) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 -0.070** -0.060 -0.060 -0.048** 0.006 0.013  
(0.025) (0.059) (0.058) (0.018) (0.061) (0.064) 
_cons 0.057*** 0.065** 0.047*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.021**  
(0.014) (0.029) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
N 1080 1080 1080 960 960 960 
r2_a 0.150 0.160 0.163 
   
AR(1)    0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR(2)    0.568 0.540 0.446 
Hansen (p-value)    0.327 0.235 0.281 
Note: This table shows the results relating the reaction on deposit rate to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit insurance and 
interaction between them during the crisis. The dependent variables are interest expense rate of time deposits expressed as % annual rate. 
Deposit insurance is the log value of the insurance amount for each country. Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan 
commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models are panel 
regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 and regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (4) to (6) 
are dynamic panel model (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments 
are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% 
level. 
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4.4.8 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, deposit insurance and 
deposit inflows 
Banks with greater previous unfunded commitments may face deposit shortages so that 
their deposit inflows is decreased (Acharya and Mora, 2015). As models 2, 3, 5 and 6, 
Table 10 show, the interactive term for deposit insurance and crisis dummy 
(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) has a positive relationship with deposit inflows. The 
result suggests that the “stabilization effect” of deposit guarantee could restore investors’ 
confidence so that the amounts of deposit inflow still increases during the crisis 
(Chernykh and Cole, 2011; Karas et al., 2013). However, models 3 and 6 show that the 
interactive term for deposit insurance and unfunded ratio and crisis dummy 
( 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 ) have a negative relationship 
with deposit inflows and the co-efficiency are also highly significant (β=-0.068, ρ<0.05; 
β=-0.055, ρ<0.05) respectively, and suggest that this “stabilization effect” of deposit 
insurance could not mitigate the impact of undrawn loan commitments in the crisis,  
Moreover, as models 2, 3, 5 and 6, Table 10 show, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1has a negative 
relationship with deposit inflows, which means that banks may rely less on the deposits 
and more on shorter-maturity funding in the normal period (King, 2013),. Short-term 
funding could improve banks’ liquidity and increase the flexibility of making new loans. 
Previous papers (e.g. Ioannidou and Penas, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2013) suggest that 
the “moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance provides incentives for banks to take 
excessive risk, for example of overusing unfunded loan commitments. As a result, banks 
may use more short-term funding to support their excessive risk-taking (King, 2013), and 
this “moral hazard” behaviour creates potential liquidity demand risk (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Kane, 2002; Acharya and Mora, 2015). Therefore, the “moral hazard” effect of 
191 
 
  
deposit insurance inspires banks to rely less deposit inflows and more on short-maturity 
funding in the normal times.    
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Table 10 
The relationship between deposit inflow interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
𝐿. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡    0.026*** 0.006*** 0.024*** 
    (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 
-
0.057*** 
-0.045** 
 
-0.006** -0.023*** 
  
(0.021) (0.018) 
 
(0.003) (0.008) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
0.009*** 0.010*** 
 
0.011*** 0.009**   
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 
  
0.112** 
  
0.089**    
(0.046) 
  
(0.041) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  
-0.068*** 
  
-0.055*** 
   
(0.020) 
  
(0.020) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 0.252** 0.247* 0.312** 0.060** 0.139* 0.726**  
(0.112) (0.143) (0.142) (0031) (0072) (0.308) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 -0.478** -0.209** -0.829*** -0.359*** -0.321** -0.410***  
(0.241) (0.101) (0.253) (0.134) (0.150) (0.124) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 0.830*** 0.891*** 0.893*** 0.587*** 0.696*** -0.239**  
(0.160) (0.165) (0.169) (0.187) (0.203) (0.105) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.237 0.305 0.302 -0.190 -0.060 0.045  
(0.225) (0.220) (0.226) (0.345) (0.232) (0.169) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 10-Continued   
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
Deposit 
inflows 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.286** -0.249** -0.245** 0.012* 0.013* 0.002**  
(0.129) (0.124) (0.119) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.538 -0.191 -0.128 -0.566 -0.486 -1.023**  
(0.469) (0.509) (0.534) (0.450) (0.500) (0.455) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.292** 0.100** 0.233* 0.849** 0.526*** 1.572***  
(0.139) (0.054) (0.129) (0.421) (0.173) (0.501) 
_cons 4.968** 4.816** 4.644** -0.329* -0.067*** 0.305**  
(2.137) (2.103) (1.887) (0.170) (0.019) (0.132) 
N 1080 1080 1080 960 960 960 
r2_a 0.152 0.154 0.154 
   
AR(1)    0.015 0.011 0.017 
AR(2)    0.700 0.512 0.334 
Hansen (p-value)    0.479 0.787 0.228 
Note: This table shows the results relating to the reaction on deposit inflow ratio to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit 
insurance and interaction between them during the crisis. The dependent variables are deposited inflow ratios, which are ratios that the 
difference between total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1, divided by total deposits in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. Deposit insurance is the log 
value of insurance amount for each country. Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans 
and unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models are panel regressions with fixed effects during 
the period 2005 – 2014 and regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel model (GMM) 
with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical 
significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.9 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, deposit insurance and 
lending decisions 
As Table 11 shows, the negative relationship between 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 and 
lending decision suggests that the increase of lending from banks with deposit insurance 
is caused by loan commitments that are converted to loans during ordinary periods 
Acharya et al. (2013a), while they are exposed to higher liquidity demand risk thus 
reducing the extension of new loans during a crisis (Acharya and Mora, 2015). However, 
model 3 and 6 in Table 11 show that the interactive term for deposit insurance and 
unfunded ratio and crisis dummy ( 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) have a negative relationship with lending decision and the co-efficiency are also 
highly significant (β=-0.027, ρ<0.01; β=-0.073, ρ<0.01) respectively, and suggests that 
deposit insurance could not increase the lending amounts and this “safety net” could not 
mitigate the impact of liquidity demand risk, during the crisis. In addition, the interactive 
term 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 has a negative relationship with lending decision in 
models 2, 3, 5 and 6, which means that the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance is 
not constant and may be distorted by other factors (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; 
Hovakimian et al., 2003).  
Moreover, as models 2, 3, 5 and 6, Table 11 show, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1has a positive 
relationship with lending decision, which means that deposit insurance could inspire bank 
to make more loans in normal times. Because of the lack of market discipline, deposit 
insurance incentivizing banks for excessive lending will lead to excessive risk taking 
culminating in banking crisis. (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). This moral hazard 
problem in lending will be exacerbated by deposit insurance in the normal times and is 
associated with a higher likelihood of the banking crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2002; Shapiro and Skeie, 2015). As a result, over-lending along with unfunded loan 
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commitments increase potential liquidity risk when banks suffer shortage of funding. The 
liquidity risk exacerbated by the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance could not be 
mitigated by the “stabilization effect” during the crisis.   
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Table 11 
The relationship between lending decision and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
𝐿. 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
   
0.066*** 0.079*** 0.063***     
(0.012) (0.021) (0.017) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 
0.021*** 0.024*** 
 
0.002** 0.005***   
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
-0.003*** -0.004*** 
 
-0.003*** -0.005**   
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 
  
0.039** 
  
0.039***    
(0.010) 
  
(0.011) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  
-0.027*** 
  
-0.073*** 
   
(0.011) 
  
(0.019) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.272** 0.034** 0.055** 0.365***  
(0.020) (0.024) (0.135) (0.018) (0.024) (0.136) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 -0.087*** -0.028*** -0.196*** -0.115** -0.088** -0.569**  
(0.029) (0.007) (0.067) (0.054) (0.037) (0.283) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 -0.012 0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.028 -0.258  
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) (0.027) (0.328) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.009 0.036 0.036 -0.454*** -0.229* -0.028  
(0.090) (0.087) (0.088) (0.146) (0.122) (0.062) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 11-Continued       
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
Lending 
decision 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.102*** -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.011*** -0.006** -0.004**  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.129 -0.005 -0.006 0.349* 0.412** 0.362*  
(0.125) (0.135) (0.138) (0.185) (0.180) (0.205) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.204* 0.130 0.176 0.539* 0.271 0.133  
(0.106) (0.135) (0.138) (0.285) (0.214) (0.240) 
_cons 1.797*** 1.741*** 1.802*** 0.224*** 0.092*** 0.096**  
(0.198) (0.189) (0.202) (0.062) (0.033) (0.045) 
N 1080 1080 1080 960 960 960 
r2_a 0.167 0.180 0.183 
   
AR(1)    0.001 0.000 0.001 
AR(2)    0.259 0.404 0.376 
Hansen (p-value)    0.527 0.733 0.456 
Note: This table shows the results relating the reaction on deposit inflow ratio to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit insurance 
and interaction between them during the crisis. The dependent variables are lending decision, which is a ratio that the difference between 
total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and total loans in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1, divided by total assets in 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. Deposit insurance is the log value of insurance amount for 
each country. Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is 
an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models are panel regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 and 
regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel model (GMM) with robust standard errors 
during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic 
tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% 
level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.10 Relationship between unfunded commitment ratio, deposit insurance and 
liquid ratio 
Banks with greater previous unfunded commitments may face deposit shortages and they 
may cash liquid asset to fulfil the obligation of loans (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Acharya 
and Mora, 2015), so that there is a negative relationship between 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 and liquid ratio. As models 2, 3, 5 and 6, Table 12 show, the interactive term 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 has a positive relationship with the liquid ratio. The result 
suggests that deposit insurance protects the interests of unsophisticated depositors and 
helps prevent bank runs, which can improve social welfare (Chernykh and Cole, 2011). 
This positive stabilization effect of deposit insurance is, naturally, more important during 
economic downturns when contagious bank runs are more likely to occur (Anginer et al., 
2014b). 
However, models 3 and 6, Table 12 show that the interactive term for deposit insurance 
and unfunded ratio and crisis dummy (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) have a negative relationship with liquid ratio and co-efficiency are also highly 
significant (β=-0.035, ρ<0.05; β=-0.016, ρ<0.05) respectively, and suggest that although 
deposit insurance helps banks realize the benefit of stabilization effect of deposit 
insurance, this “safety net” could not mitigate the impact of unused commitments on 
liquid ratio. Moreover, interestingly, models 2, 3, 5 and 6 show that 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 has a negative effect on liquid ratio. This finding suggests that 
banks with deposit guarantee may take excessive risk, in the normal times (Anginer et al., 
2014b). They would like to use all funding to make loans and investments, instead of 
increasing liquid asset to against shortage of deposit. Since banks think that deposit 
insurance could provide a funding guarantee, they would reduce the requirement of liquid 
asset for preventing the banks run.   
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Table 12 
The relationship between liquid ratio and interactive term for 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 and 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Liquid 
ratio 
Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio 
𝐿. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t 
   
0.744*** 0.784*** 0.750***     
(0.086) (0.054) (0.077) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
 
-0.009*** -0.027** 
 
-0.002** -0.002**   
(0.003) (0.011) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
0.002** 0.002*** 
 
0.001* 0.005***   
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 
  
0.094** 
  
0.006**    
(0.043) 
  
(0.003) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1
∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 
  
-0.035*** 
  
-0.016** 
   
(0.010) 
  
(0.007) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 0.164*** 0.176*** 0.701* 0.070** 0.063** 0.122**  
(0.084) (0.050) (0.384) (0.034) (0.024) (0.052) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 -0.138*** -0.134** -0.352*** -0.109*** -0.059*** -0.168**  
(0.037) (0.062) (0.096) (0.042) (0.019) (0.078) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 -0.190** -0.187** -0.189** -0.335** -0.050** -0.374**  
(0.087) (0.084) (0.079) (0.145) (0.021) (0.157) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 0.030 0.043 0.043 0.012 -0.112* 0.004  
(0.119) (0.115) (0.115) (0.064) (0.060) (0.064) 
      (Continued) 
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Table 12-Continued       
 Panel A – Fixed effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Liquid 
ratio 
Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio Liquid ratio 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.022** -0.016* -0.021** -0.002* -0.003* -0.004**  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 0.055** 0.103 0.088 0.092* -0.196 0.040  
(0.026) (0.103) (0.095) (0.056) (0.159) (0.138) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 0.199 0.162 0.219 -0.252 0.242 0.039  
(0.150) (0.161) (0.159) (0.269) (0.257) (0.227) 
_cons 0.535*** 0.510*** 0.656*** 0.152*** 0.077*** 0.012***  
(0.174) (0.166) (0.189) (0.044) (0.025) (0.004) 
N 1080 1080 1080 960 960 960 
r2_a 0.160 0.161 0.160 
   
AR(1)    0.007 0.005 0.007 
AR(2)    0.527 0.305 0.524 
Hansen (p-value)    0.346 0.100 0.494 
Note: This table shows the results relating the reaction on liquid ratio to a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit insurance and 
interaction between them during the crisis. The dependent variables are liquid ratios that liquid assets to total assets. It is the indicator of 
liquidity risk. Deposit insurance is the log value of insurance amount for each country. Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn 
loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk The first three models (Panel 
A) are panel regressions with fixed effects during the period 2005 – 2014 and the regressions use phase of the crisis: 2008 and 2009. The 
models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection 
implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical 
significance at the 10% level. 
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According to Table from 9 to 12, deposit insurance could have a positive effect on banks 
during the crisis, but it may also bring a wrong signal for banks to take excessive risk in 
the normal time. This “moral hazard” effect potentially increases the liquidity risk, since 
bank depositors lack incentives to monitor when deposits are insured (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). When the condition of financial funding 
is stressed, the “stabilization” effect could not mitigate the liquidity risk. Overall, 
although deposit insurance may be implemented to ensure the stability of the banking 
industry (Anginer et al., 2014b), banks misuse this advantage to overdraft their risk 
tolerance (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002), and the lack of market discipline leads to 
excessive risk taking culminating in banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2002; Barth et al., 2004). Therefore, this finding aligns with the hypothesis H5 that the 
“moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance may be greater than the “stabilization effect” 
on the liquid demand risk during the crisis.  
 
4.4.11 Robustness Tests 
Above we show empirically that the impact of liquidity demand risk can be reduced by 
deposit diversification. For testing the hypothesis that the impact of a bank’s unfunded 
commitment on costs of deposit can be reduced during a crisis, we also use the interest 
rates of the core deposit53 and demand deposit as the dependent variable. As models 1 
and 5, Table 13 show, the interactive term (𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒) has a positive 
connection with time expense ratio, while it has a negative relationship with deposit 
inflows. The results also align with our hypothesis 1 and 2. For estimating the impact of 
deposit insurance, we also divided the countries into two groups. The first group contains 
                                                          
53 Core deposit are the sum of time deposits and saving deposits. 
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countries that have deposit insurance while the second group is countries that do not have 
deposit insurance. According to Table 13, we find that banks in a country with deposit 
insurance may be more likely to suffer liquidity demand risk than banks in a country 
without this safety net. The results also support the hypothesis that the “moral hazard” 
effect of deposit insurance dominates in normal time while the “stabilization” effect 
dominates in the financial downturn.        
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Table 13 
The impact of 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1on interest expense and deposit inflows in different groups 
Dependent variables Time expense ratio Deposit inflows  
(1) (2) (5) (6)  
With deposit 
insurance  
Without deposit 
insurance 
With deposit 
insurance  
Without deposit 
insurance 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.045** -0.062** 0.371** 0.564** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.147) (0.237) 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 0.055*** -0.026 -0.723*** -0.757 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.202) (1.229) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 -0.021 0.010* 0.395 -0.240 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.285) (0.397) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 -0.038 -0.007** -0.125 -0.040* 
 (0.026) (0.003) (0.276) (0.024) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 0.001* 0.002* 0.001* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 0.020* 0.094** 0.642*** -0.076* 
 (0.012) (0.035) (0.216) (0.034) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 -0.107** 0.064*** 0.186* -0.491*  
(0.050) (0.022) (0.074) (0.260) 
_cons 0.195*** 0.034** 7.026** 1.215*  
(0.059) (0.016) (3.217) (0.696) 
N 882 198 882 198 
r2_a 0.107 0.090 0.113 0.116 
Note: This table shows the impact of unfunded commitment t-1 on interest expense and deposit inflows in different groups during the crisis. The dependent variables 
interest expense rate of time deposits expressed as % annual rate and deposit inflows ratio. Unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to 
the sum of loans and unused commitments. It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk. 12 countries are divided into two groups. The first groups are countries with 
deposit insurance and second groups are countries without deposit insurance. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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For analysing the impact of deposit diversification and insurance on the liquidity demand 
risk, we also consider the period of normal times and separate the period into two groups54. 
Table 14 shows the impact of liquidity demand risk, deposit diversification, deposit 
insurance prior and after the crisis on interest expense, deposit inflow, lending amount 
and liquid ratio. Before and after the crisis, the 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1  could reduce 
interest expense and increase the deposit inflow, lending amount and liquidity. For the 
deposit diversification, it increases the interest expense during the normal period. This 
cost may be treated by banks as a fixed expense for enhancing liquidity (Cerasi and 
Daltung 2000). However, the impact of deposit diversification on the unfunded loan 
commitments is not obvious in normal time, since banks may not suffer a shortage of 
funding (Gatev et al., 2009, Acharya and Mora, 2015). It is interesting that deposit 
insurance has a negative effect on interest expense, deposit inflow and liquid ratio prior 
to crisis while it increases the lending amount. It means that it may bring an incentive for 
banks to take excessive risk before the crisis, which may exist as a “moral hazard” based 
on the study of Anginer et al. (2014b). However, after a crisis, deposit insurance could 
continue to have “stabilization effect” on banks.   
 
                                                          
54 The first groups are the years before the crisis (2005 to 2007). The second groups are the years after the 
crisis (2010 to 2014). 
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Table 14 
The impact of 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1, 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼)t−1, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 prior and after the crisis 
 Time expense ratio Deposit inflows Lending decision Liquid ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Prior the 
crisis 
After the 
crisis 
Prior 
the 
crisis 
After 
the 
crisis 
Prior the 
crisis 
After the 
crisis 
Prior 
the 
crisis 
After the 
crisis 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.075** -0.045* 13.06* 1.830* 
2.080**
* 0.297* 
0.115*
* 0.779* 
 (0.037) (0.024) (8.005) (1.153) (0.623) (0.154) (0.053) (0.468) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1) 0.015** 0.016* -0.941* -0.995* 0.262 -0.045 -0.167* -0.235** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.475) (0.522) (0.229) (0.080) (0.091) (0.102) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−𝐻𝐻𝐼t−1)* 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.010 -0.165** 8.374 0.800 0.411* 
0.165**
* 
0.395*
* 1.079* 
 (0.154) (0.068) (11.51) (2.520) (0.253) (0.049) (0.141) (0.559) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1 
-
0.005*** 0.004** -0.001* 0.032* 0.002** 0.026* 
-
0.004*
* 0.039** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.015) (0.002) (0.019) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒t−1*
 𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 t−1 -0.004** 0.012* -0.523 -0.133 0.162** 0.022** -0.096* 0.155* 
 (0.002) (0.007) (1.082) (0.084) (0.079) (0.011) (0.055) (0.080) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜t−1 
0.107* 0.006* 2.382 0.127 0.226 0.030 -0.517* -0.320**  
(0.057) (0.004) (6.030) (0.123) (0.597) (0.116) (0.265) (0.122) 
𝐸𝑇𝐴t−1 
0.012 -0.023* -2.789 0.283** 0.366** 0.286* 0.347 0.138  
(0.026) (0.012) (3.663) (0.115) (0.179) (0.170) (0.364) (0.245) 
 
      
(Continued) 
 
       
 
206 
 
  
Table 14-Continued         
 Time expense ratio Deposit inflows Lending decision Liquid ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Prior the 
crisis 
After the 
crisis 
Prior 
the 
crisis 
After 
the 
crisis 
Prior the 
crisis 
After the 
crisis 
Prior 
the 
crisis 
After the 
crisis 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠t−1 -0.003* -0.001* -0.563 
-
0.202** -0.011 -0.066** 0.038 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.640) (0.078) (0.057) (0.029) (0.046) (0.021) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ t−1 -0.007** -0.014** 8.097 -0.705 0.539** 0.267* 
0.048*
* 0.368** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (6.715) (0.887) (0.257) (0.150) (0.016) (0.175) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 t−1 -0.079 -0.045 21.778 0.041 0.362 -0.249 0.005 0.477** 
 (0.111) (0.052) 
(18.735
) (0.605) (0.807) (0.237) (0.475) (0.220) 
_cons 0.196** 0.111** 7.919** 2.606** 0.426* 1.327** 0.615* 0.268* 
 (0.084) (0.056) (3.332) (1.158) (0.231) (0.523) (0.384) (0.143) 
N 240 600 240 600 240 600 240 600 
r2_a 0.101 0.142 0.128 0.113 0.112 0.171 0.096 0.099 
Note: This table shows the results relating to the impact of a bank’s unfunded loan commitments, deposit diversification, deposit insurance 
and interaction between them prior to and after the crisis. The dependent variables are interest expense, deposit inflows, lending decision 
and liquid ratios. The unfunded ratio is measured as the ratio of undrawn loan commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments. 
It is an indicator of liquidity demand risk. Deposit (-HHI) is an indicator of diversification, which is a ratio that the ratio of deposit HHI 
times (-1). Deposit insurance is the log value of the insurance amount for each country. The period between 2005 to 2014 is divided into 
two groups. The first groups are the years before the crisis (2005 to 2007). The second groups are the years after the crisis (2010 to 2014). 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.5 Conclusions  
Through analysing banks in 12 countries, it is clear that there exists liquidity demand risk 
during a crisis. Because of a synergy between deposit-taking and commitment needs, 
banks confronted the higher costs of funding and a shortage of capital during the period 
2008-2009. We find that diversification may offer an additional channel for banks to 
access funding, which may decrease the pressure on funding demand and the cost of a 
deposit during a crisis; while lower diversification could bring an advantage for banks in 
obtaining deposits during normal periods. Furthermore, diversification could not only 
decrease the probability of liquidity demand risk, but could also help banks to maintain 
their lending decisions and even reduce liquidity risk.  
However, we find that the “moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance dominates in the 
normal period while the “stabilization effect” dominates during a crisis. The “moral 
hazard” effect of an increase of liquidity risk may be greater than the “stabilization effect” 
during the crunch. Our results suggest that banks with deposit insurance may be more 
likely to suffer liquidity demand risk than those without a safety net. We can expect that 
although many countries increased the amount of deposit insurance in order to restore 
investors’ confidence and decrease the probability of a run on the bank, this protection 
mechanism triggered potential liquidity demand risk. Additionally, the buffer function of 
diversification on liquidity demand risk is more effective in the countries with a safety 
net, than in those countries without deposit guarantees. 
For the liquidity risk, the Basel III may provide a better liquidity regulation, such as a 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), but for individual strategies, banks should adjust to an 
appropriate structure of attracting capital. Diversification in deposits is an important 
strategy for banks to adjust their bearing capacity of liquidity (e.g., Disyatat, 2011; Kang 
2013; García-Kuhnert et al., 2015). In addition, as discussed in various studies (e.g., Boyd 
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and De Nicolo, 2005; Gorton and Metrick, 2013; Anginer et al., 2014b; Shapiro and Skeie, 
2015), we find that deposit insurance may operate in exactly the opposite direction, which 
causes banks to become risky during a crisis. Therefore, the strategy of diversification 
can be treated as an alternative scheme for banks to deal with liquidity risk, in case LCR 
follows the old path as the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance.    
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Chapter 5: Expected government support and bank risk-
taking: Evidence from China 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Bank bailouts after the recent global financial crisis have brought to debates the issue of 
explicit government support (Anginer et al., 2014b), implicit guarantee (Schich and Lindh, 
2012) and expected government support (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014). The effect of 
government support raises concern about the size of this support, the potential distortions 
in competition and the moral hazard problem. More importantly, it can influence banks’ 
willingness to take on risk by detracting from market discipline (Peleg‐Lazar and Raviv, 
2017) and increasing banks’ charter value (Kaufman, 2014).  
The explicit government support, such as troubled asset relief program and deposit 
insurance, are the cornerstone of the banking system, which protects the depositor and 
prevents bank runs during the crisis (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Anginer et al., 2014b). 
However, these guarantees may weaken the market discipline carried out by depositors 
and creditors (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004), and motivate banks to take excessive 
risks shifting the agent problem from the bank’s creditors to the regulators (Cooper and 
Ross, 2002). While the implicit guarantee for banks considered by policymakers to be too 
important to be allowed to fail have been generally implemented in the region where 
policymakers do not have any explicit commitment to support (Schnabel, 2009; Schich 
and Lindh, 2012). This government support provides funding cost, which benefits banks 
triggering competitive distortions (Gropp et al., 2011). Thus, both explicit and implicit 
government support make it possible to exit the moral hazard problem.  
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However, the moral hazard problems arise from excessive risk-taking due to higher 
bailout expectations (Dam and Koetter, 2012). The safety net, such as explicit and implicit 
government support is neither a prerequisite nor a guarantee to be bailed out. If a bank is 
significantly essential in the financial market, it would be more likely to be rescued even 
though it is not a member of the safety net (Freixas and Rochet 2011). Thus, the moral 
hazard problem triggered by expected government support distorts competition (Schich 
and Lindh, 2012), weakens market discipline (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014), and 
induces banks to take excessive risk.  
This problem attracts a number of researchers' attention. For example, Schich and Lindh 
(2012) used the evidence from OECD countries to show that the moral hazard problem 
of guarantee may distort banking competition. Antzoulatos and Tsoumas (2014) revealed 
the impact of the moral hazard and institutional environment on the willingness of 
government support. Dam and Koetter (2012) developed a model showing how the 
regional political factors affect bank bailouts. However, few research considers the 
impact of the willingness and capacity of government support on bank risk-taking 
behaviour by using rating information. 
Implicit or expected government support is inherently difficult to measure. According to 
Schich and Lindh (2012) and Antzoulatos and Tsoumas (2014), the all-in rating is a 
bank’s long term deposit rating from Moody’s, which includes expected government 
support, while the stand-alone rating is financial strength rating, which reflects an ability 
to repay its financial obligation without any expected support. Thus, we employ the 
difference between these two ratings to represent the willingness and capacity of 
government support (expected government support).  
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China is now the second biggest economy after overtaking Japan in 2010, and its banking 
sector is its main important financial intermediary. Hence, the stability of the banking 
system for Chinese economic growth is crucial. However, it is interesting that there is no 
any significant financial crash in the Chinese banking sector over the last two decades. 
Even though the 2007 global financial crisis had a huge impact on the banking system 
throughout the world, the Chinese banking industry did not suffer obvious damage and 
even maintained its growth rate with net profits rising to RMB 668.4 billion in 2009, a 
30.6% increase from the previous year (Fenech et al., 2014). This is because the Chinese 
government provides support to the banking sector, and because of this support the risk 
of a run on a bank is minimal (Bailey et al., 2011). As the explicit government support is 
not implemented in China’s banking system before 2016, the support from the Chinese 
government was implicit guarantees (Gropp et al., 2011) 55 . Although this type of 
government support could provide liquidity (Acharya and Mora, 2015) and restrict the 
bank run (Pennacchi, 2006) during the crisis, this bailout expectation of implicit support 
will inspire the bank to take an excessive risk during the normal times (Dam and Koetter, 
2012). In addition, Chinese banks with implicit support may be pressured to issue loans 
to support some state-owned companies with underperformance, in order to serve the 
political goals of governments (Bailey et al., 2011).  
We contribute to government support in a few important ways. First, the majority of 
previous papers focuses on the role of expected government support in different 
instruments such as competition (Schich and Lindh, 2012), political factors (Dam and 
Koetter, 2012) and sovereign credit risk (Correa et al., 2014), and even on how to 
determine the expected government support (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014). We 
                                                          
55 By implicit guarantees we mean the market expectation that a bank is saved even if there is no explicit 
government commitment to do so (Gropp et al/. 2011). 
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employ the difference between the ratings to reflect expected government support and 
extend previous the literature by focusing the impact of the support on bank risk-taking. 
This is the first paper to suggest that the bailout expectation of implicit support increases 
bank risk-taking in China. The expected government support not only exists with the 
moral hazard problem in normal times, but also reduces banking stability. Second, we 
find that expected government support and bank risk-taking is stronger in state-owned 
banks. Third, we find that expected government support and bank risk-taking is stronger 
in large banks.  
The rest of this paper is structured along the following lines. Section 2 provides our paper 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data description and the methods used to estimate 
expected government support and the relationship between expected government support 
and bank risk-taking. Section 4 analyses the empirical results. Section 5 contains the 
conclusions. 
 
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses development  
5.2.1 Expected Government support and bank risk-taking  
Government support plays an important role in the banking sector during the 2007 to 2009 
crisis. The government interventions provided backup liquidity to the banking industry in 
the financial crash, when banks suffered a funding shortage (Acharya and Mora, 2015). 
The explicit government support on deposits reduced banks’ liquidity and credit risk. It 
also restricted the bank run and restored investor confidence (Pennacchi, 2006). For 
example, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was one of the important ways 
implemented by government to support the banking sector during the crisis. This measure 
was employed to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system, and impose 
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restrictions on excessive risk-taking (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Therefore, banks with 
government support may be more stable, since the government could internalize the 
benefits of a more stable macroeconomic environment (Micco and Panizza, 2006).  
However, there is a perception about “too big to fail” and the moral hazard problem 
associated with the willingness of government support. This willingness may send a 
wrong signal to banks to take excessive risk, as banks believe that they are important in 
the financial market and will be bailed out in the future (Wilson and Wu, 2010; Elyasiani 
et al., 2014). Hence, banks may still choose to increase lending and invest in risk 
portfolios, even though their financial condition was stressed (Black and Hazelwood, 
2013). In addition, because of expected government support, managers may be more 
concerned about compensation incentives rather than risk, and then make more risk 
decisions (Chakraborty et al., 2007; Kempf et al., 2009). More importantly, Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2007) point out an implicit “too many to fail” theory that banks have 
incentives to herd and increase the risk, in order to increase the likelihood of being bailed 
out, if the government is willing to bail out failed banks. Although government guarantee 
aims at ensuring the stability of the banking sector and reducing the “excessive risk-
taking”, it provides incentives for banks to take excessive risk.       
The “moral hazard” effect of government support, such as deposit insurance, dominates 
in normal times, even though this guarantee may reduce the fragility of the banking 
system during the crisis (Anginer et al., 2014b). Actually, this moral hazard problem is 
induced by expected support from the government (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014), 
since the support tempts banks to reduce their capital requirements. It provides incentives 
for banks to take excessive risk by using spare funding (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). 
Furthermore, based on the market discipline theory, expected government support 
decreases bank depositors’ incentives to monitor bank risk-taking, particularly in normal 
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times (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). As the incentives of investors to limit bank 
risk-taking decreases, they may release the “punishment” in interest rates and then the 
funding cost of banks declines. As a result, the bank would enjoy the benefit of lower cost 
to take excessive risk. Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The expected government support would increase bank risk-taking.  
 
5.2.2 Stated-owned banks  
A large percentage of Chinese commercial banks is owned or controlled by the state, 
either directly or indirectly through central or local government agencies. Chinese 
government will hardly ever allow a bank in which they hold a greater ownership stake, 
to fail. In this situation, state-owned banks may have a lower cost of debt as well as higher 
leverage (Borisova and Megginson, 2011), and even experience a less pronounced impact 
of audit quality (Akins et al., 2017). As the government ownership reduces the probability 
of banks’ failure, it would increase incentives for bad behaviour, such as corruption and 
over risk-taking (Dam and Koetter, 2012).  
When the government controls a bank, the board of directors and senior officers would 
generally be approved by the government. Their main responsibility is to effectively carry 
out the instructions of the government, and then not to bear the consequences of any 
inappropriate decisions they made (Chen et al., 2009). It increases the probability that 
officers experience less employment risk and exert corrupt behaviour for private benefit, 
which increases the bad loans (Akins et al., 2017). Thus, the officers have less incentive 
to monitor the banks and even make more risky decisions. More importantly, state-owned 
banks generally enjoy the benefit of either implicit or explicit support from government 
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(Okazaki, 2007; Dong et al., 2014)56. This protection provides incentives for banks to 
take excessive risks, since the losses and costs are covered-up by government. Therefore, 
our second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between expected government support and bank 
risk-taking is stronger in banks where the government holds a significant stake.  
 
5.2.3 Large banks  
Larger bank size tends to raise the potential systemic risk (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010), 
such as liquidity and credit risk, as large banks tend to have lower capital ratios, less stable 
funding, and more exposure to potentially risky market-based activities (Laeven et al., 
2014). According to the “too big to fail” theory, governments are reluctant to allow large 
banks to fail, since they adhere to protect the depositors and reduce the probability of 
contagion of failure in the financial market. As a result, it creates moral hazard behaviour 
that larger banks would like to take excessive risks in the expectation of government 
bailouts (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). For the investors and depositors, they are uncertain ex-
ante about which banks will be bailed out in the future. In their inertial thinking, larger 
banks are more likely to be covered by the government, as they are too cost to fail. Hence, 
the incentive of outside investors to monitor bank risk-taking is decreased. According to 
the agency cost theory, large banks experience increased agency problems through 
activities diversification, which can translate into systemic risk (Bolton et al., 2007). It 
means that they have a natural tendency to take excessive risks to retain their size, and 
share these risks in the system (Laeven et al., 2016). However, government guarantees 
                                                          
56 The State Council transferred around 1245 billion Yuan in non-performing loans from the Big Five banks 
to asset management companies set up by the government during 2003–2005. 
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like deposit insurance, are designed for all banks, regardless of bank size. It will amplify 
the risk-taking behaviour of large banks and the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance 
will be gradually eliminated (Anginer et al., 2014b). Therefore, our third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between expected government support and bank 
risk-taking is stronger in large banks. 
 
5.3 Data description and Methodology  
5.3.1 Dependent variables 
We use data on the bank-level variables from BankScope. All of them are reported in 
$US from the period of 2010 to 2016 and shown in Panel A, Table 1. The dependent 
variables, we use four types of indicators as our measures of bank risk. First, we use the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡) as bank insolvency risk, and this ratio 
reflects the aggressiveness of the bank’s lending decisions (Akins et al., 2017). Second, 
we use the (𝑧𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡) to estimate the distance to insolvency (Laeven and Levine 2009). 
This indicator is equal to the return on asset (ROA) plus leverage (equity to total asset) 
of each bank divided by the bank’s standard deviation of return on asset (𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴). A higher 
z-score means that the bank has a greater degree of stability. Third, we use the ratio of 
liquid asset to total asset (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡) as a measure of liquidity risk (Acharya and Mora, 
2015). This ratio reflects whether a bank is exposed to a financial intermediation risk and 
whether a bank has a sufficient liquidity to match sudden funding demand. Finally, we 
use the ratio of doubtful loan to total loans (𝐷𝐿𝑡) as a proxy to measure bank risk-taking 
(Dermine and De Carvalho, 2006). Doubtful loan represents the loss of bank in a lending. 
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Higher value implies more risk-taking. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), we 
adjust the differences in accounting standards across countries.
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Table 1   
Variables  
Panel A – Dependent variables 
Non-performance loan 
ratio 
This ratio is measured as loan loss provisions to total assets (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡) as bank insolvency risk. Expressed as % 
annual rate and collected from the Bankscope.  
Z-score  
This indicator equals to the return on asset (ROA) plus leverage (equity to total asset) of each bank divided by 
the banks’ standard deviation of return on asset (𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴).  
Liquidity ratio  Liquidity ratio is measured as liquid assets to total assets (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡). Collected from the Bankscope.  
Doubtful loan ratio This ratio is measured as doubtful loans to total loans (𝐷𝐿𝑡). Collected from the Bankscope.  
Panel B Independent variables 
Expected Government 
support  
This indicator is the difference between the bank long-term deposit ratings and financial strength ratings. 
Collected from the Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon.    
Stated-owned  This is the dummy variable. Indicator with one for bank owned by government, and zero otherwise. 
Large This is the dummy variable with one for the biggest quartile banks and zero otherwise, based on total asset. 
Deposit  This ratio is measured as total deposits to total assets (𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1). Collected from the Bankscope. 
Interest income  
This indicator equals to interest operating income divided by total loans (𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1). Collected from the 
Bankscope. 
Liability This equals to total liability to total asset (𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1). Collected from the Bankscope. 
Loan This is the ratio of total loan to total asset (𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1). Collected from the Bankscope. 
Equity  Equity is the natural logarithm of total equity (𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1). Collected from the Bankscope. 
GDP  The GDP growth rate (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1) is expressed as annual rate collected from World Bank. 
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5.3.2 Explanatory variable 
We measure expected government support using bank-specific ratings information from 
Moody’s. According to the studies (e.g. Gropp et al., 2011; Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 
2014; Correa et al., 2014), we employ the proxy 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 , 
which is the difference between the bank all-in rating and stand-alone rating, to reflect 
the capacity and willingness of government support.  
For the all-in rating, Moody’s takes into account the expected support from regional 
government and national government (Moody's, 2007b). This rating reflects the 
government capacity as well as willingness to provide support, and the probability that 
the government will bail out when banks fail (Schich and Lindh, 2012). This Moody’s 
assessment relies on the importance of the banking sector for the national economy and 
the importance of an individual bank in the economy. Hence, the standard credit rating 
(long-term deposit rating in local currency) is the all-in rating collected from Bloomberg 
and Thomson Reuters Eikon, which is used to reflect bank credit quality with government 
support.  
The stand-alone rating, the financial strength ratings (BFSR) reflects a bank’s ability to 
repay its financial obligation without expected government support (Moody's, 2007a). 
BFSB is the local currency deposit rating without any expected external support, collected 
from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. Therefore, the proxy 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 is 
measured as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
= (𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ) − (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
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Although, the standard credit rating may consider the expected support from cooperative 
group and regional government, their capacity and willingness are boosted by the national 
government (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014).  
As Table 2 shows, long-term deposit rating like all other measures of the all-in ratings, 
are ranking from Aaa to C, while the BFSR is on the scale A to E. In order to calculate 
the difference, we assign numerical values for the ratings. We code these ranking grades 
using 20 as the highest and 0 as the lowest accordingly, by following the study of 
Antzoulatos and Tsoumas (2014)  
Table 2 
Bank's long-term credit rating grades and bank financial strength ratings  
Moody's ratings Assigned numerical values 
LTDR BFSR  
Aaa A 20 
Aa1 A- 19 
Aa2 B+ 18 
Aa3 B 17 
A1 B- 16 
A2 C+ 15 
A3 C 14 
Baa1 C- 13 
Baa2 C- 12 
Baa3 D+ 11 
Ba1 D+ 10 
Ba2 D 9 
Ba3 D- 8 
B1 E+ 7 
B2 E+ 6 
B3 E+ 5 
Caa1 E 4 
Caa2 E 3 
Caa3 E 2 
Ca E 1 
C E 0 
Note: The numerical values is based on the measurement of Antzoulatos and Tsoumas (2014) 
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5.3.3 Control variable  
We control bank specific characteristics and macro economy characteristics, which are 
found to affect bank risk-taking. All of them are shown in Panel B, Table 1. We use the 
ratio of total deposits to total assets (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) to control bank funding liquidity. 
Acharya and Mora (2015) suggest that if banks have more deposits, they have less “run” 
risk. We control the interest income ( 𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 ), which equals interest operating 
income divided by total loans because it represents the price of loan products. We control 
the liability (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1), which is the ratio of total liability to total asset. Liability is an 
indicator of potential risk, and the greater value may reflect the lower risk-prevention 
incentives (Biais et al., 2016). Consistent with (Khan et al., 2016), we control the ratio of 
total loan to total asset (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1) and the natural logarithm of total equity (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1) 
to represent bank characteristics as potential determinants of bank risk. Finally, we 
control GDP growth (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1) to reflect the economic condition.  
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of variables. All of the variables used in the 
regression have a correlation co-efficiencies lower than 0.65, indicating no serious 
multicollinearity issues. . Tables 4 provides descriptive statistics for our variables 
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Table 3              
Correlation matrix             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
NPL 1             
Z-score -0.007 1            
Liquid -0.279 0.050 1           
DL 0.183 -0.185 -0.274 1          
EGS 0.545 -0.112 -0.239 0.078 1         
SO -0.411 0.178 0.417 -0.067 -0.327 1        
Large 0.189 0.086 0.275 -0.352 0.117 -0.055 1       
Deposit 0.068 0.444 0.099 -0.230 -0.193 0.321 0.208 1      
Iincome -0.261 -0.220 -0.188 0.328 -0.150 0.169 -0.455 -0.362 1     
Liability -0.107 0.103 -0.302 0.232 -0.129 0.079 -0.542 0.088 0.520 1    
Loan -0.475 0.048 0.295 -0.182 -0.380 0.453 -0.182 0.166 0.269 0.072 1   
Equity -0.088 0.086 -0.198 0.220 -0.105 0.304 -0.451 0.223 0.397 0.502 0.050 1  
GDP -0.041 0.039 -0.187 0.186 -0.053 0.104 -0.515 0.118 0.507 0.460 0.126 0.517 1 
Notes: EGS is the expected government support. SO is the state-owned. Other variable definitions refer to Table 1. 
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Table 4         
Summary statistics         
Variable N mean p25 p50 p75 min max Std 
NPL 255 0.201 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.589 2.421 
Z-score 255 4.073 3.425 4.349 4.982 -1.652 7.975 1.397 
Liquid 255 0.242 0.129 0.205 0.309 0.002 0.882 0.157 
DL 255 0.178 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.403 0.611 
Expected government 
support 213 2.494 1.000 2.000 3.000 0.000 7.000 1.477 
State-owned 225 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
Large 255 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.301 
Deposit 255 0.837 0.836 0.869 0.896 0.086 0.954 0.123 
Iincome 255 0.149 0.086 0.103 0.130 0.000 5.893 0.360 
Liability 255 0.836 0.892 0.921 0.936 0.016 0.987 0.222 
Loan 255 0.420 0.333 0.434 0.508 0.001 0.971 0.148 
Equity 255 14.485 13.543 14.204 15.057 6.757 19.468 1.593 
GDP 255 7.308 6.918 7.298 7.758 6.756 9.536 0.567 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (number, mean, P25, median, P75, minimum, maximum and standard deviation) for the variables used in this paper. BRI-
PCA is a national regulation index. Other variable definitions refer to Table 1. 
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5.3.4 Methodology  
Fixed Effect 
In order to estimate the impact of government support on the risk-taking behaviour of 
banks, we use a panel regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The 
model includes a number of control variables, such as bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables, which may influence a bank‘s risk-taking behaviour. We also consider the time 
effect in the model. Therefore, the model is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1 +
𝛽10𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡           (1)     
The dependent variable, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of alternative bank risk variables for bank 𝑖 
in year 𝑡. Bank risk has been estimated by the ratios of loan loss provisions to total assets 
(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡), the natural logarithm of the Z-score (𝑧𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡), the ratio of liquid asset to total 
asset (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑡), and the ratio of doubtful loans to total asset (𝐷𝐿𝑡).  
The main independent variable, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  is the capacity 
and willingness of government support for bank 𝑖  in year 𝑡 − 1 . This proxy is the 
difference between long-term deposit ratings and financial strength ratings, and reflects 
the expected support from the government (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014). If 
government has a greater willingness to support a bank, it will induce bank managers to 
take excessive risk (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  is the dummy 
variable for measuring whether state-owned bank takes more risk with government 
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support. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the dummy variable with one for the biggest quartile banks and 
zero otherwise.  
The control variables,  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 is the ratio of total deposits to total assets. 𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 
is the ratio of interest operating income divided by total loans. 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 is the ratio of 
total liability to total asset. 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1 is the ratio of total loan to total asset. 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 is 
the natural logarithm of total equity. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 is the GDP growth ratio. 
Dynamic Panel Model 
A common problem in using empirical data is autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, and 
we eliminate their impact using fixed effect with robust check. Another important feature 
of this analysis is that we account for the potential endogeneity of inefficiency. In order 
to correct for possible endogeneity (Arellano & Bond 1991; Aslan & Kumar, 2014), we 
estimate the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) panel regression (2) as below: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1 +
𝛽11𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡         (2)     
In this equation, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lag value of the risk of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 1. 
 
5.4 Empirical results  
5.4.1 The effect of expected government support on bank risk-taking  
The regression results are summarized in Table 5. Panel A, Table 5 shows the results 
using fixed effect panel estimations while Panel B shows the results using dynamic panel 
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models (GMM). These two approaches generate similar results. Thus, we focus on Panel 
A to discuss our empirical results. 
As model 1, Table 5 shows, expected government support is positively related to the ratio 
non-performance loan (NPL) and the co-efficiency is highly significant (β=0.002, 
ρ<0.01), and indicates that one standard deviation increase in expected government 
support is associated with a 0.002 increase on non-performance loan. It means that 
previous expected government support will increase bank risk-taking behaviour as 
evidenced by rising non-performance loan. Model 2, Table 5 shows that there is a 
significantly negative relationship between expected government support and the Z-score 
(β=-0.005, ρ<0.01). It means that expected government support reduces bank stability 
and increases bank’s insolvency risk. Similarly, there is a significantly negative 
relationship between expected government support and liquid ratio. It suggests that the 
willingness and capacity of government support may increase the possibility of liquidity 
risk. Finally, model 4 further shows that expected government support may increase 
bank’s risk-taking behaviour as evidenced by rising doubtful loan ratio.   
The results in Panel A, Table 5 support the hypothesis1 that the expected government 
support would increase bank risk-taking, which contrasts with previous studies ((Micco 
and Panizza, 2006; Pennacchi, 2006; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Acharya and Mora, 2015). 
Our findings suggest that the willingness of government support may send a wrong signal 
to banks to take excessive risk, as banks believe that they are important in the financial 
market and will be bailed out in the future (Wilson and Wu, 2010; Elyasiani et al., 2014). 
Comparing this with the study of Anginer et al. (2014b), we find that expected 
government support could create the “moral hazard” problem.   
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Our results also show that deposit ratio has a positive impact on the ratio of non-
performance loan and doubtful loan, while it has a negative impact on Z-score and 
liquidity ratio. These findings support the idea that banks with greater funding inflow 
(lower funding liquidity risk) will have incentives to take more risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 
2012; Khan et al., 2016). Furthermore, our findings show that liability has a negative 
relationship with risk-taking behaviour while equity has a positive association with this 
behaviour. These results suggest that debtholders threaten to liquidate a bank that has not 
monitored its loans, which may restrict bank risk-taking behaviour (Acharya et al., 2016), 
while shareholders have incentives to take excessive risk, as this risk-shifting increases 
equity value at the expense of debtholders (Lambert et al., 2015; Peleg‐Lazar and Raviv, 
2017). 
Panel B, Table 5 shows the regression models using the GMM approach, which is 
employed to address possible endogeneity issues. Following Arellano & Bond (1991), we 
adopt the AB-GMM approach by using the lagged values of the dependent variables, such 
as NPL, Z-score, Liquid and DL, as instrumental variables. The results in Panel B also 
support the hypothesis 1, and suggest that if banks receive a sign from the willingness of 
government support, they would be more likely to take excessive risk.   
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Table 5       
The relationship between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 and bank risk-taking 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 NPL Z-score Liquid DL NPL Z-score Liquid DL 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.003*** -0.005*** -0.009* 0.028** 0.011*** -0.042*** -0.008** 0.084*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.030) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 0.023* -0.183* -0.450** 0.673* 0.019* -1.049*** 0.041 1.929* 
 (0.013) (0.111) (0.208) (0.374) (0.011) (0.306) (0.053) (1.065) 
𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 0.009 -0.967*** 0.598 -0.759 0.071* -2.651** -0.466* -0.180 
 (0.032) (0.319) (0.436) (1.320) (0.037) (1.296) (0.246) (1.524) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 -0.184** 11.505*** -1.440 -1.501 -0.181** 7.281*** 1.977*** 6.473 
 (0.077) (0.584) (0.905) (3.595) (0.082) (1.669) (0.600) (4.286) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1 -0.001 -0.187* -0.115 0.029 0.027* -0.354 -0.091 2.496*** 
 (0.017) (0.111) (0.179) (0.607) (0.014) (0.547) (0.129) (0.554) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 0.006 -0.101*** -0.105* 0.170** -0.001 -0.035 -0.009* 0.049* 
 (0.004) (0.037) (0.059) (0.066) (0.001) (0.044) (0.006) (0.029) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.001* -0.010 0.023* -0.032* -0.004*** -0.155*** 0.031* -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.013) (0.018) (0.001) (0.058) (0.017) (0.076) 
L. NPL     0.521***    
     (0.117)    
L. Z-score      0.891***   
      (0.077)   
L. Liquid       0.665***  
       (0.087)  
L. DL        0.571** 
        (0.222) 
_cons -0.241* -4.000*** 2.963* 3.487 -0.135* -4.930*** 1.893*** -5.548 
 (0.141) (1.069) (1.709) (4.357) (0.072) (1.316) (0.564) (4.096) 
N 188 195 195 173 151 154 154 133 
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Table 5         
The relationship between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 and bank risk-taking   
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NPL Z-score Liquid DL NPL Z-score Liquid DL 
r2_a 0.661 0.907 0.400 0.263     
F 25.821 148.995 9.446 6.152     
AR(1)     0.100 0.006 0.005 0.099 
AR(2)     0.306 0.637 0.530 0.592 
Hansen(p-value)     1.000 0.625 1.000 0.679 
Notes: This table presents coefficients for the relationship between expected government support (EGS) and bank risk-taking. The dependent variables are the NPL, Z-
score, Liquid and DL in used to reflect individual bank's risk-taking behaviour. The main dependent variable is 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑖,𝑡−1
, which is the 
difference between bank’s long-term credit rating grades and financial strength ratings. The control variables include bank specific variables and macroeconomic 
variables. The models (1) to (3) are panel regressions with fixed effects during the period 2010 – 2016. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) with 
robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the 
validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% 
level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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5.4.2 The relationship between expected government support and bank risk-taking 
in state-owned banks 
The results from model 1 to 4 in Panel A, Table 6 show that expected government support 
increase bank risk-taking behaviour through increasing the non-performance loan (NPL) 
as well as the doubtful loan, and decreasing the Z-score as well as the liquid ratio, which 
is in line with the findings in Table 5. As Models 3 and 4 show, the dummy variable, 
state-owned, has a negative impact on liquid ratio (β=-0.078, ρ<0.05) and has a positive 
impact on the doubtful loan (DL) (β=0.084, ρ<0.10). It means that state-owned banks 
may take more risk than other banks (Dam and Koetter, 2012). Furthermore, we find that 
deposit and equity provide incentives for banks to take excessive risk while liability may 
restrict the risk-taking behaviour, which is consistent with our previous findings.  
Model 1, Table 6 further shows that there is a significant positive interaction between 
expected government support and a state-owned dummy in affecting the ratio of the non-
performance loan (β=0.003, ρ<0.01). While model 2, shows that there is a negative 
interaction between expected government support and state-owned in affecting the Z-
score (β=-0.006, ρ<0.05). These results imply that since the board of directors in state-
owned bank has less responsibility to bear the consequences of any inappropriate 
decisions (Chen et al., 2009), the “moral hazard” effect of expected government support 
provides officers with incentives to exert corrupt behaviour for private benefit, which 
increases the bank’s risk (Akins et al., 2017).  
Models using the GMM approach in Panel B, Table 6 further show that there is a positive 
interaction between expected government support and state-owned in affecting the non-
performance loan (β=0.011, ρ<0.01) and is a negative interaction in impacting the Z-score 
(β=-0.028, ρ<0.05). This indicates that the risk-taking behaviour induced by expected 
government support will be exacerbated in state-owned banks, which generally take 
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advantage of either implicit or explicit support from government to increase risk-taking 
(Dong et al., 2014). These findings support the hypothesis 2, and suggest that the positive 
relationship between expected government support and risk-taking behaviour is stronger 
in state-owned banks.   
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Table 6       
The relationship between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 and bank risk-taking in state-owned banks 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 NPL Z-score Liquid DL NPL Z-score Liquid DL 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 0.002** -0.006** 0.004 -0.056 0.003* -0.028*** -0.031* 0.031** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.072) (0.002) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001* -0.006** -0.013* 0.028* -0.001 0.006 -0.035** 0.011* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.016) (0.001) (0.008) (0.018) (0.006) 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 -0.001 0.019 -0.078** 0.084* -0.005 0.049 -0.152** -0.031 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.038) (0.050) (0.004) (0.037) (0.075) (0.021) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 0.037** -0.307** -0.520** -0.631 0.064** -1.201*** -0.020 0.344* 
 (0.016) (0.125) (0.218) (0.396) (0.028) (0.253) (0.427) (0.183) 
𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 0.022 1.097*** 0.608 -0.870 0.146*** -0.176 -0.114 -1.712*** 
 (0.031) (0.320) (0.467) (1.470) (0.045) (0.207) (0.525) (0.187) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 -0.180** 11.558*** -1.460 -5.737* -0.308** 3.601*** 1.725* -4.056*** 
 (0.068) (0.570) (0.909) (3.785) (0.146) (0.765) (1.119) (0.988) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1 -0.004 -0.145 -0.100 -0.071 0.057** 0.470** 0.288 -0.279 
 (0.015) (0.104) (0.198) (0.718) (0.024) (0.212) (0.330) (0.223) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 0.004 -0.109*** -0.105* -0.092 -0.000 -0.021*** 0.011 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.039) (0.060) (0.065) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 -0.002* -0.010 -0.023* -0.035* -0.004** -0.017*** -0.047* -0.015 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.013) (0.019) (0.002) (0.006) (0.026) (0.020) 
L. NPL     0.463***    
     (0.167)    
L. Z-score      0.996***   
      (0.006)   
L. Liquid       1.280***  
       (0.180)  
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Table 6         
The relationship between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 and bank risk-taking in state-owned banks   
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NPL Z-score Liquid DL NPL Z-score Liquid DL 
L. DL        0.316*** 
        (0.063) 
_cons -0.195 -3.866*** 2.908* 4.177 -0.229* -2.039*** -1.020 4.166*** 
 (0.122) (1.107) (1.725) (4.426) (0.124) (0.544) (0.956) (0.830) 
N 182 185 185 169 143 146 146 130 
r2_a 0.701 0.911 0.417 0.214     
F 16.173 129.189 9.682 4.882     
AR(1)     0.073 0.001 0.008 0.082 
AR(2)     0.194 0.452 0.665 0.632 
Hansen(p-value)  1.000 0.794 0.888 0.654 
Notes: This table presents coefficients for the relationship between expected government support (EGS) and bank risk-taking in state-owned banks. The dependent variables 
are the NPL, Z-score, Liquid and DL in used to reflect individual bank's risk-taking behaviour. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑖,𝑡−1
 is the difference between bank’s 
long-term credit rating grades and financial strength ratings. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the dummy variable. This indicator with one for bank owned by government, and 0 
otherwise. The control variables include bank specific variables and macroeconomic variables. The models (1) to (3) are panel regressions with fixed effects during the 
period 2010 – 2016. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation 
has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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5.4.3 The relationship between expected government support and bank risk-taking 
in large banks 
The regression results using fixed effect panel estimations are shown in Panel A Table 7. 
The models 1 and 3 show that expected government support has a positive impact on non-
performance loan (β=0.002, ρ<0.01) and has a negative effect on liquid ratio (β=-0.017, 
ρ<0.01), which is consistent with the previous finding that expected government support 
would increase bank risk-taking behaviour. As Models 1 and 4 show, the dummy variable, 
large, has a positive impact on non-performance loan (β=0.03, ρ<0.01) and doubtful loan 
(β=0.031, ρ<0.05). This finding suggests that large banks tend to have lower capital ratios, 
less stable funding, and more exposure to potentially risky activities (Laeven et al., 2014). 
Additionally, we also support the view that bank with greater deposit inflow will take 
more risk in the future (Khan et al., 2016), and debtholders will monitor the bank risk-
taking behaviour as evidenced by liability (Acharya et al., 2016), and shareholders would 
like to shift the risk to debtholders by taking excessive risk (Peleg‐Lazar and Raviv, 
2017). 
Model 1, Table 7 further indicates that there is a significant positive interaction between 
the expected government support and the large dummy in affecting the ratio of the non-
performance loan (β=0.003, ρ<0.01). While model 3, shows that there is a negative 
interaction between the expected government support and the large dummy in affecting 
liquid ratio (β=-0.017, ρ<0.10). These results imply that governments are reluctant to 
allow large bank to fail, in order to reduce the probability of contagion of failure in the 
financial market (Elyasiani et al., 2014), and expected government support triggers the 
moral hazard behaviour that larger banks would like to take excessive risks in the 
expectation of government bailouts (Farhi and Tirole, 2012).  
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The models in Panel B using GMM measurement further show that there is a negative 
interaction between the expected government support and the large dummy in affecting 
the Z-score (β=-0.030, ρ<0.05) and there is a positive interaction in impacting the 
doubtful loan (β=0.082, ρ<0.42). Combining the results in Panel A and Panel B, it 
suggests that banks have a natural tendency to take excessive risk (Laeven et al., 2016), 
and the government guarantee provides more incentives for them to take risk (Anginer et 
al., 2014b) and decreases depositors’ incentives to monitor bank’s risk-taking (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). The findings support the hypothesis 3, and suggest that the 
positive relationship between expected government support and risk-taking behaviour is 
stronger in large banks.   
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Table 7       
The relationship between 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 and bank risk-taking in large banks 
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 NPL Z-score Liquid DL NPL Z-score Liquid DL 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.003*** 0.002 -0.017* -0.008 0.002** -0.030** -0.037* 0.082** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.014) (0.021) (0.042) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001* -0.006** -0.015** 0.026* 0.001* 0.019 0.011 0.041** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.003* 0.004 0.043 0.062* -0.004 -0.154* -0.142** 0.637** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.040) (0.036) (0.003) (0.083) (0.067) (0.322) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 -0.031** -0.192 -0.480** 0.557* -0.028* -0.094 -0.285** 1.938* 
 (0.014) (0.135) (0.212) (0.297) (0.014) (0.158) (0.133) (1.039) 
𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1 0.017 0.977*** 0.546 -0.771 0.071** -0.905*** 0.115 0.418 
 (0.029) (0.324) (0.453) (1.329) (0.033) (0.288) (0.535) (1.630) 
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 0.143** -11.464*** -1.307 -1.437 0.177*** -2.645*** -2.487* 14.956** 
 (0.063) (0.581) (0.869) (3.682) (0.068) (0.523) (1.496) (6.581) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡−1 -0.013 -0.201* -0.089 0.049 0.021 -0.070 0.337 1.677* 
 (0.014) (0.116) (0.184) (0.627) (0.015) (0.150) (0.326) (0.892) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 0.004 -0.103*** -0.111* -0.067 0.000 0.003 -0.024 0.118 
 (0.004) (0.038) (0.060) (0.064) (0.001) (0.011) (0.018) (0.074) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.001 -0.019** -0.017* -0.032* -0.004** -0.027*** -0.069* -0.148* 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) (0.019) (0.002) (0.004) (0.035) (0.082) 
L. NPL     0.378***    
     (0.114)    
L. Z-score      0.977***   
      (0.007)   
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Table 7-Continued   
 Panel A – Fixed Effect Panel B – GMM model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NPL Z-score Liquid DL NPL Z-score Liquid DL 
L. Liquid       0.217**  
       (0.109)  
L. DL        0.586*** 
        (0.119) 
_cons -0.169 -3.926*** 2.720 3.373 -0.131** -2.088*** 2.319* -16.363** 
 (0.118) (1.076) (1.819) (4.427) (0.062) (0.639) (1.257) (7.268) 
N 188 195 195 173 147 154 144 133 
r2_a 0.605 0.906 0.404 0.154     
F 39.763 484.568 8.405 5.515     
AR(1)     0.029 0.001 0.017 0.062 
AR(2)     0.222 0.445 0.413 0.783 
Hansen(p-value)     0.999 1.000 0.769 0.932 
Notes: This table presents coefficients for the relationship between expected government support (EGS) and bank risk-taking in big banks. The dependent variables are the 
NPL, Z-score, Liquid and DL in used to reflect individual bank's risk-taking behaviour. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑖,𝑡−1
 is the difference between bank’s long-term 
credit rating grades and financial strength ratings. 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
𝑖,𝑡−1
 is the dummy variable with one for the biggest quartile banks and zero otherwise. This indicator with one for 
bank owned by government, and 0 otherwise. The control variables include bank specific variables and macroeconomic variables. The models (1) to (3) are panel regressions 
with fixed effects during the period 2010 – 2016. The models (4) to (6) are dynamic panel models (GMM) with robust standard errors during the same period. The Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the 
instruments are not valid. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
This research analyses the impact of expected government support on bank risk-taking, 
and in particular how their impacts can be stronger in state-owned banks and large banks. 
Using 255 observations from 45 banks in China during the period 2010-2016, we find the 
willingness and capacity of government support enhance the bank’s risk-taking behaviour 
through increasing the non-performance loan as well as the doubtful loan, and decreasing 
the Z-score as well as the liquid ratio. This moral hazard problem is further enhanced in 
state-owned banks and large banks.  
Our analysis has important policy implications. From a wider government support 
perspective, we reveal that the implicit guarantee for banks considered by policymakers 
may send a signal of higher bailout expectation to banks, which raises moral hazard 
problems giving banks incentives to take excessive risk (Gropp et al., 2011; Dam and 
Koetter, 2012). Policymakers should reduce the size of expected support, and strengthen 
regulations on state-owned as well as large banks, in order to restrict the risk-taking 
behaviour. Moreover, the government should enhance the power of market discipline and 
improve banks’ stand-alone ratings to tackle the problems of “Too big to fail” and 
excessive risk-taking. More importantly, policymakers should implement explicit 
guarantee rather than implicit safety net, as implicit support may provide higher bailout 
expectations, which reduce the incentives of market discipline and increase the likelihood 
of moral hazard.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of macro-level and bank-
specific variables on banking performance in the emerging market (11 Asian countries) 
during the period 2000-2012. Furthermore, we look at the bank liquidity risk by focusing 
on banks’ undrawn loan commitment, and investigate whether deposit diversification and 
insurance could mitigate this risk, particularly during the financial crisis. Finally, we 
analyse whether expected government support could enhance bank risk-taking. This 
thesis is a novel contribution to the banking literature that analyses the determinant of 
bank performance, stability as well as risk-taking, and has substantial policy implications. 
The contribution initiated by investigating the impact of credit rating, bank regulation, 
supervision as well as investor protection on the performance, as estimated by cost 
inefficiency scores, in the emerging market (11 Asian countries) (chapter 2). Over last 
two decades, banks in emerging markets have developed dramatically, and encounter 
numerous challenges and opportunities, because of economic integration, 
internationalization and globalization. Although they are trying to improve their 
performance aiming to catch up with the banks in developed countries, their nature 
weakness that banks in emerging markets usually face large shocks is a stumbling block. 
The regime shifts, speculative bank runs, “hot money” flows and exchange rate volatility 
are a more likely influence their overall credit worthiness. (Khwaja and Mian, 2008). 
Therefore, it is important to analyse whether CRAs’ can monitor banks by addressing the 
issues related to high complexity and serious credit problems in the industry, when 
cooperating with Basel II regulations and investor protection.  
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In more detail, we have estimated bank cost inefficiency scores by employing a 
parametric methodology (SFA) in the emerging market during the period 2000-2012. In 
the nest stage, we have regressed these inefficiency scores by using fixed effect, dynamic 
panel model and a two-stage least squares instrumental variable model for the main three 
variables, such as credit rating, bank regulation and supervision, and investor protection. 
The first contribution is that we focus on the credit ratings assigned to an individual bank 
and extend the previous literature by focusing the monitoring impact of CRAs on bank 
performance, comparing this with the majority of previous papers57. The important result 
that credit rating has a negative impact on bank cost inefficiency, and suggests that credit 
ratings issued by credit rating agencies improve bank performance. Secondly, through 
investigating the interaction between CRAs and investor protection embodied in different 
institutional environments, as well as between CRAs and bank regulation, we not only 
enhance our understanding of the specific transmission mechanism related to CRAs, 
which helps to realize the impact of bank regulations and investor protection on bank 
performance. Our results suggest that credit ratings improve bank cost efficiency more 
when there is a higher investor protection embedded in the institutional environment in 
an emerging market, while strict bank regulation, as a relatively less flexible approach to 
monitor bank activities, can offset the benefits of credit in monitoring banks. Finally, we 
find an important result that credit ratings downgrade is consistent with the result of CRA 
that credit rating agencies can play a role as market discipline to improve bank 
performance, while credit ratings upgrade may show a “credit shopping” behaviour on 
the part of banks. The public policy implications that arise from this chapter are clear. 
                                                          
57 The previous literatures focus on the role of external credit ratings in different financial instruments 
such as corporate bonds (Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010; White, 2010), sovereign bonds (Hilscher and 
Nosbusch, 2010; Acharya et al., 2014), debt (Asquith, 2005) and loans (Hasan et al., 2014) and stock 
markets (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001).  
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From a wider governance perspective, we reveal that optimal public policy may not be 
achieved by too much bank regulation and discipline (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; 
Bruno and Claessens, 2010). It is clear that the banking sector could benefit from the 
monitoring of credit rating agencies with less strict bank regulation and supervision. 
Policy makers can enhance their overall investor protection quality for the purpose of 
further enhancing the benefits of CRAs in the banking sectors, if their economies are in 
weak institutional environments.  
In Chapter 3, we have analysed the impact of micro-level and bank-specific variables on 
the bank performance in the emerging market over the 2000-2012 period. The micro-level 
variables include two strategies such as market power and revenue diversification. The 
market power is measured by Lerner methodology, while revenue diversification is an 
accounting ratio. We place particular attention on these two strategies since there is no 
clear evidence or conclusion of whether these strategies have contributed to the 
underperformance of the banking industry.  Recent studies on the causes of the credit 
crunch have highlighted deregulation and excessive competition as factors that led to a 
financial sector meltdowns in the US and the UK (Llewellyn, 2007; Brunnermeier, 2009; 
Milne, 2009; OECD, 2011). It is interesting to investigate whether the relationship 
between banking market power, performance and stability has been affected after the 
outbreak of the recent financial crisis. Moreover, financial liberalisation also allows 
commercial banks to compete on a wider range of market segments (investment banking 
and market trading). While some previous papers suggest that combining traditional 
service with other earning activities could benefit from diversification and risk reduction, 
other literature put another forward that revenue diversification could increase the earning 
volatility. Thus, it is important to assess whether this strategy has a different impact on 
bank performance and stability.  
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In more detail, we have also estimated bank cost inefficiency scores by employing a 
parametric methodology (SFA) in the emerging market during the period 2000-2012. In 
the nest stage, we have regressed these inefficiency scores by using fixed effect, dynamic 
panel model, a two-stage least squares instrumental variable model and dynamic panel 
threshold model for the two main strategies. First, the important finding is that market 
power reduce bank cost inefficiency and has a negative relationship with Z-score. In other 
words, market power may attract managers pursue the maximization of profit and 
reduction of labor conflict at the expense of efficiency, but it provides incentives for 
managers to take excessive risk. Second, we find that revenue diversification reduces 
bank efficiency while it improves individual stability. When a bank expands a service in 
a new industry, it may use resources from its traditional activity and increase cost 
inefficiency, but the bank could be involved in non-profits activities to reduce its revenue 
volatility at the same time (Stiroh, 2006a; Stiroh, 2006b; Mercieca et al., 2007; Lepetit et 
al., 2008; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012). Furthermore, our findings further 
suggest that market power and revenue diversification should be simultaneously 
employed as a bundle to improve bank efficiency and stability. Both regulatory and 
institutional environmental factors are considered in our models. An important result 
threshold analysis reveals is that the positive impact of market power, measured by the 
Lerner index, on bank performance is more pronounced for banks in a high regime, while 
the negative impact of revenue diversification on bank efficiency is more pronounced for 
banks in a high regime. Regarding the stability, the negative effect of market power is 
more pronounced for banks that fall below a threshold market power value, while the 
positive impact of revenue diversification is more pronounced for banks that rise above a 
threshold value. These findings provide some important implications for bank managers 
and regulators in emerging markets. First, bank managers can expand their market power 
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to improve performance while enhancing bank’s ability for risk-tolerance through 
diversifying non-interest activities. As financial liberalisation increases in an emerging 
market, to prevent the competition from foreign banks, managers consolidate market 
power through merger and acquisition. Simultaneously, managers should expand services 
in not-profit activity in order to offset portfolio risk caused by market power. First, to 
protect the domestic small bank with lower market power, regulators adopt a more 
cautious approach to put in place a certain level of entry restriction for foreign bank 
entrants. Second, regulators should adjust an appropriate capital requirement and 
encourage banks to diversify their non-interest activities instead of only focusing on 
traditional lending services. However, regulators still need to issue some regulations to 
restrict larger banks’ activities, since the institutional environment in an emerging market 
is little far from complete, which may provider a wrong incentive to take excessive risk. 
Finally, policymakers should encourage financial innovation among banks, based on 
prudential regulation to allow resource allocation within an economy effectively, in order 
to expand their services, reduce non-performance loan and economies of scale. 
In Chapter 4, we find that the negative impact of unfunded loan commitments on bank 
liquidity is significant when banks are in a stressed financial condition. Evidence from 
G7 and BRICS countries suggests that this impact can be mitigated by deposit 
diversification while exacerbated by deposit insurance, over the period 2005-2014. We 
put emphasis on the four main dependent variables such as the interest rate, deposit inflow, 
lending amount and liquid ratio as proxies for bank liquidity, and investigate whether 
these indicators are affected by undrawn loan commitments as well as how these effects 
are mitigated by deposit diversification or insurance. Unfunded loan commitment is that 
a bank provides the firm with loan funds when the firm faces a liquidity shortfall, and a 
bank charges a commitment fee as compensation for the firm in exchange. A firm can 
244 
 
  
reduce the cost of holding cash by employing this credit commitment (Sufi, 2009), while 
a bank may use this to enhance liquidity and reduce the cost of finding a borrower 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Acharya et al., 2013a). However, the period 2007-2009 
was a crisis of banks as liquidity providers, and banks suffered huge withdrawals from 
deposit accounts as well as tightened lending (Brunnermeier, 2009; Covitz et al., 2013). 
Consequently, under great pressure of the liquidity demand from firms that had pre-
existing credit commitments with banks, banks had to increase their deposit rates, faced 
low deposit inflow, reduced lending and liquid asset (Acharya and Mora, 2015). This 
liquidity risk of commitments-exposed banks are simply transformed to insolvency 
problem. Hence, the investigation of unfunded loan commitments on the liquidity of 
banks becomes predominantly relevant in the context of this thesis.  
In more detail, we have regressed the unfunded loan commitment ratio by employing 
fixed effect and dynamic panel model with interest rate, deposit inflow, lending amount 
and liquid ratio. We find that there is great potential liquidity risk for banks with the pre-
exiting commitment during the recent financial crisis, since they suffer from higher 
interest rate, lower deposit inflow, decreasing lending and lower liquid ratio. In the next 
stage, an important finding is that deposit diversification can mitigate the negative impact 
of undrawn loan commitment on the four main variables (interest rate, deposit inflow, 
lending amount and liquid ratio). It means that diversification may offer an additional 
channel for banks to access funding (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013), and to reduce the impact of liquidity demand risk during the crisis by decreasing 
the cost of funding, increasing the funding inflow, maintaining the total amount of loan 
lending and enhancing the liquid ratio. However, another important result is that banks 
with deposit insurance may be more likely to suffer liquidity demand risk than those 
without this safety net, and the “moral hazard” effect of deposit insurance on liquidity 
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risk may be greater than the “stabilization effect” during the crunch. Although deposit 
insurance could restore depositor confidence and avert panic in the banking sector 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Karas et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014b), this safety 
net can exacerbate moral hazard problems in the banking sector by incentivizing banks to 
take on excessive risk (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2013; Shapiro 
and Skeie, 2015). These results have some important implications for regulators and 
policy makers. As the deposit diversification plays an important role in mitigating the 
liquidity risk caused by credit commitments during the crisis, it seems imperative that 
regulators should put emphasis on this strategy that allows banks to adjust their bearing 
capacity of liquidity and reduces an authority’s pressure on government borrowing 
(Disyatat, 2011; Kang 2013; García-Kuhnert et al., 2015). Comparing with previous 
papers (e.g., Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Gorton and Metrick, 2013; Anginer et al., 2014b; 
Shapiro and Skeie, 2015), we find that deposit insurance may operate in exactly the 
opposite direction and loses its benefit, which causes banks to become risky during a 
crisis. Although Basel III may provide a better liquidity regulation such as a liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) to handle liquidity risk, regulators should encourage banks to set 
up an “internal monitoring standard” (deposit diversification standard) to increase 
funding sources. This “internal monitoring standard” can be treated as an alternative 
scheme for banks to deal with liquidity risk, in case LCR follows the old path as the 
lender-of-last-resort, and deposit insurance.    
In chapter 5, we analyse whether expected government support could enhance bank risk-
taking. In chapter 4, we find that the ‘moral hazard’ effect of explicit government support 
is significant in the banking sector. Thus, we want to investigate whether an implicit 
guarantee could trigger a ‘moral hazard’ problem, particularly in normal times. We put 
emphasis on the four main dependent variables such as the non-performance loan, Z-score, 
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doubtful loan and liquid ratio as proxies for bank risk-taking behaviour, and investigate 
whether these indicators are affected by expected government support as well as how 
these effects are enhanced in state-owned and large banks. The explicit and implicit 
government support are the cornerstone of financial market and protect the investors and 
creditors (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Schich and Lindh, 2012; Anginer et al., 2014). 
However, these guarantees may weaken the market discipline carried out by depositors 
and creditors (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004), and motivate banks to take excessive 
risks shifting the agent problem from the bank’s creditors to the regulators (Cooper and 
Ross, 2002), and lead banks to trigger competitive distortions (Gropp et al., 2011). More 
importantly, the implicit guarantee may send a wrong signal of higher bailout expectation 
to banks, and this expectation would possibly provide incentives for banks to take 
excessive risk (Dam and Koetter, 2012). Over risk-taking increases bank fragility and 
may reduce financial market stability. Thus, it is important to analyse the impact of 
expected government support on bank risk-taking.       
In more detail, following the studies (e.g. Gropp et al., 2011; Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 
2014; Correa et al., 2014), we employ the difference between the bank all-in rating and 
stand-alone rating, to reflect the capacity and willingness of government support. For the 
all-in rating, Moody’s takes into account the expected support from regional government 
and national government (Moody's, 2007b). The stand-alone rating, the financial strength 
ratings (BFSR) reflects a bank’s ability to repay its financial obligation without 
government expected support (Moody's, 2007a). We have regressed the expected 
government support by employing fixed effect and dynamic panel model with the non-
performance loan, Z-score, doubtful loan and liquid ratio. We find that the willingness 
and capacity of government support enhances bank’s risk-taking behaviour through 
increasing the non-performance loan as well as the doubtful loan, and decreasing the Z-
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score as well as the liquid ratio. This moral hazard problem is further enhanced in state-
owned banks and large banks. These results have some important implications for 
regulators and policy makers. From a wider government support perspective, we reveal 
that the implicit guarantee for banks considered by policymakers may send a signal of 
higher bailout expectation to banks, which may trigger moral hazard problems giving 
banks the incentives to take excessive risk (Gropp et al., 2011; Dam and Koetter, 2012). 
Policymakers should reduce the size of expected support, and strengthen regulations on 
state-owned as well as large banks, in order to restrict the risk-taking behaviour. Moreover, 
the government should enhance the power of market discipline and improve banks’ stand-
alone ratings to tackle the problems of “Too big to fail” and excessive risk-taking. More 
importantly, policymakers should implement explicit guarantee rather than the implicit 
safety net, as implicit support may provide higher bailout expectations, which reduce the 
incentives for market discipline and increase the likelihood of moral hazard.   
This thesis has showed a comprehensive research on the macro-level and bank-specific 
determinants of the bank performance and stability including the crisis, but there are 
remain some limitations and challenges for future research. Previous papers have 
discussed in detail, which methodology is most appropriate for estimating bank 
performance. In this thesis, we use cost inefficiency as bank performance measured by a 
structural method (SFA). We also consider the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, which 
allows measurement of inefficiency from the best-practice frontier in a single-step 
estimation to run the robustness test. However, in this thesis, we do not employ a non-
parametric method, such as DEA, to measure bank performance and further test the 
impact of the macro-level as well as bank-specific variables on bank performance. The 
main strength of DEA is that this methodology does not require priori information on 
functional forms (cost functions). In addition, there is low likelihood of estimation bias 
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on inefficiency scores. However, the main disadvantage of DEA is that it cannot 
distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic shocks in the estimation of 
efficiency scores. In future research, it would be an interesting point to measure efficiency 
scores and further tests for robustness.    
Additionally, because of data limitations, we have only looked in Chapter 2 at the four 
main regulatory variables on bank performance in an emerging market. Therefore, a 
further investigation would enable the examination of the impact of all regulatory 
variables on the performance of banks in a global market. This is interesting research 
because regulators have implemented Basel III regulation on banking activity, and capital 
and liquid requirements, after the latest global crisis. In future research, we will not only 
analyse the external monitoring standard (CRA), but also consider the internal monitoring 
standard, such as bank corporate governance and ownership control. In Chapter 3, we 
have only used the non-interest income as diversification because of data limitations in 
BankScope and Compustar. Hence, further research would analyse in which country non-
interest income has been generated, and consider the country’s regulatory and 
institutional environment at the same time. Then, we can consider financial integration 
and international business in the banking sector. In Chapter 4, we focus on the liquidity 
risk in G7 and BRICS countries (1200 observations), since a lot of annual reports of banks 
do not show this part of the off balance sheet and have language limitations. Therefore, 
since the recent financial crisis has had a huge impact on the European economy, further 
research will focus on the liquidity risk of banks in European countries, in order to analyse 
whether this liquidity risk is a contagion in an economic union. In chapter 5, because of 
data limitations, we focus on the period from 2010 to 2016. In future research, we will 
consider the impact of implicit government support on bank stability during the crisis. 
Furthermore, as China implement explicit government support (deposit insurance) in 
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2016, we will investigate whether the explicit government support could be more 
effective than the implicit guarantee.  
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